University of Alberta

Figuring Inventions: Education in the Wake of the Postmodern

by

Gae L. Mackwood ©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled *Figuring Inventions: Education in the Wake of the Postmodern* submitted by Gae L. Mackwood in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

As of this millennial year (2000), educational research discourses have been profoundly, if unevenly, impacted by poststructural and postmodern ideas. Part I of "Figuring Inventions: Education in the Wake of the Postmodern" begins "in the wake" of the postmodern, considering it perhaps even deceased, in order to investigate and analyze its impact on education discourses. In a field currently characterized as awash in paradigm "proliferation," Jean-Francois Lyotard's (1971) notion of *the figural* is used to explain how orders of thinking (or educational research methodologies) are intimately *relational*, but never simply *plural*. Instead, Lyotard describes the figural as a blocking together of incommensurates, an *interruption* of one order by another, an *inability to see or understand* one order from the perspective of another. The figural is therefore an inherently *ethical* imperative, as Spivak notes, to consider the future anterior or what is rendered "other" by the construction of our educational discourses.

In Part II, Lyotard's notion of the figural is performed through four essay-style analyses of educational discourses which claim (in various ways) to be innovative or even postmodern in their approach: qualitative research, narrative studies in teacher education and teacher research, critical studies of education, and studies of race and epistemological racism in education. Each essay performs a critique of these current discourses, but also explores what is rendered "figural" or incomprehensible by the very dominance of these discourses, suggesting alternative and potentially more poststructural paths little-noticed by the mainstream of educational researchers. By instead writing what is *figural for* the current mainstream of "alternative" educational research methods, "Figuring Inventions" serves to re-open discussion on the potential and future of poststructural and postmodern discourses in education.

Acknowledgements

The first time I ever dared to think of myself as a "writer," as working on "a book," it was the late 1980s and I was developing social studies texts and teachers' guides. I learned very quickly what a large group of people come together (in many and various ways) in the production of a text – and this thesis has only served to reinforce that truism.

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CONTENTS

Introduction 1
- Writing the Invention 2

Part I

Postmodernism, Postmodernity, the Postmodern: Inside and Outside Educational Discourse 5
- *Where* is the Postmodern? 6
- Body Guards: Examining the Corpus 7
- Prophets/Profits of Apocalypse Now 8
- (Con)figurations of the Postmodern: Contradictions "in the Wake" 10
- Figuring the Postmodern 12
- Figural and Form: Examples of the Figural 19
- The Stakes of the Figural: Indeterminate Judgement 23

Part II

Flight Lines as Transformations: An Anti-Genealogy 31
- Deleuzian Lines/Rhizomatic Flights 33

Art in Education, Education as Art: The Utility of the Aesthetic in (Post)Modern Education 36
- The Art of the Sublime: (Ab)use of the Aesthetic 38
- Eisner's "Enlightened"/(Enlightenment) Eye 39
- Functional Figuring: Articulating the Teacher as Artist 43
- Possibilities for Art and Aesthetics in Education: from Nostalgia to Invention 47
- Aesthetics as Nostalgia: Continue to Represent the Object 49
- Aesthetics (Re)figured: Don't Represent, *Invent* 50

Unlearning the 3R's (Relativism, Realism and Reflection): Narrative as Figural 55
- Opening Narrative 56
- I Relativism: The Never-Ending Tale 57
- II Realism: Let it Tell its Own Tale 61
- III Romanticism: Looking Back to See the Tale... 63
- IV Narrative as Figural 72
- Narrative as Witnessing in a Crisis of Representation 74

Occasioning Relations: Writing History as Deferred Action 83
- Who's Afraid of the Post? 84
- History as Return 88
- Changing Signs of History 90
- Freudian Temporality: Deferred Action 92
- Deferred Action: Trauma 94
- Deferred Action: Repetition 96
- Critical and "Post" Studies of Education: A Narrative of Deferred Action 97
- Conclusion 100

Race, Singularity, Context: Reading Epistemology in Tyler's *Rationale* 103
- Epistemological Racism Revisited 104
- The Tyler *Rationale* Revisited 105
- Reading the Aporias of Structuralism in Tyler 108
- Context, Subject, Iterability 110
- Conditions of Possibility: For a Different Reading ... 112
- Singularity, Force, Context 116

Introduction

INVENTING THE DISSERTATION

"The Moribund Curriculum Field: Its Wake and Our Work"

title, Dwayne Huebner, *Curriculum Inquiry* 6:2 (1976).

Graduate students in curriculum often look to curriculum theorists to provide ... guidance. School officials have tended to stop looking to us for guidance; many dismiss us with the cynical disenchantment of a disappointed lover. The view of the practitioner is often antitheoretical: "If I can't use it, it's worthless." In hard times like the present ones, curriculum theory can seem an ornament, nice to have around if you can afford it but hardly necessary.

William Pinar and Madeleine Grumet, "Socratic Caesura and the Theory-Practice Relationship" 92-3, *Contemporary Curriculum Discourses*, 1988.

It is always necessary to begin again in order finally to arrive at the beginning, and reinvent invention.

Jacques Derrida, "Psyche: Inventions of the Other" in Waters and Godzich, eds. *Reading de Man Reading*, 1989 (trans. Catherine Porter),

It has perhaps become customary in writing a text on the postmodern (and in this case, on the postmodern in education) to begin with the exordial "you-are-there," climatic disaster report from the frontiers of the apocalypse. Markets always exist for dire prophesies, whether they report rapidly-changing social conditions requiring (begging) for new (and better) 'post' theorizing, or the state of confusion of a field hopelessly enamoured of the pompous dogma and cryptic theoretical language of 'post' illuminati. The postmodern in education is indeed "deeply unsettling," (Lather 1991, 1) a "conflict-ridden terrain" full of apostles and vandals (Giroux 1991, 17).

While measuring the distance between those espousing the virtue or vice of the postmodern in education may seem an insurmountable task, both these polemics seem equally invested in the concept of *invention*. Reactionaries busily caress their despair by assuming the postmodern is inventive (and therefore dangerous), releasing spores of new theoretical jargon to the winds, and distracting us from the pragmatics of real school study and reform. Those on the left (and some liberals) desire and demand the postmodern's inventiveness, hoping to cast previous paradigms quietly aside like a failed housing development or a bunch of faded Vegas entertainers. If the postmodern in education is anything, it must be inventive to hold its audience; it must evoke endings which prompt new beginnings, novelty in the face of tradition, the future to save us from the present and the past. As inventive, invention, the postmodern in education indeed indicates as Henry Giroux (1991, ibid) suggests, "something important is being fought over...new forms of social discourse are being constructed at a time when the intellectual, political and cultural boundaries of the age are being refigured..."

Giroux's references to "refiguration" and "construction" are significant in defining in what way the postmodern is inventive. Invention implies not discovery, finding or coming upon something which existed previously but was not well known (such as the European "discovery" of America); rather, invention is productive -- it produces, or constructs "the new." In this light, invention is tekhné, a type of know-how or technical machine which orders components or materials, configures a lexicon or set of elements in order to produce a completely new artifact or effect. Invention also differs from creating or creation, which carries (religious) connotations of creating from nothing, developing some-thing out of a void rather than configuring or refiguring a prior set of elements. The process of figuring a self would be a prime example of invention: re-writing and re-viewing elements of experience to produce a new configuration of the self, or in Mary Catherine Bateson's title, *Composing a Life* (Bateson, 1990). In a similar capacity, a dissertation is an invention of the self, and also of a discourse (in my case, on the postmodern in education) which recombines and reworks (re-visions) a particular set of prior references and research to produce something "new."

To continue Giroux's reference further, other examples of refiguration (intellectual, cultural, and political inventions) of the postmodern are easily drawn. We are certainly bombarded with the new technological inventions of the electronic media, virtually instant telecommunications, and the computer technology fuelling an information-based society; these inventions built upon previous component technologies and such convergence will likely continue. Beyond "hardware," however, lie the "softer" inventive technologies of ideas and systems of organization in our day: post-Fordism, globalization, and increased corporate and transnational economic control. We experience inventions of nation and culture in the former Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, two Germanys, and in Northern Ireland and Hong Kong. In education, we seem to be continually re-inventing schools, and even "reinventing" reform. In schools and in society, racism, sexism, classism, ageism and homophobia are inventions of the Other acting to shore up boundaries of the Same. Lest we consider these "softer" types of inventions less significant, Edward Said reminds us that although the academic and social theory of Orientalism was "only" invention, "only" fictitious, it mobilized a whole economy and extensive political relationships with "real-life" consequences.[1]

Writing the Invention

What else am I going to be able to invent?

> ...Imagine if you will, a speaker daring to address his hosts in these terms. He thus seems to appear before them without knowing what he is going to say; he declares rather insolently that he is setting out to improvise. ...But simultaneously he seems to be implying, not without presumptuousness, that the improvised speech will constantly remain unpredictable, that is to say, as usual, "still" new, original, unique -- in a word, inventive. And in fact, by having at least invented something with his very first sentence, such an orator would be breaking the rules, would be breaking with convention, etiquette, the rhetoric of modesty, in short, with all the conditions of social interaction. An invention always presupposes some illegality, the breaking of an implicit contract; it inserts a disorder into the peaceful ordering of things, it disregards the proprieties.

---

[1] See Edward Said's *Orientalism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 5-6 for a discussion of how discursively creating "the Orient" mobilized an entire academic and political economy for the West.

> ...[the] politics of invention is always at one and the same time a politics of culture and a politics of war."
>
> Jacques Derrida, "Psyche: Inventions of the Other," tr. Catherine Porter, in *Reading deMan Reading*, ed. Lindsay Waters and Wlad Godwich (1989, 25)

While this dissertation writes a particular configuration and invention of the postmodern in/for education, a dissertation itself is institutionally obligated to *perform* inventively. Such obligations are often set according to the conventions of (paradigm) death and generational succession: the postmodern ought to re-new (aging) educational theorizing, and the dissertation ought to re-new and refresh its discipline, add an "original" contribution. But how is invention to transform theorizing, or a discipline? Under what conditions does the postmodern or the dissertation perform invention? In his essay "Psyche: Inventions of the Other" (1989), Jacques Derrida moves beyond the conventional organic metaphors of death and rebirth to ask instead after the invention of invention, or of how invention functions as transformational re-writing.

For Derrida, there are always certain paradoxes (aporias) which are put into play through the work of invention.[2] The obvious dilemma of invention is that it must simultaneously affirm a tradition of common conventions which it manipulates, figures, and yet as Derrida comments, invention is also pledged to illegality, to breaking these rules and conventions in order to be considered "original" (Derrida in Waters and Godzich 1989, 25). The dissertation, as institutional form, presents itself as an occasion of judgement between traditions and transgressions, but also of which transgressions are necessary to keep traditions, which rule-breaking acts service and enhance the tradition.[3] Here we would think of the transgressions necessary to return a tradition to its "roots," to examine its structure and identity.[4] What can the postmodern say to education? How does education address the postmodern? How can these communiques be seen other-wise -- than simply the "new" postmodern addressing "old" educational theorizing?

But beyond the obvious, invention generates significant aporias around the presentation of invention, around the address of invention and the address necessary for invention. Invention can never be purely private or exclusively singular, for this would render it simply untranslateable. But nor can invention rely purely on its content to be judged as invention, as "original". Derrida points out that legal texts define as property only the form and composition of an author or inventor's work (ibid, 27). Ideas, as they say, are free. The dissertation as institutional form then, is necessary to its functioning as inventive, as invention. This significant attention to form designates the technical, almost machine-like quality of invention necessary to paradoxically "announce" itself as innovative, "produce" itself as original. Through form, invention is oddly enough rendered machine-like, and yet this "machine" produces the coming of something "new" in a "first time" or "original" event (ibid, 28). In this way, form serves to announce the invention through/as an inaugural event. By institutional convention, the dissertation announces and inaugurates a contribution to its field or discipline, heralding the coming of new knowledge. The dissertation must present itself as a productive capacity, in this case, a postmodern "engine," creating for the future a "possibility or a power that will remain at the disposal of everyone" (ibid). Only in its productive capacity is invention understood as invention; and yet this is a great distance away from the common understanding of invention as an original idea created from the mind of private genius.

---

[2] My use of the word "work" carries connotations outlined by Derrida in his *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). To "work" a frame (in our case, a frame of invention, or production) is to make it work, to let it work, and also to make work for it. Invention both works, and makes work for itself (in the sense invention heralds itself as a productive force).

[3] In his interrogation of reason ("The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils," *diacritics* 19 (1983), 3-20), Derrida again debunks the fear his work is simply a nihilistic destruction of the principle of reason. Instead, he suggests asking questions ("Is the reason for reason rational?) reminiscient of immanent critique is an obligation to the principle of reason, and to western philosophy itself. He asks on page 9, "Who is more faithful to reason's call, who hears it with a keener ear, who better sees the difference, the one who offers questions in return and tries to think through the possibility of that summons, or the one who does not want to hear any question about the reason of reason?".

[4] Michel Foucault, in addressing issues of tradition, transgression and "return" suggests such returns to the tradition are fundamentally incited by an omission or "gap" fundamental to every discourse. This "gap" functions, paradoxically, to both return to the tradition in order necessarily to transform it, to keep the tradition "alive" and continuously functioning. See Michel Foucault, "What is an author?" *in Language, Countermemory, Practice*, trans. Donald Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 134-5. For an expanded discussion of how poststructuralism functions in this way as a "return" to modernist critical studies of education, see the final essay in this text.

The importance of invention's form, its ability to announce originality, and in particular the demand for invention to be productive raises a final, and often overlooked question of invention (and dissertation): who or what is (rendered) the other of invention? While invention must produce for the future, this future must never be reduced to a future present. Who is the reader of an invention/ dissertation? How is the reader inscribed into the text of invention/dissertation? These questions must remain forever open, for as Spivak (1993, 22) reminds us, "...the audience is a blank. ...[It] can be constituted by people I cannot even imagine." For all that is invested in invention/dissertation(/self), for all the desire it become generative and productive, it absolutely must be haunted by the future anterior -- what has been left unsaid, unchosen, un-invented. As Spivak notes, "Could (and therefore will) there have been a ...?" What invention (and I, as dissertation writer) cannot imagine must stand a watchful post over every single one of our productions.

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Part I

POSTMODERNISM, POSTMODERNITY, THE POSTMODERN: INSIDE AND OUTSIDE EDUCATIONAL DISCOURSE

...it was conservative politics, it was subversive politics, it was the return of tradition, it was the final revolt of tradition, it was the unmooring of patriarchy, it was the reassertion of patriarchy...

Anne Friedberg, 1988, cited in Hutcheon, *The Politics of Postmodernism*, 1991, 13

The time is out of joint.

Hamlet Act I Sc. V

I have often had occasion to define deconstruction as that which is -- far from a theory, a school, a method, even a discourse, still less a technique that can be appropriated -- at bottom *what happens or comes to pass* [ce qui arrive]. It remains then to situate, localize, determine what happens with what happens, *when* it happens. To date it. Has deconstruction happened? Has it arrived? Of course it has, if you like, but then, if it has, so many questions arise: How? Where? When? On what date exactly? Was it so long ago, already? Or perhaps not yet?

Jacques Derrida, "The Time is Out of Joint," in *Deconstruction Is/In America*, ed. Anselm Haverkamp, (New York: New York University Press) 1995, 17.

As you know, I made use of the word "postmodern": it was but a provocative way to put the struggle into the foreground of the field of knowledge. Postmodernity is not a new age, it is the rewriting of some features modernity had tried or pretended to gain.... But such a rewriting, as has already been said, was for a long time active in modernity itself.

Lyotard, "Rewriting Modernity" *SubStance* 54, (1987), 8-9

Dates, timetables, property registers, place-names, all the codes that we cast like nets over time and space -- in order to reduce or master differences, to arrest them, determine them –

Derrida, "Aphorism Countertime" in *Acts of Literature*, (New York: Routledge), 1992, p.

Political power...entails the power of self-description. ...achieving an understanding of political justice may require that we first arrive at an understanding of making and unmaking. As in an earlier century the most searing questions of right and wrong were perceived to be bound up with questions of "truth," so in the coming time these same, still-searing questions of right and wrong must be reperceived as centrally bound up with questions about "fictions." Knowledge about the character of creating and created objects is at present in a state of conceptual infancy.

Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1985, 279

Where is the Postmodern?: The *Situation* of the Postmodern: Death, Corpus, Definitions, and Things Crepuscular -- A Time for Hauntings

The postmodern is often considered a condition (Lyotard, 1984) saturated with endings, including perhaps its own (see, for example, Stanley Fish's claim that deconstruction is 'dead' because it is now everywhere[1]). Within education, the prognoses for postmodern discourses are astoundingly mixed; the postmodern is said to be "new,"and yet others proclaim it "ended," "exhausted."[2] For many education writers, the "post" of the postmodern seemingly cannot be situated; is the postmodern at the starting post, the finishing post, or past the post (potentially, the "last post" played at a funeral)? And what implications of its life (or death) are there for education? While the debate over the life or death of the postmodern in education may turn on deeply invested desires to promote or extinguish its effects upon traditional disciplinary practices, the seductiveness of its influence is without question. After all, to speak in such animated[3] terms about *theory* seems uncannily odd: derived from the Greek *theorein*, to look at, theory seems rather *inanimate*, a form of speculative knowledge surely far removed from the fleshy issues of life and death.[4]

As a reiteration of this conflict-ridden postmodern, this particular text must then *open* with a *wake*. Specifically, this text is veined with *three* wakes. *In the wake of* death announcements, perhaps *in the wake of* the postmodern itself (if we accept as honest the claim it is "dead"), we are situated in the turbulent, boiling disciplinary waters churned up as postmodern theorizing has moved "through" education. Now that the postmodern (as "fad") has checked into that great intertextuality in the sky, what *next*? There are recent calls to re-invent the subject, re-institute the author, re-establish the materiality of the world *in the wake of* the postmodern, poststructuralism, and deconstruction (Wexler, 1995; Foster 1996).

But perhaps things have not "progressed" so far. Perhaps we are still *at* the wake, standing next to the florid bouquets surrounding the corpus which is *not yet* flaccid and watery, too puerile *yet* to be melting like a Dali clock into the silky pillows of its pall. Perhaps we are still "at home," keeping vigil over the postmodern corpse, delusionally attempting to avert its inevitable fall into the mortician's gloved clutch. As friends or visitors, we arrive to "pay our respects," but also to *place in memory* our experiences with the postmodern, to *pause over the corpse/corpus* and reflect on its achievements and failures, its purpose, its meanings.

---

[1] M. Stephens, "Jacques Derrida,"*New York Times Magazine*, January 23, 1994, 22-25. In education, the claim that the postmodern has been (or should be) *transcended* has been taken up by Philip Wexler in Richard Smith and Philip Wexler, eds., *After Postmodernism: Education, Politics and Identity* (London: Falmer Press, 1995). Henry Giroux at times has commented on this reductionism as "postmodern backlash," calling it "both disturbing and irresponsible in its refusal to engage postmodernism in any kind of dialogical, theoretical debate...any attempt to engage the value and importance of postmodern discourses critically is sacrificed to the cold winter winds of orthodoxy and intellectual parochialism." See Giroux, "Series Forward" to *Education and the Postmodern Condition*, ed. Michael Peters (Westport, Conn: Bergin and Garvey, 1995), xii; ix-xvii. Derrida himself humorously comments in a 1994 seminar, "For more than twenty-five years, in fact, we have been told that deconstruction is dying or that it is 'on the wane'" (Derrida, "The Time is Out of Joint", in Anselm Haverkamp, ed., *Deconstruction is/in America* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 30; 14-38.)

[2] Norman Denzin suggests poststructural and postmodern approaches constitute a "new sensibility" (1994, 501). But Philip Wexler devotes his *After Postmodernism* (1996) to asking the question of what comes *after* postmodernism. George Marcus, in the Denzin and Lincoln's *Handbook on Qualitative Research* suggests the postmodern is itself in a "post" state (1994, 563).

[3] I mean to imply two senses of *animated* here: to be excited, anxious, *invested*, and also to be *alive*, conscious, *embodied*, sentient.

[4] Wlad Godzich, in his introduction to Paul de Man's *The Resistance to Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986, xii-xiv), reminds us that the Greeks did not oppose theory to praxis but rather to *aesthesis*, the latter constituting the sensual, "animal" pleasures of the flesh.

And yet the corpus of the postmodern might even be a *twitching*case of mis-taken identity, merely *sleeping* and *ready* to *awaken* or re-awaken. Perhaps the postmodern has simply gone into stasis, a kind of presumptuous complacency or repetitive, ho-hum middle age, and requires the glistening-wet-steel taste of electrotherapy to jerk, spasm, and live again. Here we would gather to *defend* the postmodern and its workings in education, to *guarantee* its health and vitality *for the future*. There is also, of course, the possibility (inadmissable in some quarters of the education field) that the postmodern is just *simply awake*, conscious, animate, conducting its affairs despite the rumours of its impending or actual death.

How do we read these texts of corpulent fleshiness, of sentient embodiment that ascribe such disasters of *organic* proportion to the postmodern? And in particular, *what does it mean to anthropomorphize or personify a theory*? While animating the postmodern "body" renders its "growth" or "demise" a simple rhetorical function, perhaps there is also a sense of recalling, re-membering "theory" back to a bodily, sensual life that cannot be "textualized" away. In *Bodies That Matter*, Judith Butler describes this as a desire to conflate a body/theory opposition with a nature/culture or an organic/constructed opposition.[5] Butler wonders why in our everyday concepts we seem only able to dichotomize bodies away from constructing/theorizing, rather than asking how bodies are constructed, or how constructions are materialized. Instead, she argues, we view construction, making, theorizing as possessing an *artificial* character, antithetical to fleshy bodies which seem to just *exist*. How then can the postmodern, postmodern "theory" be a "body"? And to what ends?

Body Guards: Examining the Corpus

As Elaine Scarry's quote at the beginning of this chapter suggests, knowledge of making, creating, and created objects (Derrida would prefer the term "invention") in relation to bodies is presently in its conceptual infancy (Scarry 1985, 280). Scarry provides a brilliant analysis of making, invention, as a *projection* of *sentient desire*, the need to animate the inanimate (ibid., 281). In particular, she discusses examples of how the material "factness" of the body is "borrowed" to lend cultural constructs a sense of certainty or "reality" (ibid.,14). This desire to "borrow" or *suture* "body" onto the postmodern and postmodern theorizing is certainly not without unambiguous consequences, for as Scarry points out, the body can be relocated to lend virile credence to failing ideologies (ibid., 14, 124-133) *or* utilized to *reduce* culture/theories to a sentient (and sometimes frail, uncomfortable) bodily existence (ibid., 45-48, 53-54).

Possessing a body creates, among other things, a sense of *order* and this sense appears initially as primarily *spatial*. Jane Gallop refers to the desire to engage in *body reading*, to make *sense* of one's idiosyncratic body shape and one's peculiar physical tastes and distastes, as a desire to reduce these embarrassing "bodliy enigmas" to a consistent "style" (Gallop 1988, 12-13). Judith Butler suggests the body is a set of boundaries, politically maintained; she utilizes Julia Kristeva's notion of the *abject* to contend how the naturalized notion of the body demands that bodies be *intact* and *stable*, that orifices not leak, that "inside" and "outside" be clearly demarcated (Butler 1990, 132-133).[6] Such ordering produces a body as material fact, but also as *object*: the postmodern "as" body then becomes a *body of knowledge*, an object of knowledge that is recognizable as coherent and boundaried. The reported "death" of the postmodern functions even more so to construct the postmodern as an object of knowledge; as Derrida suggests, the work of mourning the dead always attempts to ontologize the remains, *identifying* the bodily remains and *localizing* the dead, *keeping* it in its place (Derrida 1994, 9). As a localizable and intact object, the postmodern body of knowledge is also *nameable*, and again the rhetoric of death reveals the power of this name to recall the dead body as intact and whole, even after its demise and the effacement of its boundaries as it leaks into decay (Derrida 1986, 48-50).

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[5] Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York: Routledge, 1993), ix-xi. I would add there is also generally a conflation between body/theory and synchronic/diachronic temporal states. In general, the body is understood as synchronic: it seems static, unchanging, "simply" there and "simply" material. Theory seems diachronic, historical, moving from one "trend" or "fad" to the next.

Like scientists, those secular priests of the Enlightenment, we *could* choose to display the postmodern as such a spatial body, demarcate neat and clean boundaries for *anatomical study*. Conceiving of the postmodern *as body* allows us to "work over" the corpus, dissect it, put it under the microscope, pin it as a butterfly to a board, but above all make of it a *public object for view*. As *object*, the postmodern body is *available for view by a reigning subject*, a separation which puts under erasure the process of *conceiving* and *constructing* the postmodern in the first instance. Foucault (1979) described well this *technology* of the *examination*, how the *assumption* of a fully separate and autonomous subject serves to (anonymously) endorse the assumed presence of "objects" for the subject's observation and understanding. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a body from a viewing position *other than* over the corpse, separated from and superior to the subject's apparently distant existence.

Prophets/Profits of Apocalypse Now

While possessing a body creates a sense of spatial order, of intact anatomies with determinate bodily parts and functions, enfleshing the postmodern *as body* creates a particular *temporal* order as well. Conceived as sentient, the postmodern as all bodies must "follow this and come to dust,"[7] must follow a developmental birth, growth and development, aging and death sequence.[8] As seemingly sentient, writing the postmodern *as body* betrays a desire to inscribe it as a *period* concept with a chronological sequence, perhaps even merely a soon-to-die "fad." For many authors, the postmodern is a condition obsessed with such *endings*, perhaps even heading toward a new Dark Age, a new barbarism resulting from the death of Enlightenment reason. The postmodern can seem a time literally strewn with corpses – the death of man, history (Fukijama), the metanarrative (Lyotard), the subject, author and humanism (Foucault), and even education (Spanos).

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[6] Kristeva's notion of the abject, and the process of abjection, appears in her book, *The Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

[7] William Shakespeare, *Cymbeline*.

[8] Suturing a developmental temporality onto an *inanimate* concept is by no means an uncommon practice; Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) is a theory of paradigm temporality often cited in educational theorizing. Freudian temporality, with its deferred action, event status, and emphasis on the future anterior is far less often applied in curricular and educational theorizing, yet may be more successful in its explanations of paradigm shifts. See the third essay in the second half of this text.

But beyond writing the postmodern as a quickly passing or dead body, there appears a certain *tone* in postmodern writings characterized by more than just acknowledged apostrophe (address to the dead). For death itself seems less of a 'natural' occurrence when it is the death of Reason or Enlightenment, of *progress*: such a 'death' *undoes* the very sense of *progressive* or *developmental* time which allows 'death' to be sequenced in a sentient or bodily sense in the first place. Such 'death' poses a limit question for sentient death itself. In "Of An Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy," Jacques Derrida suggests this postmodern tone properly be called "apocalyptic," a strategy of eschatology he traces to be older than the Copernican revolution (1984, 20).

For Derrida, postmodern philosophy registers not only in its pronouncements of death and end-times, but in the *pace* and *consequences* of this activity: this is a body (of Reason, Man, Enlightenment, etc.) which is ending *soon* and actions must be taken to prepare for this. While "apocalyptic" refers in a general way to a sense of *crisis* in the postmodern, Derrida also acknowledges the specific Judeo-Christian roots of such thinking. Apocalypse occurs in conjunction with the decadence at the end of an era, a decadence *recognized* by some which *separates* those who can demystify it, those who can anticipate the revelation of *truth* and judgement based on this event from those who can not. "...I know your deeds," says the apostle John, "you have a reputation of being alive, but you are dead. Wake up!". "...if you do not awake, I will come like a thief, and you will not know at what time I will come to you" (Revelations 3:3). Derrida suggests the structure of apocalyptic writing mirrors that of watchers at a wake, keeping vigil over the corpse, but also encircles the witnesses *themselves* into death and judgement: the corpse "...place[s] yet its death on your shoulders...[making] you inherit in advance its corpse..." (1984, 23). Derrida signifies the power of the apocalyptic tone through the continually echoed declarations of Christ in John's haunting Apocalypse: "I am coming." There is no escape from apocalypse, and, as Derrida suggests (ibid, 25) this death sentence will not fail to *separate* by *judging us all:*

> We're going to die, you and me, the others too, the goyim, the gentiles, and all the others, all those who don't share this secret with us, but they don't know it. ...We're the only ones in the world...let us be for a moment, before the end the sole survivors, the only ones to stay awake...

As with the neatly demarcated anatomical analyses of the postmodern body, the eschatological and apocalyptic postmodern body of the end-times enforces boundaries, containment, separation, and above all, *clarity*. Every apocalyptic vision, for Derrida, is based upon elucidation of *the truth* by which judgement (and separation) may occur:

> ...every apocalyptic eschatology is promised in the name of light, of seeing and vision, and of a light of light, of a light brighter than all the lights it makes possible (ibid, 22).

The temporality of apocalypse is interminably bound with this desire for *clarity*, for a clear vision or *truth*, an *epiphany* which (for true believers) results in judgement and *redemption* after revolution, *justification* for rightness. For Derrida, apocalyptic temporality is even more correctly a truth *machine*, a technology by which truth is produced, designating the announcement itself and not the content or *what* is being announced (ibid, 28). The 'post' of the postmodern says little, if anything, about what comes next – its apocalyptic tone and temporality rather work to form a structure which *enforces* announcement, clarity, truth, and separates individuals as a result. Writing the postmodern as body (notably a dead or dying one) may be a simple rhetorical strategy to "kill it off" as mere "fad," but even the more elaborate apocalyptic tone of the postmodern may work as little more than an attempt to separate truths from fictions, "correct" theoretical ideas or paradigms from hapless infatuations with decadence.

(Con)figurations of the Postmodern: Contradictions "in the Wake"

Many attempts at em-bodying the postmodern, from both spatial and temporal perspectives, involve dichotomies of subject/object, death/life, and truth-rightness/falsehood-judgement which encircle and *border* it off as an entity-for-use, whether one views such a move pessimistically or optimistically.[9] Such periodizations of the postmodern are by now commonplace, often totalizing a modern vs. postmodern stance in order to *oppositionally* define each by reference to the other. I offer three examples of such periodization:

1. Postmodernism as the move from modernism (as conceived as a space for autonomous, oppositional critique - evidenced, for example, in the proliferation of depth models) toward complicitous commodification within mass culture -- the sense that capitalism has invaded all social systems. Frederic Jameson's (1991) *Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* [10] is most representative of this genre. Aesthetic (and other) innovations which previously served as modernist strategies to create spaces of cultural opposition and political dissent are within the postmodern simply "style" packaged for the marketplace. Knowledge, nature, bodies and even versions of reality (think of Disneyland) are packaged as consumer products. Jameson's analysis often simply reproduces aspects of Jean Baudrillard's depiction of postmodernism as a media culture where the image and the real have coalesced into the hyperreal, where subjects have disappeared and objects/commodities are what define and seduce us. For Jameson, the postmodern simply signals the end of a modernist (and in certain senses, romantic) insistence on aesthetic autonomy, aesthetic or critical distance, and of a realist art which mirrors an external world outside of the text.

2. Moving from Marxist analyses, Jean Francois Lyotard's "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?" (1984, 71-82) offers an account of the postmodern that has been criticized by Marxists such as Terry Eagleton as 'purely aesthetic,' a naive account of 'desire' that appears almost 'spontaneous' in denying its own historicity (1986, 135). Lyotard's postmodern is also highly aware of the dangers in consumer capitalism, but calls upon Kant's concept of the sublime to prevent art from falling into a kind of populist paradise unaware of its complicity in the market (1984, 76). For Kant, the sublime is the experience of an object which invites the idea of reason, but which is incommensurate with any formulation, knowledge, or judgement on it. Lyotard uses this notion to suggest the only authentic postmodernism is one in which the work of art alludes to 'something

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[9] While it may be argued that enfleshing the postmodern may be nothing less than a strategy to emphasize its frail corporeality, rendering it an aging or dying "fad" to be replaced by newer trends, en-corporating the postmodern as body may also be viewed in an ethical sense as (re)calling a seemingly ethereal "theory" back to its constructedness, its nature as a human construction and therefore never transcendent, never eternal.

[10] Jameson first published an article under this title, later a book. The article was published in July-Aug 1984 as "Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism", *New Left Review*, 146:59-92. The book was published in 1991 through Duke University.

which does not allow itself to be made present' (ibid., 80). Lyotard's essay is a response to Jurgen Habermas' assertion that modernity still remains incomplete because of the overvaluation of the cognitive over the practical (ethical) and aesthetic (Habermas 1987). For Habermas, the aesthetic can be used to remind us of the bodily aspects of experience, but only in balance with the cognitive and practical, and always in service toward the ultimate culmination of rational public conversation. For Lyotard, the sublime can never be realized in a political programme or it would become terroristic; the sublime acts as a call to the ideal, almost a reinvention of an autonomous resistance (a space 'outside') to the commodifying aspects of modernity, but one which must necessarily never become embodied or represented in sensory form.

3. Postmodernism has also been conditioned as the possibility of social, personal, or political redemption or resurrection from the corruption of the modern. This begins in Nietzsche's (post)modern, placing art as the central task of living, providing the reconciliation of splinters created by a fractured God and the possibility of shaping a life in the face of shifting, if not crumbling, foundations (1967). Nietzsche's postmodern suggests a bodily-driven, self-as-artist expressing itself through the transformation of its culture. The theme of redemption, particularly redemption through the body, develops from this Nietzschian sense of bodily drives in the work of Julia Kristeva (the maternal body), Lyotard (libidinal band), Georges Bataille (ecstasy experiences, terror and excess), and Deleuze and Guattari (the politics of desire). The redemptive moment in the postmodern is an immanent rather than a transcendent one, claiming a state of primordial unity before the separation of subject and object, mind and body. Echoes of this bodily redemptive postmodern can be found in the Romanticist delight in experience, but experience which is perplexed by the unavoidable knowledge of the mediation of this experience. Both desire to completely reconcile perception and art/ifice, but the difference is in the Romantic desire to connect self-world-divine, while in the postmodern the divine metaphysical base is removed. The redemptive postmodern is aware of its fictionalizing powers, the self, as Nietzsche suggested, having released itself from its connection to God and relocated in a self that aesthetically constructs its own foundations by "transforming body through body."

The first embodiment of the postmodern formulates a *critical* modernism against a (perhaps even lecherous) postmodern "free-for-all"; Jameson writes an autonomous and wary subject lost in the postmodern funhouse with little if any chance of finding the critical *distance* necessary to truly *understand* capitalism's evils. Separation between subject and object are crucial here for the establishment of truth. The second embodiment of the postmodern, while far less oppositional, nevertheless also relies upon a conception of art as completely autonomous from co-option by consumer capitalism. The third postmodern "body" most clearly exemplifies the apocalyptic "tone" of much postmodern writing, positing a complete redemption from the ills of modernist philosophy and life through a Romantic (re)turn to art as the highest form of life. But regardless whether it is the postmodern (for Nietzsche, Kristeva, et al) which redeems us from the modern, or the modern (for Jameson) which saves us from the postmodern, the *technology* which embodies, constructs, orders each body produces a seeming *difference* between the two. The modern is *not* postmodern; postmodern is most definitely *not* modern: periodization *clearly* demarcates the two into separate strategies, entities, *forms*.

What is at stake in articulating a body? Clearly, the limits that constitute the body allow for differential value to be expressed for one body or another, but an equally important question is *what constitutes these limits* themselves. For Michel Foucault (1977), regimes of truth or "structures of intelligibility" govern what is codified into "possible" or "impossible," "thinkable" (for example, "thinkable *as a body*") or "unthinkable." But as Britzman (1995, 156) suggests, limits function only because of the presence of the unworthy, the dismissed, the excluded. In the case of the limits guarding and bordering the postmodern body, one periodization works to eliminate the other, or dismiss it as "unworthy." The *adjudication* of bodies of knowledge is possible because of the limits placed around (and constituting) the bodies, but a further, and more troubling condition must be present for this adjudication to take place. While such bodies of knowledge are judged "different," this difference must be based upon some common criteria, some commonly-agreed upon rendition of the Same by which a decision can be rendered. The postmodern body is said to be "different" than the modern body but the two must in some way be *measurable* by each other, *comparable* to each other so that difference can be decided. Some underlying semantic value, some way of translating one in terms of the other must be possible for difference to be articulated. The stakes in articulating a body, then, involve a particular (and contradictory) ordering of space and time by which difference is based upon (is produced by) similarity or commonality. As we shall see, this particular rendering of difference – a *reduction* of difference to *opposition* – is not the only possible one, and the periodization of postmodern in opposition with the modern, the most common method of embodying the postmodern – is not its only possible production or *invention* (cf. Derrida).

Figuring the Postmodern

> ...modernist aesthetics is an aesthetic of the sublime, though a nostalgic one. It allows the unpresentable to be put forward only as the missing contents; but the form, because of its recognizable consistency, continues to offer the reader or viewer matter for solace and pleasure...the postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms...
>
> Jean-François Lyotard, "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?" *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, 1984, 81

The work of Jean-François Lyotard is generally known to English language audiences through a book requested by the Conseil des Universitiés of the Quebec government entitled *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* [1979](1984), where Lyotard outlines a concern about the collapse of "grand metanarratives" as legitimating practices, and particularly the legitimating practices of *scientific* metanarratives. It is less well known, however, that Lyotard was both a political activist in the late 1940s to the 1950s, and also a renowned author in French aesthetics by the mid 1970s (Dews 1984, 40). A proponent of the artistic avant-garde, Lyotard had published a multitude of articles and reviews in aesthetics (as well as exhibition catalogues) years *before* the polemic and somewhat faddish *Postmodern Condition* which nonetheless came to be his best known work to English-speaking audiences.

While the *Postmodern Condition* is an endorsement for *the aesthetic* (and aesthetic experience) as resistant trace to the worst automatising and indifferent effects of modernity, it is less than indicative of Lyotard's more specific and longer history of work in aesthetics. Written as a polemic reply to Jurgen Habermas' 1980 argument "Modernity versus Postmodernity," the *Postmodern Condition* writes the aesthetic as an autonomous realm, an *art of the sublime* which resists suturing onto either the real (co-opted into a therapeutic role in an "easy" reconciliation to the conventional), or onto the market (commodified into the surfaces of late capitalist consumerisms). Debatable for its romantic, near *counter*-Enlightenment position, the *Postmodern Condition* unfortunately fails to render intelligible any of Lyotard's past detailed work in aesthetics, instead elaborating a rather general position *bemoaning* the aesthetic as a relatively *neglected* category amid other categories of the practical (ethical) and the cognitive (scientific). Without the backdrop of Lyotard's extensive earlier writings in aesthetics, the use of "aesthetics" as a category of experience leaves the *Postmodern Condition* open to criticism from those already suspicious of all forms of aesthetics as apolitical or formalist.

Returning instead to Lyotard's foundational work, my selective use will highlight Lyotard's specific discussions of form and figure in one of his earliest and argueably greatest works, *Discours, Figure* (1971). Like other "postmodern" authors, Lyotard's work has undergone distinct phases which some have quite ingeniously characterized as "postmodern aesthetic experiments," performing his text as conversation (*Just Gaming*), as epistle (*Le Postmoderne Expliqué aux Enfants*), as philosophical notes (*The Differend*), and less convincingly as a metaphysics of desire (*Economie Libidinale*).[11] However, it is selectively to the foundational and much overlooked *Discours, Figure* that I turn to explicate the difficulties of form, forming or *figure*, *figuring* the postmodern in and for education in order to offer the depth and complexity demanded by such a problem. For in *Discours, Figure*, Lyotard does not simply delineate concepts and examples of form and figure for us to understand, he *performs* what it means to figure and form through the depth and writing of *Discours, Figure* itself.

Discours, Figure is not an easy book; it is a formidable reading challenge, roughly divided into a first half accentuating the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and a second half (which I will not emphasize) writing an encounter with Freudian psychoanalysis. *Discours, Figure* is also markedly "post"structural in the sense it offers a critique of classical structuralism, and yet its impressiveness lies in the fact this critique does not merely oppose such structure or system of differences to some pre-linguistic, undifferentiated "real." In this sense Lyotard's *Discours, Figure* is similar to Jacques Derrida's "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," as both heighten the problematic of how to account for and position the *observer* who is able to *understand* the *langue* or system of culture.[12] Lyotard's *Discours, Figure* questions the structuralist linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure but interestingly by recourse to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, which in itself will not be exempt from analysis and critique.

Discours, Figure begins with the deceptively simple phenomenological assertion that acts of reading and seeing do not share a similar nature or basis; they are most decidedly not congruent activities. Discourse, defined by Lyotard as *representation* by concepts, creates a spatial arrangement of oppositions, a 'textual' universe of signification able to be read. Looking at the world, by contrast, invokes a sense of visual space which is *deep*, three-dimensional, and of the same order as the spatial body which perceives it. In reading the space of the text is *flat*, made possible by a series of oppositions which differentiate one sign from the next. The space of the visual is *deep*, made possible by my own seeing/perceiving body which is as much an object in the world as those I see. These two activities can be clearly illustrated in the different experiences of reading and seeing words on the page of a book.

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[11] See Bill Readings, *Introducing Lyotard: Art and Politics* (New York: Routledge, 1991), xvi.

[12] For an insightful connection between Lyotard and Derrida's work, see Rodolphe Gasché, "Deconstruction as Criticism," in Gasché, *Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 22-57.



Figure 1. Examples of oppositional and visual space of the text.

To *read* these words, one must *recognize* letters as distinct from one another: d is d because it is not a, b, c, or any other letter. *In order to read*, I must forget the plastic forms of these letters: it makes no difference if the word "dog" is printed or handwritten, whether the d is larger than the o or g. The actual plastic shape of the letter is *irrelevant* in reading. In *seeing*, shape is all significant: the curvature of a line, the texture of a surface are all important in determining a figure from a ground. *In order to see*, the line must be understood as tracing objects in space, and drawing distances and perspective between the object and the background. Seeing requires us to forget the system by which we *recognize* letters, and instead treat the wandering of the line as drawing objects in relief from their deep background space. From this insistence that reading and seeing are dissimilar experiences, Lyotard evokes a long phenomenological tradition critiquing what is perceived to be a dominating structuralist overvaluation of discursive forms of knowing and of "textualizing" the world. Lyotard accomplishes this by using Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology as *intervention* into Saussurian structuralist linguistics.[13]

A brief review of the structuralism attributed to Saussurian linguistics is in order here. While a great deal has been made (by both those affirming *and* those attacking various strands of later poststructural and deconstructive thought) of de Saussure's endorsement of the sign as *arbitrary*, the *Course* itself does not support this interpretation but rather points to the fact de Saussure believed this "arbitrariness" to be a well-established precept in linguistics of the day (de Saussure 1986, 71-74). Argueably more significant and innovative is de Saussure's claim the linguistic system involves a play of relations, of oppositions and differences *which structure differential value* among elements. For de Saussure, the signifier is not essentially or naturally linked to the signified; the signifier is not a "word" that *essentially* represents or connotes a signified "thing." "Dog," for example, does not evoke the furry, four-legged creature directly or essentially, but only by differential comparison to other signifiers in the *langue* (linguistic system) such as "cat," horse," or "monkey." Playing on de Saussure's national origin, Bill Readings (1991, 10) dubs this the "Swiss cheese theory of language," where a signifier's value is determined by its difference from all other signifiers in the system, and thus creating value by "holes," or by negativity (being what other signifiers *are not*). While it is certainly the case de Saussure's signs are *arbitrarily motivated* and constitute no essential link between words and things (furry, four-legged friends are *arbitrarily/conventionally* termed "dog" in English, "chien" in French, "perro" in Spanish) the innuendo that this is somehow indicative of an inherent nihilism in structuralist and poststructuralist thought is simply wrongheaded and historically indefensible.[14] Instead, what is significant in Saussurean linguistics is the characterization of language as a system functioning through the creation of differential value:

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[13] Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) is often considered a "father" of structuralism as it came into vogue in late 1950s and 60s France, but can be dubbed so only posthumously. He was neither aware of, or consciously intending to found such a "school": indeed, structuralism can hardly be regarded as an organized school of thought, or group of individuals. It also bears mentioning once again that the famous *Course in General Linguistics* attributed to de Saussure was actually compiled after his death by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, almost exclusively from the notes taken by students during his three lectures from 1906-1911 (Saussure himself never kept the rough notes he used to deliver these lectures). See both the "Translator's introduction," and the "Preface to the first edition" in Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* , trans. Roy Harris (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986), ix-xvi and xvii-xix.

> Everything we have said so far comes down to this. *In the language itself, there are only differences*. Even more important than that is the fact that, although in general a difference presupposes positive terms between which the difference holds, in a language there are only differences, *and no positive terms*. ...In a sign, what matters more than any idea or sound associated with it is what other signs surround it. The proof of this lies in the fact that the value of a sign may change without affecting either meaning or sound, simply because some neighboring sign has undergone a change (de Saussure 1986, 118).

In *Discours, Figure*, Lyotard is as interested as other poststructural writers about this system of *differential* value, but wonders about the relationship of this *langue* (system) to *parole* (individual execution and acts of *speech*), and to the function of *reference* in Saussure's work. In particular, Lyotard points to an apparent *ambivalence* in Saussure around the signified.

> [Saussure's] conception of structure leads him to absorb the whole of signification into the cutting-up, i.e. into the system of intervals between the terms, or the system of *values*. And yet he does not give up having recourse at the very same time to an idea of signification which opposes it to value as vertical is opposed to horizontal or depth to surface. What could pass for a failing in a linguist determined to limit his study to the structure of language...is, however, much more than an error or naivety; namely that all discourse constitutes its object in depth...he spontaneously thematises it as something thick, he is led to posit signification as a sign. In reality this depth is an effect of object-positioning due to the current discourse which holds signification at a distance and posits that it is a sign just as it does any object (Lyotard 1971, 93-4).

What Lyotard notices in de Saussure appears to be a sort of resistance, a trace within structuralist linguistics where a non-linguistic element seems to operate *within* the system of differential and oppositional value. Lyotard explains this "ambivalence" as two *simultaneous* functions of the signifier: certainly, the signifier creates a value immanent to the system by opposition to other signifiers, but the signifier *also* functions by *pointing* or *designating* toward the signified (concept). This second function is of particular interest to Lyotard, because pointing or referring is not an act that follows Saussure's structural model of *oppositional* value.

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[14] Such criticism falls in the face of a long history of philosophical antecedents to "Saussure's" arbitrary sign, including St. Augustine's claim ("On Christian Doctrine," 427A.D.) that conventional signs signifying beyond their sensory counterparts are still given by God *because* they are represented through men; Diderot and Condillac's claims of the arbitrariness of language in the 18th century; and John Locke's claim in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) that language is mere convention between men but that this is a mutual good and an example of the positive social contract between individuals in society.

Lyotard's observation hinges on terms which linguists know as *deictics*, or "indicator" words such as "here," or "now," which do not strictly speaking *mean*, but rather exist to *indicate* or point to something *in a sensory field*. To use an example from Readings, the distinction between "a tree," and "this tree" is not a distinction of *meaning*, but one of *distance* or *place* in a sensory field (Readings 1991, 14). These deictic terms appear to be *between* signification and designation, between the oppositional system of the *langue* and the act of utterance (*parole*). For these deictic terms operate in as different a manner as the earlier distinction between reading and seeing -- "here" functions as a designatory term not by *eliminating* all other terms around it (as Saussure claims the *langue* does) but rather points to *one place within a larger topography*, establishing *proximate distances* between terms/concepts and creating a space of *heterogeneity* rather than a space of opposition. Lyotard (1971, 38) explains:

> ...the place indicated, the *here*, is grasped in a *sensory field*, as the focus of that field to be sure, but not in such a manner that its surroundings are eliminated as is the case in the choices operated by a speaker; they remain there in the uncertain and undeniable, curvilinear presence of what sits on the edges of vision, as a reference absolutely necessary to the indication of place...the linguistic operation is subject ot the rule of the spoken sequence which requires the unicity of the actual and the elimination of the virtual, whereas sight determines a sensory field...

Lyotard is quick to identify the operation of this different, "sensory field" with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's texts on the visual field and its operation.[15] For Merleau-Ponty, visual space is opposed to structuralist textual space by virtue of the *corporeal* nature of the eye. The eye *moves* in order to see, argues Merleau-Ponty; the world is not flat, as de Saussure's textual space or the space invoked by Cartesian visuality where the eye is *fixed* to receive light. Visual space is deep and corporeal, *participating* in the creation of vision. Merleau-Ponty uses the example of seeing a cube: if the eye were not mobile, corporeal, it would never be able to see all six sides of a cube but would rather constitute the cube as flat space. As the eye moves, the cube is perceived by *combining* images of the cube to create volume, a volume common also to the eye and body of the perceiver. As mentioned previously, a large part of Lyotard's brilliance in *Discours, Figure* is not that he simply develops concepts and examples for us to understand, but that he *performs* them within the space of his text. In probing de Saussure's "ambivalence" toward the signified and the sign, Lyotard is not simply *claiming* that language (with deictic terms as example) contains two separate functions; rather, he is actually explaining and demonstrating how de Saussure's work and text *performs* both functions. As Geoffrey Bennington (1988, 65) puts it:

> The depth Saussure is thereby led to attribute to the sign is thus not specific to the sign, but is a property of the act of reference operated by

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[15] See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible* trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), and *The Primacy of Perpection* trans. Edie *et al* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964).

> his own discourse, as an act of *parole*, on the object 'sign' or 'language.'
> ...In order to describe the sign in this sort of way, Saussure, said so often to bracket out the referent, is *taking the sign itself as his referent.*

The consequences of Lyotard's explanation serve to complicate the original example of how seeing and reading are different activities and completely opposite orders. By demonstrating the designatory or "pointing" function he ascribes to language, Lyotard disrupts de Saussure's "system of pure differences" with the phenomenological argument for the existence of *visual* or deep space alongside textual space; *heterogeneous* difference alongside oppositional difference. Further, such a "pointing" function invokes an *exteriority* to language, indicates a world of things beyond language which is nevertheless *related to* language. Lyotard does *not* claim that objects in the world have a *pre-linguistic* meaning, but rather that language *not only means* (signifies), but also *indicates*, points in a sensory field. This "pointing" function is, however, lost -- or more significantly, *forgotten* -- in the operation of signification as signifiers overcome the "ambivalence" toward the exteriority of language and *replace* it by the differential *oppositional* system of the langue. Lyotard's term for this relationship between the designatory and signifying functions of language is *the figural*, where pointing or designating functions as *figure* for signification, or designation is *figural to* signification. For Lyotard, a figure is "something of another kind that is lodged within discourse and lends it its expressivity" (1971, 51).

Because Lyotard's first discussion of the figural stems from a phenomenological critique of Saussurian structuralist linguistics, it might be easy to assume by "figural" Lyotard means "embodied," "corporeal," or material, "figured" or *shaped* into dimensional *form*. Such could not be further from the case in *Discours, Figure*. The figural, for Lyotard, is not similar to arguments (particularly in cultural studies) for the "materiality of the signifier." This is an oft-used misappropriation of deconstructive insights by Marxist and neo-Marxist writers which simply valorizes "materiality" over the covert effects of *ideology*.[16] Such an argument suggests the "materiality" of the signifier can be read to cut through the otherwise *ideological* effects of signifiers, magically revealing the construction of dominant discourses. The difficulty of equating this position with Lyotard's *figural* is that the former understands signifiers as only *literal*, as a materiality belonging (like "property") to the signifier; for Lyotard, language doesn't possess such a blunt "materiality" that guarantees its association in the sensible realm, but language is figural because materiality *cannot exclusively* be an object of signification or meaning. Lyotard's sense of materiality is that it functions to resist representation, resists being represented by a literal and definitive description ("it lacks good form"). Materiality is not a *guarantee* of truth or one *literal* meaning, but a resistance to meaning and representation, refusing to be "pinned" by signification. This is why for Lyotard the figural describes the *interruption* of the textual order by the sensible order, rather than simply "claiming" that some blunt materiality "exists" and can guarantee truth.

While Lyotard's primary example of the figural is his phenomenological critique of Saussurian structuralism, Lyotard performs his understanding of the figural by turning the tables on phenomenology as well, finding traces of textual elements within visual and corporeal space. (Lyotard titles a later chapter in his book "Fiscourse Digure" to indicate the discursive within the figural [visual] in addition to the figural/visual in the discursive.) While Merleau-Ponty is initially used to criticize structuralist linguistics, Lyotard now turns to his *suspicions* about the phenomenological insistence on a body completely "at home" in the world. Lyotard critiques Merleau-Ponty for constructing perception as if it were *removed* from all traces of *emotion*, for emotion stands as a glaring reminder that our hold on the world is not always completely certain (1971, 137 n.3). From this initial doubt, Lyotard goes on to suggest perceptual (visual) space is itself inhabited by textual space because we *attend* to our perceptions: "attention writes space, traces in it lines and triangles; for it, colours are like phonemes, units which work by opposition and not by motivation" (ibid., 155). For Lyotard, attention *writes* perception:

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[16] Such authors would seek to *remedy*, as Thomas McCarthy (1989/90, 160) would put it, the supposed "withdrawl from the specificity of politics and of empirical social research" inherent in deconstruction and other poststructural approaches. See Thomas McCarthy, "The Politics of the Ineffable: Derrida's Deconstructionism," *The Philosophical Forum* 21 (1989/90), 146-168.

> There is something false even in the movement of the eye; it lends itself to the construction of the knowable, it represses the truthful. The truthful is the unbalanced configuration of space before any construction: it demands that the movement of the eye be deconstructed, in an immobility which is not a state of mobility (ibid., 159).

Lyotard's opening argument for the (assumed) opposition between reading and seeing has now come all the way to a mutual "deconstruction" of the textual by the visual, and the visual by the textual. While Lyotard is *clearly* indicating not everything is "text," neither does he simply resort to valorizing the other of textual space. The *difference* between the textual and the visual is the *figural*, which is to say the figural cannot be thought under a logic of identity as an opposition: both orders are *impossibly co-present* within each other -- *inseparable, but incommensurate.*[17] As Readings suggests, the figural is a blocking together of heterogeneous spaces, not another kind of representation (ie. corporeal/visual *vs.* textual) but *other to* representation, disruptive of representation (Readings 1991, 20). This is not to say that the figural is an other to representation that can be "represented" as such -- the figural is not *opposed* to representation but disruptive of it, reminding us there are things which cannot be represented. The figural functions as one of Lyotard's other conditions, the *immemorial*. The immemorial for Lyotard is that which can neither be completely forgotten *or* completely remembered. Lest some question whether or not Lyotard writes such conditions just to be obtuse or "difficult," he gives the example of Auschwitz to outline what is at stake in the figural or the immemorial. Auschwitz as an event demands we represent and speak of it so that it remains an event (in memory and in signification), but not in a way that it becomes *only* a historical event among other events, *only* a representation with no real effects. Auschwitz as figure, as figural, demands both to be represented, but not completely (thus preserving it as a corporeal event); and demands to be remembered, but not so completely that it becomes "only" a memory. Similarly, neither oppositional (textual) space *nor* perceptual (visual) space *completely* define the workings of language, but "impossibly co-exist" in its functioning.

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[17] Neither is the figural *dialectical*. Lyotard is quite clear on this point when he states: "But the relation between these two negations is *not dialectical*; one is not the moment of the other...Invariance and variance, that is to say secondary and primary processes, are at once always given together and yet absolutely unable to form a unity" *Discours, Figure*, p. 58-9.

Figural and Form: Examples of the Figural

> ...A text must not only be able to be read according to its signification, which comes under linguistic space, but *seen* according to its configuration, which is supported by the sensory-imaginary space...the figure is a *deformation* [auth-my emphasis] which *imposes a different form* onto the disposition of the linguistic unities. This form is not reducible to the constraints of structure (Lyotard 1971, 61).

While thus far I have indicated figure or the figural as a "blocking together" of heterogeneous spaces (in Lyotard's inaugural example, the blocking together of seeing and reading, or textual and visual spaces) the relationship between these two spaces should also be approached through Lyotard's notion of *form*. While to North American audiences "form" is most often associated with arrangement, system, or structure (perhaps even "organic form"), for Lyotard form is more closely associated with *deforming* or distortion, disruption of closed structure or style. While structuralists such as Claude Levi-Strauss understood structure/form as a sort of "matrix of possibilities" which generate (for Levi-Strauss) cultural myths or (for Vladimir Propp, another structuralist) folk tales through the 'play' or combination of various elements, for Lyotard form or the figural is what *disrupts*, or rather *deforms* such structural units and orders.[18] By defining form as *structure*, the emphasis falls on how the structure or matrix is simply "loose," allowing for play among the constraints, rather than (as Lyotard does) revealing the *deforming* function of form. Lyotard understands form as less of a loose grid or matrix with combinatory units than as co-existant but disrupting orders, one *deforming* the other. Two additional examples from *Discours, Figure* may help to explain this notion of form.

Although Lyotard writes several examples of the relation between form and the figural, perhaps some of the most vivid are those illustrating how figurality works through *anamorphosis* in paintings. From the Greek *anamorphoun* (to transform), anamorphosis is generally understood as a practice or instrument which renders an image unrecognizable except if viewed with the proper device or appropriate angle.[19] Lyotard uses anamorphosis as an example of figurality, where the Cartesian perspective of viewing objects from a single, fixed point (making visuality into a geometry) is remarkably co-present with the radical difference of *curved* visual space described by Merleau-Ponty as the eye *moves* to create three-dimensional objects, and where the eye creates both focal *and* peripheral vision (objects *remain* on the margins of vision and are not rendered unclear or unimportant by the central focus).

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[18] This is an important difference in Lyotard's work from many educationalist interpreters of Michel Foucault's work, who appear to interpret the latter as a "post"structuralist yet continue to speak of archaeology or genealogy as a "matrix of possibilities," or imply that within a certain matrix of social, political, and economic concepts, a combination arises and emerges as a new discursive order. Stephen Ball states in his edited book on Foucault that "words and concepts change their meaning and their effects as they are *deployed* within different discourses. Discourses constrain the possibilities of thought. They order and combine words in particular ways..." [p. 2, emphasis mine]. While he notes that such combinatory activities are themselves hindered by inclusions and exclusions of what can and cannot be said, many of the essays in this edited volume are written as if to simply "identify" the "matrix" of possible elements that combine together to form a particular power/knowledge coupling. See Stephen Ball, ed. *Foucault and Education: Disciplines and Knowledge* (New York: Routledge, 1990). Other education authors interpret Foucault as poststructural, but speak quite literally of a "register," "scaffold" or "grid" of possible ideas and events that "come together" to form historical social practices. See for example Tom Popkewitz, "A Changing Terrain of Knowledge and Power: A Social Epistemology of Educational Research," *Educational Researcher* 26:9 (1997), p. 18.

[19] Webster's *Third New International Dictionary*, 1986.

A rather intriguing example of anamorphosis in painting is Lyotard's description of an anamorphic portrait of Charles the 1st, shown in Figure 2. The portrait was occasioned by the decapitation of King Charles the 1st; copies of the clandestine portrait were circulated by royal supporters after 1649. Viewed in Cartesian perspective, the painting appears hopelessly distorted -- the eye wanders aimlessly around the portrait and is attracted only by the death's head, which seems to provide the only focal center in an indecipherable space. Indeed, it is only through the *key* of the death's head that the *curved* space of the portrait emerges: a cylindrical tube placed over the death's head reveals a discernable, proportionate *reflection* of Charles the 1st (see Figure 3). The painting is *anamorphic* because it "blocks together" heterogeneous spaces -- curved and geometric, vertical and horizontal -- that interrupt or *deform* one another. The portrait, while presented to the viewer as a "possible" Cartesian, geometric space is only comprehensible by projecting its image on a *curved, material* support. Yet this curved support (a vertical, material and three-dimensional space) interrupts our typical understanding of a portrait as a transparent screen, and as Lyotard writes, we try to lift the tube because it is in our way, causing the face of death to appear (1971, 378). The death's head marks the incommensurate difference between the two spaces. What it is recognizable as in one space, it is not recognizable as in the other; one space or 'order' *deforms* the other (ibid).

A second example of anamorphosis in painting is the 18th century *veduta* (Italian for "view pictures"), the style of which can still be found today. Eighteenth century *vedutisti* often drew these landscape projections for tourists who desired a memento of a famous city or town, as witnessed by a modern (1989) tourist map of Montreal in Figure 4.[20] To the fixed Cartesian eye, the *veduta* is a somewhat "distorted" city view. It *appears* to position the viewer at a point on a hill outside the city, but simultaneously *offers* the scene as if the viewer were *within* the city. Thus to comprehend the city from one focal point displaces other possible points to the edge of vision, *deforming* them. In the veduta of Montreal in Figure 4, the focal point occurs interestingly enough from a topographically very *low* position out in the St. Lawrence River, but all points in the city appear *as if* they were available to the eye high above the river and the city, which in Cartesian perspective is clearly not possible.

As Readings (1991, 26-7) suggests, the *veduta* offers an important lesson in contrast between Lyotard's *figural* and pluralism:

> For pluralism, the city would offer a number of different focal points amongst which we might choose indifferently, the choice of one excluding the others. Deconstruction insists that our choice of focal points makes a *difference*, produces the anamorphosis rather than the exclusion of other points of view. We live *in* the city, not outside it, any 'perspective' or point of view is implicated, not detached. ...Rather, the point of view is wagered against...The implication of opposing the construction of the city from a single point, of taking a unilinear perspective on history, is not that all points are the same, that anything goes. Rather, everything is at stake in the different kinds of

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[20] Famous Italian *vedutisti* include the 18th century Venetian painters Canaletto, Francesco Guardi, and Giambattista Piranesi.

Figure 2 removed because of copyright restrictions

Figure 2. Secret portrait of Charles 1st.
Anamorphic portrait of Charles 1st, painted sometime after 1649. Reproduction after Jurgis Baltrusaitis, *Anamorphoses*... (Paris: Ol. Perrin, 1969), V. pl. 24-6. Cited in Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Discours, Figure* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1971).

Figure 3 removed because of copyright restrictions.

Figure 3. Curved reflection of Charles 1st portrait. In Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Discours, Figure* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1971).

Figure 4 removed because of copyright restrictions.

Figure 4. Section of veduta tourist map of Montreal. Map by Jiero (Montreal: Maison Descartes, 1989).

> continuities, distortions and motivations produced by a point of view.

Thus Lyotard's discussion of anamorphosis in paintings quite dramatically illustrates how the figural is a 'blocking together' of incommensurate spaces that *disrupts* representation. In his work post-*Discours, Figure*, Lyotard extends the notion of the figural to temporality and the writing of history.

The Stakes of the Figural: Indeterminate Judgement

> It is just as easy to understand why the nature of the social -- for example, its identification -- by a definitional phrase, is immediately deferred. ...the nature of the social always remains to be judged. In this way, the social is the referent...of a judgement to be always done over again. It is a "case" pled contradictorily before a tribunal.
>
> Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 140.

While all of this previous discussion on Lyotard's *figural* may seem to indicate merely an internal debate among semioticians, linguists, or philosophers, the stakes invoked by the figural are much higher, and deeply *social* and *political*. Lyotard's *figural* points directly toward a "refiguring" of the political, and of the question of *judgement* itself, with the attendant *social* implications for *responsibility* and *ethics*.

The figural, for Lyotard, indicates not the presence of simple oppositions, but "a *deformation* which imposes a different form" onto, in his examples, the dispositions of linguistic entities (1971, 61). Lyotard emphasizes how de Saussure *hides* or *denies* difference by reducing it to opposition; similarly, difference can be denied in the movements toward unity in the process of the *dialectic*. For Lyotard, the figural is entirely different from classical structuralisms or structural notions of form in that the figural implies a *force* or *tension* that is not reconciled. As Derrida complains of structuralism in "Force and Signification" (1978, 4-5):

> ...a lapse of the attention given to *force*, which is the tension of force itself. *Form* fascinates when one no longer has the force to understand force from within itself. That is, to create. This is why literary criticism is structuralist in every age, in its essence and destiny. ...These [structuralist] analyses are possible only after a certain defeat of force. [They are] A reflection of the accomplished, the constituted, the *constructed*. Historical, eschatalogical, and crepuscular by its very situation.

This denial, "forgetting," or *erasure* of the figural *as simply* oppositional is at work not only within the confines of literary criticism or philosophy, but within the field of education (from educational research, to decisions made on a daily basis in schools and classrooms). The reduction of debates within literary criticism or philosophy to "presence" or "nothing," the "strong subject" or "nothing," "intentionality and will" or "nothing" echo similar debates within educational research. At the classroom and school level, differences are reduced to "standards" and "testing" or "nothing," "phonics" or "nothing," "basics" or "nothing." Lyotard's figural not only questions whether such oppositions can actually exist or be constructed as *plausible*, but supports a discussion, through examples, of specifically *how* difference is denied in such instances and *what the stakes are* in denying such difference.

Lyotard is also *not*, in pointing out this erasure of difference to opposition, merely recommending a less black-and-white, more nuanced version of gauging difference. Nor is he suggesting that one "reading" or performance is simply the *reverse or inverse* of the other. The difference invoked by Lyotard's figural is *ultimately not groundable*, not translatable or comparable by reference to some "common" plane of experience, standard, or value. One term cannot eliminate the other *or* substitute for it. The radical singularity of difference evoked by Lyotard's figural disrupts, *de-forms* representation and the logic of identity; as Derrida suggests, it is akin to a *force* in this manner. For Lyotard, *reading* and *seeing* are figural for each other; to understand one is to forget or erase the other. No "master code" is therefore available; no translation is possible. Since no common grounding, no constant value or equivalency, no stable "measuring device" exists to relate the two, *calculation* is displaced as an option.[21] The radical singularity of difference evoked by the figural *undermines* any notion of *determinate* judgement which would "settle" or erase the difference. Since calculation or translation between the two would be a destruction of this force of difference, what are we left to do?

Lyotard's figural leaves us squarely within the realm of *indeterminate judgement*. The vast majority of our activity in schools, for example, involves teaching determinate or *normative judgement* – judgement according to pre-established criteria, rules, measurement, or standards. In mathematics and science, we spend a great deal of our time teaching students proper formulas, and also the *paradigmatic criteria* of scientific method, reason, objectivity, laws of conservation and equivalency, distribution, etc. that allow students (and teachers) to adjudicate scientific and mathematical performances. By exercising such determinate judgement, students compare methods and answers with normal standards to judge whether or not they are "correct." But even in more "aesthetic" subjects, in English and social studies classrooms, most of our pedagogical time is spent teaching disciplinary structures, aesthetic forms, paradigms and philosophies. Students learn to classify political arguments as belonging to Marxist or free enterprise philosophy, learn to equate history with a narrative past-present-future form, and learn to argue from the historical past with *reasonable* examples. They study and apply plot diagrams to novels, learn the difference between Elizabethan and Italian sonnet structure, between fiction and non-fiction; they learn also to apply literary terms for figurative language (such as metaphor, allusion, soliloquy, personification) to what they read. Now I do *not* wish to argue in a *romantic* way that any of these activities are wrong-headed or misguided because they somehow "stifle" creativity or do not allow students enough time for "self-expression." Rather, I list these examples to illustrate how much curriculum time and resources are devoted to this area. School, it seems, is not the place to teach indeterminate judgement because there "first" appear to be so many *norms* for students to know.

In educational research, we similarly spend most of our time teaching, learning, and referring to *normative* standards by which to judge quality research. This does not apply only to statistical or other forms of quantitative research, but also to qualitative forms – the research "object" is often assumed to be "out there" and so capable of observation and analysis by a perceiving subject-researcher through the many research *forms* and methodologies offered. Even in qualitative research, we learn to apply normative standards, even though these may be "imported" from the humanities, social sciences, communication studies, the arts, and other disciplines.

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[21] Since I am siting some of Jacques Derrida's work alongside Lyotard's figural, it is important to note here that *deconstruction* escapes being a method precisely because of its attention to the radical singularity of difference. A "method" must be predicated on some more-or-less stable criteria for judgement and "application," and it is precisely Derrida's emphasis on the *singularity* of difference, on the "finding" and not the "erasing" of difference in each event, that renders it distinctly apart from anything called "method."

In the realm of *indeterminate judgement*, no criteria are evident or even possible in the wake of the figural. Judgement *cannot* be "grounded" or put in comparison to a norm because such an act *reduces* difference to mere opposition (Lyotard and Thebaud, 1985). As a *figure* can have no determinate meaning, we do not "find" truth or dig for a "hidden" meaning. Indeterminate judgement involves instead a setting *to work*, an obligation to *do* something (Derrida 1992, 181-220, esp. 213). This imperative to act carries with it consequences for the subject, and also for a (re)new(ed) sense of ethical obligation for the subject.

The co-presence of two incommensurate functions places the subject in a space requiring response, action, judgement, decision even if the subject does not know in advance what the "standard" is: indeterminate judgement renders the subject's position as constantly (re)open(ed) and *in formulation*. For to judge in such a manner, without criteria, *creates* or *reinvents* the subject anew each time a judgement is made. As Derrida suggests:

> In other words, the decision, [for Lyotard, the *judgement*-auth.] if there is such a thing, must neutralize if not render impossible in advance the who and the what. If one knows, and if it is a subject that knows who and what, then the decision is simply the application of a law [for Lyotard, preexisting *normative criteria*-auth.]. In other words, if there is a decision, it presupposes that the subject of the decision does not yet exist and neither does the object. ... when I decide I invent the subject. Every time I decide ... I invent the who, and I decide who decides what ... (1996, 84).

Indeterminate judgement thus calls forth a subject *to be created*, and the call to this subject is profoundly *ethical*. If the figural is the blocking together of two co-present but incommensurate elements, then all acts of judgement with regard to the two elements are decidedly questions of *justice*: the judgement *must* be an indeterminate one, without criteria, since a criterion would have to belong to one element and thus lead to the exclusion and silencing of the other. Such would be the case with two incommensurate languages or ways of viewing the world: to *translate* or judge one in terms of the other would render the other unjustly, would not serve the interests of justice. To return to Lyotard's example of the line and the letter in *Discours, figure*, to "see" or "read" (to judge) the *letter* and to value its oppositional way of creating meaning is to render the *line* (the sense of visual space) distorted or unrecognizable, and vice versa. Indeterminate judgement without criteria forces us to *witness* to the figural, to deny neither line nor letter.

Indeterminate judgement as an *ethical* concern is also intimately bound to Lyotard's figural sense of *temporality*, to what he terms "the event." For Lyotard, the *event* is an occurrence that is radical in its singularity – a happening after which things are never the same again (Lyotard 1988, 79, 88). The event is a fundamental disturbance in modernist temporality, even being *figural to it*: the event as such *is* an event because it ruptures all pre-existing representational frameworks through which the event might be understood. As such, there is no answer to the question "what is happening?" because there exists no means of representation for the event. Since we do not know how to understand the event when it occurs, the event renders indeterminate judgement the only means by which to adjudicate it. In this sense, indeterminate judgement is the ethical act of inventing ways to understand the event and to witness or testify to its having happened. For without such a witness the event would remain *silenced* as it does not conform to modernist temporality but rather breaks its representational schemas. The temporality of indeterminate judgement and the event are very similar in nature to Derrida's account of the *future anterior* (a-venir). Lyotard's *inventive* indeterminate judgement is provoked by the future anterior, a sense that something, someone, is "to come" but "what" comes cannot be *known in advance*. It is only *after* the event that the "what" is known or understood, thereby provoking the exercise of indeterminate judgement. Only *after* the event, after the work has occurred or been created will the rules by which it can be judged be possible (Derrida, 1990). Rules are never able to be stated in advance, or even in the present tense: the rules always *will have been* (future anterior). Spivak gives the example of speaking to an audience -- one never knows who the audience one addresses is or *is going to be*:

> The audience is not an essence, the audience is a blank. An audience can be constituted by people I cannot even imagine ... what I cannot imagine stands guard over everything that I must/can do, think, live. ... The most radical challenge of deconstruction is that notion of thought being a blank part of the text given over to a future that is not just a future present but always a future anterior. It never will be, but always will have been ... (Spivak 1993, 22).

Because the event *by its nature* breaks representational forms, our certitude about the "essence" or "definition" of the event is not possible. The rules for understanding or interpreting the event can then never be *known in advance* but *after the fact*, brought about after the event *has come*.

Indeterminate judgement also raises the stakes of the *political*. The very different sense of the subject and of temporality (the event or the future anterior) profoundly impacts the nature of the social and strategies of political action.

As early as 1984, efforts were underway in literary criticism to arrange discussions between leftist and deconstructionalist critics to debate the very nature of "politics," with leftists lining up as political "activists" vs. deconstructionists' "discursive" or "textual" politics (Johnson in Con Davis and Schliefer 1985, 78). Then, as now in the later 1990s, there are continuous efforts and struggles over the terrain of politics and the social: in education efforts at "appropriating postmodernism as a part of a broader pedagogical project that reasserts the primary of the political" (Giroux in Peters 1995, xiv-xv) and critical pedagogy's efforts at "appropriating deconstructive readings of discursive formations" (McLaren in Peters 1995, 88) illustrate leftist insistence that postmodern and poststructural practices remain *differential* and that caution must be exercised with postmodern philosophy.[22] Generally, efforts to "translate" Derrida's deconstruction or Lyotard's figural belie

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[22] Giroux and McLaren's comments in Michael Peter's *Education and the Postmodern Condition* (Westport Conn: Bergin and Garvey, 1995) are significant for our purposes here, as this volume focuses largely on Lyotard's work.

Spivak's admonishment that poststructural efforts "produce no simple models for political action" but instead constitute the very *rethinking* of the political (Spivak, 1980, 29). Much early leftist criticism of poststructural work constructs "politics" as almost transcendental, or certainly a metalanguage capable of *translating* competing or conflicting theories or languages into a common framework or field in which they could be *comparatively judged*. These judgements typically resort to whether or not a certain political "discourse" or "text" is concerned enough with the *literal*, with "real people" (or in the case of education, "real school or classroom situations"). There is a strong sense here that the literal *faithfully* and *directly* conveys the properties of things, whereas figural language is of a *secondary* nature, a detour or mediating force within language. As Giroux complains, "... left critics often assume the moral high ground and muster their theoretical machinery with binary oppositions that create postmodern fictions, on one side, and politically correct, materialist freedom fighters on the other" (Giroux in Peters 1995, xii). For such critics, "political" action is grounded in the literal, the *real*: for them, it is only through recourse to the real that discursive or rhetorical ("textual") *ideology* can be escaped from. Everything in a poststructural or postmodern world is "just" text.

Certainly the statement that "everything is just text" *distorts* the poststructural claim merely that there is no referent that can possibly be *exterior* to the effects of textuality, and stating that discourse is just word manipulation, or figurative/flowery prose *negates* the relationship between discourse and its material effects. For in this struggle *over the political itself*, the politics of moving "outside of the text" into "real politics," or "outside" the rhetorical and "back to" the literal must be considered. To a large extent, "playing politics" works by denying *its* politics, and leftist criticism is no exception. For in conditioning "politics" as a solidified and non-controversial signifier such critics deny their own actions to en(close) the meaning of the signifier "politics" *reducing* it in meaning to think politics as merely empirical, a pre-linguistic real. It is, in fact, just such an action that Lyotard opposes in advocating indeterminate judgement as a profoundly ethical and *just* activity.

Lyotard would consider a move to establish the justice of a normative (or prescriptive) ethical judgement by reference to a *representable* order or schema profoundly unethical, for it is only in indeterminate judgement (without a prior criteria) that we can possibly avoid the terror of *naturalizing* a definition of the real that has been configured into a state of "truth" (Lyotard 1989, 46). Lyotard instead reclaims the signifier "politics" away from leftist (and other) acts of enclosure, rendering a Marxist *surety* into an *embattled* territory. Justice is not served, for Lyotard, by the determinant use of signifiers because of the silencing effect it has on those outside of the representational schemas that create such a determined use in the first instance. An injustice, then, is "a damage [dommage] accompanied by the loss of the means to prove the damage" (Lyotard 1988, 22). While indeterminate judgement provides a *witness* to the figural, those *outside* of any predetermined signification of "political" or "just" or any other determinate signifier are rendered *non-existent*, for it is impossible to witness to a signification not understood under current representational schemas as "political" or "just," etc. Lyotard uses the example of how capitalist hegemony assumes that everything is representable by money: anyone who attempts to prove otherwise simply does not exist, is not heard (Lyotard 1988, 138).

It is this effect of silencing that makes leftist criticism's bifurcation of a supposed "pre-linguistic" real from text or discourse so significant for Lyotard's ethics. For to render discourse a mere detour from the real is to ignore the material effects of such determinate manipulations of signifiers. To define "women" according to a determinant criteria of citizenship as exclusively male is to create the material effect of excluding and disenfranching women and to render female protest of injustice at such an act incomprehensible. Similarly, writing "Lyotard" as "not political" renders this author disenfranchised as a serious player, ineffective as an "activist" – and makes his testimony to the contrary invalid. In the political stakes of the figural, the possibilities of politics itself are at stake. The *force* of indeterminate judgement in witnessing to the figural lies not with the definition or assembly of new models of political "activism" or practise, but in a *vigilance* in the continued interrogation of the political with the recognition that the rules for judging the political as event always *will have been* understood *after* the event.

As stated previously, in schools and in educational research we appear to spend very little time engaged in acts of indeterminate judgement: there are so very many determinate criteria to learn and know. As Readings suggests, in education we perform many gestures of grounding, centering ourselves in such determinate criteria:

> Each of these descriptions of education performs an initial gesture of centering: each writer takes him or herself to stand at the *center* of the educational process. What seems to me most worthwhile about Jean-Francois Lyotard's long history of writings on education is ... to insist that [the educational process] is not best understood from the point of view of a sovereign subject that takes itself to be the sole guarantor of the meanings of that process (Readings 1995, 193).

The power of indeterminate judgement is in its recognition of the figural not as a singular presence, but a co-presence of radically incommensurate elements, and of the event as capable of rupturing representation itself, disrupting all frames of reference at its arrival so as to be unspeakable, unpresentable. With such differing notions of the subject and temporality, the nature of the social and the political are, as Lyotard says, "immediately deferred ... the social is the referent of a judgement to be always done over again" (Lyotard 1988, 140). And so it is with the indeterminate judgement of pedagogy, curriculum, schooling, and particularly in the case of this work, *educational research*.

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Part II

FLIGHT LINES AS TRANSFORMATIONS: AN ANTI-GENEOLOGY

The rhizome is an anti-geneology.

Gilles Deleuze in Boundas, *The Deleuze Reader*, 1993, 36.

The period 1969-1980 saw the publication of three rather ferocious attacks on the field of curriculum studies. As mentioned previously, Dwayne Huebner in 1975 declared the field "moribund" and indeed even "dead" from lack of unity and focus (Huebner, 1976). Philip Jackson in 1980 ended this period of attacks with the parochial conclusion its roots resided in intergenerational warfare between an older group genuflecting at the altar of Tyler and Dewey, and an upstart, feisty (but disconcerting) youth movement who dared to even assert there was a curriculum "field" (Jackson, 1980). But perhaps the most interesting of the three was the first of these attacks, published by Joseph Schwab in 1969, and framing the curriculum field's "moribund" state as a function of its apparent "flight from the practical" (Schwab 1969, 1).

Outlining the curriculum field as "moribund" and "frustrated" because of an "inveterate and unexamined reliance on theory," Schwab boldly stated *theoretic* knowledge as that which was bound to fail because of its *systematic* nature, and its practitioners' commitment to engage in intellectual inquiry *prior to* any adequate *reason* for such enquiry or adequate statement of the *use-value* of such enquiry (Schwab 1969, 1-3). The incapacity of theoretic knowledge to arrive at *solutions* to problems in schools, or to *realize* proposed solutions to school problems characterized for Schwab the dichotomy between the "theoretic" (concerned with knowledge) and the "practical" (concerned with "choice and action") (ibid, 2-3). Schwab believed the curriculum field to be overly-absorbed in the pursuit of such theoretic knowledge and unconcerned with the "practical," a situation he termed a "flight from the subject of the field" (ibid, 3).

Schwab evidently did not choose the crisis metaphor of "flights" in a cliched or inadvertent manner, for directly following this image he devoted two entire sections to describing six signs or symptoms of this "flight" from the proper business of the curriculum field. Such "flights," for Schwab, included those "from the field itself," characterized by how field practitioners are eliminated from solving problems in favor of other specialists, flights "upward" from the specifics of the field to talk "about" the field, flights "downward" by practitioners wishing to return the field to a purer, more "innocent" state, flights "to the sidelines" which abandoned the problematics of the field in favor of observation, comment, histories or criticism, repetitive "flights" into old/familiar knowledge, and flights into mere ad homenium attacks of other scholars. While Schwab stated that these six signs are "not all or equally reprehensible," (acknowledging that some "flights" may contribute to resolving the curriculum field's current crisis (ibid, 4), his use of phrases such as "exploitation of the exotic and fashionable," "diseases," and "new, rabble-rousing" to describe theoretic knowledge leave little doubt he views such flights from the practical with distain (ibid, 5-6). Schwab definitely had in mind some other sorts of "movement" which would save curriculum studies, other than these "signs of collapse of principles in a field" (ibid, 5).

Schwab was not the only author describing "lines of flight" and their relation to the movement of a field during this decade, but one would have to look to another continent and another academic field to find a second set of authors – French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari's "Rhizome: Introduction" (1976)[1] diagrams the "arborescent" or tree-like nature of Western philosophy, which writes hierarchical and totalizing narratives with stratified and limited interconnections in thought. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari posture a "rhizomatic" or rhizome-like complex of interconnected and wildly proliferating elements, not unlike rabbit burrows (Deleuze in Boundas 1993, 27-29). Rhizomes, unlike trees, are non-hierarchical multiplicities which generate horizontal, arbitrary links between ideas and therefore cannot be regulated. This inability to be controlled is especially important for Deleuze and Guattari, because it expresses their psychoanalytic conclusion that the unconscious acts not as an "origin" of "hidden" representations or veiled meanings, but is instead merely a random, productive *machine* which creates contingent connections that can *block or unblock* proliferations of desire.

The rhizomatic quality of the unconscious becomes significant for Deleuze and Guattari throughout their work in *Anti-Oedipus* (1983) and beyond. In conceptualizing an Oedipalizing world they describe lines of rupture or *flight* which allow a way "out," a movement which *transforms* or *changes* a situation. Such an act occurs by *deterritorialization*, where traditional codes, languages, and practices are troubled so they cannot limit or control relations, and then *reterritorialized* into another organization or coding.[2] The line of flight for Deleuze and Guattari is not necessarily *positive*, or a movement toward *freedom*, as "there is still a danger that you will encounter organizations that restratify everything...microfacisms just waiting to crystallize" (Boundas 1993, 32). Such lines of flight can therefore be classified as *anti-genealogies*, in the sense there are no

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[1] First printed in Paris (Les Editions de Minuit) in 1976, it was reprinted in 1980 with modifications as the Introduction to *Mille Plateaux* (with Felix Guattari) and later translated by Brian Massumi as *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

[2] In *Anti-Oedipus*, capitalism deterritorializes desire by undermining traditional kinship systems and folk traditions, and then reterritorializing desire into the narrow definition of the *nuclear family* as the only (Oedipal) expression of desire).

prescribed or *required* hierarchical means to transform a situation but rather in Deleuze and Guattari's words "there are only lines" which make the multiplicity (a particular set of relations or organization of elements) proliferate and change (ibid, 31). The machine-like quality of rhizomatic structures is therefore neither good nor bad, but *generative*: not genealogical with lines of particular descent, but productive, connective lines. Deleuze and Guattari's advice becomes the following:

> Write, form a rhizome, increase your territory by deterritorialization, extend the line of flight to the point where it becomes an abstract machine covering the entire plane of consistency (ibid, 34).

Interestingly enough, Schwab, like Deleuze and Guattari, calls curriculum a "machine," but charges that theory *interrupts* this machine by posturing "*new* notions of person, group or society, mind or knowledge, which give rise to suggestions of *new* things curriculum might be or do" (my emphasis, 1969, 16). For Schwab, the practical *surpasses* the theoretical because it takes into account the *success and failures* of the machine's *present* workings, because it is "commanded to determine the whole array of possible effects of proposed change, to determine what frictions and deficiencies the proposed change may unintentionally produce" (ibid, 16-17). Indeed, for Schwab *novelty* becomes a disruptive antithesis to the curricular machine, which functions as a self-guided adjudicator of its own achievements and ills. The job of curricularists for Schwab is to test the machine (test students' subject matter knowledge, but also assess students' adaptation to life and work – 1969, 17), articulate its deficiencies, and "repair" it. Schwab's dichotomy of practical *vs.* theoretical breaks down later in the article when he suggests the practical also engage in *anticipatory* alternatives to problems yet not encountered (which sounds suspiciously like generating new "theories" based on "abstract" or hypothetical situations), and that the practical generate the greatest possible number and diversity of alternatives (which also sounds suspiciously like engaging in novel, creative, *theoretical* work), but his metaphor of curriculum as *machine* is intriguing. For Schwab, the curricular "machine" is a productive mechanism only if it is continually tinkered with, tested and fixed utilizing normative judgements of "success" or "failure." Unlike Deleuze and Guattari, he does not see the curricular machine as producing an event or order (be it social, economic, political, etc.). For Schwab, the six lines of flight in the 1970 curriculum field are *naïve* at best, and useless at worst – perhaps a childish avoidance of the real issues at hand. For Deleuze and Guattari, all flights are productive in the sense they always generate/transform into a new order; the desiring machines that drive them are *never* broken, or in need of "repair." Schwab leaves us in a social world of either "positive," *use-ful* curricular change, or a null/negative environment marked by criticism, use-less "in-fighting" and despair, a seemingly endless "procession of ephemeral bandwagons" (1969, 22).

Deleuzian Lines/Rhizomatic Flights

> The rhizome is altogether different, a *map and not a tracing*. Make a map, not a tracing. ...What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that...the map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious. ...The map is open and connectable in all its dimensions...A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes back "to the same." The map has to do with performance, whereas

> the tracing always involves an alleged "competence"...
>
> Deleuze in *The Deleuze Reader*, Ed. Constantin Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press) 1993, 35.

Joseph Schwab's 1969 "lines of flight" certainly still resonate with the state of the curricular field in 2000: curricular change still often comes from the "top" down – from ministries or state boards of education and politicians rather than from classroom teachers and practitioners; curricularists can still be accused of "talking about" metatheories in curriculum studies rather than working through the perennial dilemmas of the field; teacher-practitioners often ignore curricularists and scholars and focus on the seemingly "plain facts" in their classrooms; curricularists move outside the field to chronicle it; Tylerians and Deweyans continue to repeat (seemingly) old "tried-and-true" wisdom; and ad homenium attacks do occur between curriculum scholars. But rather than viewing these flights as *misguided*, "naïve" or *purposeless*, following Deleuze and Guattari I wish to *run the curricular machine*, to write, to extend lines of flight in the knowledge that such an endeavor is productive, generative, deterritorializing, (or in Derrida's term) curriculum *at the limit*. Figure, figurality, indeterminate judgement can serve as such lines of flight, a means of transforming 'postmodern' curriculum studies in a rhizomatic, non-systematizing manner.

Perhaps all of the essays that follow would qualify, for Schwab, as flights from "the field itself" and flights "upward," for they form rhizomatic connections between education, philosophy, literary criticism, aesthetics, and many other fields of study. In a Deleuzian manner, I am unconcerned (or perhaps hopeful) if this is the case. These essays were written at different times and circumstances. "Art as Education, Education as Art: The Utility of the Aesthetic in (Post)Modern Education" begins with a review of the oft-described "foundational" work of Elliot Eisner in qualitative educational research and in his utilization of the metaphor "education as art": no doubt this, for Schwab, would be a flight out of the field, or perhaps a flight upward to metatheoretical commentary. "Unlearning the 3R's (Relativism, Realism and Reflection): Narrative as Figural" annotates narrative research methods in teacher education and teacher research: here I am probably closest to passing a Schwabian *normative* judgement on the state of this body of knowledge, but attempt to transform it through a line of writing narrative as *figural* rather than modernist. In "Occasioning Relations: Writing History as Deferred Action" my flight is toward the Schwabian "sidelines" as I perform both *as* curricular historian and *on* the writing of curriculum history. My line of flight in the final essay, "Race, Singularity, Context: Reading Epistemology in Tyler's *Rationale*," for Schwab might fall within a "circular" path, repeating old knowledge (but only to re-write, tranform, re-figure it). Surely any of these essays could, for Schwab, fall into a line of flight epitomized as "ad homenium attack," for as deterritorializations and reterritorializations, rhizomes rarely result in repetitions of the Same (let alone laudatory repetitions). These lines of flight certainly form "signs of collapse of principles in a field" (Schwab 1969, 5) if the principles in the curriculum field can only be construed as the stratified lines of a hierarchial genealogy. As Deleuze writes:

> There are only lines. When Glen Gould speeds up the performance of a piece, he is not just displaying virtuosity, he is transforming the musical points into lines, he is making the whole piece proliferate. ...The ideal for a book would be to lay everything out on a plane of exteriority of this kind, on a single page, the same sheet: lived events, historical determinations, concepts, individuals, groups, social formations. Kleist invented a writing of this type, a broken chain of affects and variable speeds, with accelerations and ransformations... Open rings. (Deleuze in Boundas 1993, 31-32.)

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Art in Education, Education as Art: The Utility of the Aesthetic in (Post)Modern Education

"Art in Education, Education as Art: The Utility of the Aesthetic in (Post)Modern Education" is the earliest of these four essays, composed while I was a masters' student at Stanford University. This essay was written in response to my need as a classroom teacher to answer the eternal student question of how, if there weren't "right or wrong" answers in the humanities, could performances (essays, responses, etc.) be *judged*? For many students *uncomfortable* in the humanities, students with better marks in English or social studies must belong to some sort of secret bohemian order, or are perhaps simply blessed with more karma. The work of Elliot Eisner in qualitative research at first glance seemed capable of assuaging this torment; Eisner provides *criteria* such as the use of self as perceptual instrument, the use of expressive language, attention to details, and the antecedent (genre or disciplinary) knowledge of a connoisseur, all of which help to both explain and justify such *qualitative* performances of judgement. I always did have some questions about Elliot's use of "connoiseurship" as evaluation principle, but the real difficulty was with how his *use* of the arts in education always leaned towards a subject-centered, Romantic interpretation I found somewhat unconvincing. In the essay that follows I attempt a poststructural use of art and aesthetics for education, in some ways de-forming (by essentially *being figural for*) Elliot's work, but in the endeavor to write a stronger case for qualitative research and a qualitative approach in education.

ART IN EDUCATION, EDUCATION AS ART: THE UTILITY OF THE AESTHETIC IN (POST)MODERN EDUCATION

The adventures of the aesthetic make up one of the great narratives of modernity: from the time of its autonomy through-art-for-arts-sake to its status as a necessary negative category, a critique of the world as it is. [The postmodern as] "Anti-aesthetic" ... signals that the very notion of the aesthetic, its network of ideas, is in question here ...

Hal Foster, *The Anti-Aesthetic*, 1983, xv

...one must be able to use language to reveal what, paradoxically, words can never say. This means that voice must be heard in the text, alliterations allowed, and cadences encouraged. Relevant allusions should be employed, and metaphors that by suggestion used. All of these devices and more are much a part of the tool kit of those conducting qualitative inquiry ...

Elliot Eisner, *The Enlightened Eye*, 1991, 3

... modern aesthetics is an aesthetic of the sublime, though a nostalgic one. It allows the presentable to be put forward only as the missing contents: but the form, because of its recognizable consistency, continues to offer to the reader or view matter for solace and pleasure.

Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, 1991, 81

... whenever the aesthetic is involved as an appeal to clarity and control, whenever, in other words, a symptom is made into a remedy for the disorder it signals, a great deal of caution is in order.

Paul de Man, *The Resistance to Theory*, 1986, 64

As Hal Foster comments, the postmodern condition and postmodern theorizing profoundly impact paradigms and ways of understanding the world, and the realm of *aesthetics* is no exception. In educational discourses generally, educational *research* discourses, and *pedagogical* discourses, art and aesthetics have often been introduced as avante garde practices intended to rupture and rethink taken-for-granted routines. The work of Maxine Greene (1978) or Madeline Grumet (1975), or a volume such as George Willis and William Schubert's *Reflections From The Heart of Educational Inquiry: Understanding Curriculum and Teaching Through the Arts* (1991) advocate aesthetic responses as *alternative* to dominant ways of seeing in curriculum and instruction. Elliot Eisner's (1985, 1991) work in educational evaluation and qualitative research postures the arts and aesthetic judgement as (an)other possible practice than quantitative methods. Eisner also popularized the term "teacher as artist," enlisting art as an image to inspire differing pedagogical practices (1983).

In all of these "uses" for aesthetic practices, the arts function as elements, methods or practices *other than* the dominant traditions in education, educational research and pedagogy. Whether traced through a chronological line the likes of E.L. Thorndike's "science" of human behavior, Frederick Taylor's industrial scientific management, or Franklin Bobbitt and Ralph Tyler's rational, systematic, linear planning approaches fostered by an "instrumental rationality" (Eisner 1985, 8-19), aesthetic and artistic approaches in education are articulated as a *countering force* to (in no particular order) science, rationality, instrumental or efficiency-driven practices, "top-down" management styles, linear, systematic or technical processes, or quantitative inquiry methods. Art is employed most often in education *in defiance* of the norm (whatever that norm might be). Interestingly, similar claims against dominant educational traditions and practices are sometimes said to constitute *postmodern* approaches in education. Slattery's (1995) definitions are typical:

> Postmodern curriculum prioritizes the dramatic, the artistic, the nonrational, and the intuitive dimensions of the human person ... (209). Curriculum leaders must begin by replacing inspectional and clinical models with phenomenology, autobiography, and metaphorical reflections that utilize multi- and extrasensory phenomena and perceptions ... Only in this way will we move toward the postmodern aesthetic curriculum (211).

If artistic and aesthetic approaches serve as oppositional or alternative positions to dominant traditions in education, can these aesthetic practices also be seen as *poststructural* interruptions, or are even other directions possible? What is the *status* of these aesthetic intrusions upon "business-as-usual" in education, and what roles might the aesthetic play if *postmodern discourses* about the function and purpose of aesthetics are taken into account? For all the talk of challenging dominant discourses of education through art and aesthetics, have the possibilities of education as art and art as education been fully activated and explored?

The Art of the Sublime: (Ab)use of the Aesthetic

One of the more infamous debates about the role of the aesthetic and postmodernity, dividing the postmodern "project" from Enlightenment ideals is between Jurgen Habermas and Jean-Francois Lyotard. While never debating one another formally, Lyotard's essay "Answering the question: what is the postmodern?" is a thinly-veiled reaction to Jurgen Habermas' 1980 essay "Modernity vs. postmodernity," an address delivered upon receiving the Adorno prize in Frankfurt (Habermas in Foster, 1983).

For Lyotard, the postmodern is an art of the sublime, a *counterforce* to the more harsh commodification engendered in modern capitalistic society. The sublime, for Kant, is the imagination's experience of an object which, while exciting, cannot be realized or represented in sensory form: we cannot completely know or judge it (Kant 1951, 83). Because the sublime cannot be made present, Lyotard sees art as a potentially resistant factor against capitalistic commodification.

Lyotard's enlistment of art as sublime directly challenges Habermas' project to repair Enlightenment reason through recourse to, and *use* of, the aesthetic. Adorno, like Lyotard, held out hope of redemption through the aesthetic but feared it had been taken over by instrumental reason, given that violence and terror has been perpetuated in the name of reason by totalitarian regimes pursuing irrational ends (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972). Habermas critiques Adorno's view that Enlightenment reason failed because of its instrumental nature, arguing instead the Enlightenment project was merely "incomplete" because human reason had been compromised by capitalistic definitions of reason as narrow, instrumental, efficient expertise (Habermas, 1987). This compromised definition and role for reason has undermined modernity by overvaluing the cognitive to the diminishment of the aesthetic and the practical (moral). Art, and the aesthetic in all its forms must be *enlisted*, argues Habermas, in making us aware of the embodied nature of experience, and thus serving to *complete* the current impoverished working of reason. For Habermas, if the aesthetic could only be freed from its current instrumental role as expert critical taste it would expand the status of knowledge by encouraging wider participation, and therefore social unity through a fully enlightened, reasonable community.

For Lyotard, Habermas' *use* of the aesthetic to expedite social consensus amounts to little more than co-optation: in a world where consensus of every order appears to be rupturing, and where the legitimation of knowledge itself is being questioned, such easy and immediate recourse to the aesthetic seems to dangerously evoke little more than cheap feeling or sentiment to enhance a *sensus communis* (Lyotard 1988, 169). Lyotard would much rather keep the aesthetic as a non-utilitarian, separate realm resisting commodification by being witness to, but *unable to represent* the unpresentable (Lyotard 1989, 82). For Lyotard, any attempt to *realize* the sublime in a political or other agenda could result in the terror of a coerced cultural unity. The art of the sublime, therefore, cannot and must not be conceptualized. Lyotard's statement on such a postmodern aesthetics is quite clear:

> The postmodern would be that which ... puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable. ... it must be clear that it is our business not to supply reality but to invent allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented (Lyotard 1989, 81).

Just *how* art and aesthetics are to maintain their autonomy and not allow themselves to be instrumentally commodified for Lyotard involves conceiving aesthetics and representation as neither *formally* recognizable nor utilitarian in relation to the other faculties. Whether or not this sensibility is or can be incorporated into educational studies, and what roles art and the aesthetics can play, are the central themes explored in this essay.

Eisner's "Enlightened"/(Enlightenment) Eye

> The real debate of literary theory is not with its polemical opponents but rather with its own methodological assumptions and possibilities. Rather than asking why literary theory is threatening, we should perhaps ask why it has such difficulty going about its business...(de Man, 1986, 12)

As mentioned previously, Elliot Eisner is well-known in educational research circles as a border-crosser, introducing aesthetic criteria and categories into education, and particularly into educational evaluation and research. Equally infamous are Eisner's long-term battles pitting methods derived from the arts as "qualitative" research against social science norms of "quantitative" research in education (see, for example, Eisner's "The Primacy of Experience and the Politics of Method," *Educational Researcher* 17:5, 1988, 15-20). Eisner's goal, stated quite clearly at the beginning of one of his most definitive works on qualitative research, is as follows:

> The arts and the humanities have provided a long tradition of ways of describing, interpreting, and appraising the world: history, art, literature, dance, drama, poetry and music are among the most important forms through which humans have represented and shaped their experience. These forms have not been significant in

> educational inquiry for reasons that have to do with a limited and limiting conception of knowledge. My aim in this book is to explore some of the ways in which the methods, content, and assumptions in the arts, humanities, and social sciences might be used to help us better understand our schools and classrooms. My aim is to expand the ways in which we think about inquiry in education, and to broaden our views about what it means to "know" (Eisner 1991, 2).

In this sense, Eisner's purpose in the promotion of qualitative inquiry is to *use* artistic forms and aesthetic criteria *instrumentally* to conduct research in education. "The reason," states Eisner, "for emphasizing voice and other tropes is not to gussy up language so that it is 'humanistic' or 'artsy'; it is to serve epistemological interests. What we look for, as well as what we see and say, is influenced by the *tools* we know how to use and believe to be appropriate" (1991, 4, auth.'s emphasis). For Eisner, the arts can provide a set of formal qualities and criteria that, until lately, had not been utilized in educational research: metaphor and figurative language instead of literal description, musical qualities such as cadence or phrasing, film or other visual techniques, attention to emotion or feelings about educational settings and actors, and in general, attention to the *qualities* of schools and school settings (1991, 3, 17-23, 27-40). Indeed, on several occasions in *The Enlightened Eye* Eisner reduces artistic or aesthetic criteria, describing their usefulness as "tools" (1991, 3, 4, 89, 95, 200, 211). These "tools" are *utilized* in an effort to *generate truth*. For Eisner, language "reveals" (1991, 3), a work of fiction "captures" some aspect of reality (ibid, 50), clarity of writing "allows us to participate vicariously" (ibid, 95) and "good writers put you there" (ibid, 37).

Eisner's work in employing artistic practices and aesthetic criteria through qualitative research therefore, serves purely *modernist* ends: what Readings (1994, 74) describes as a modernist aesthetic innovation to either create new ways of telling the truth, or to find a new truth in the telling. This is a far cry from Lyotard's postmodern aesthetics, where the goal is to *displace* truth, to find no comfort or solace in good forms. Despite Eisner's insistence on adhering to the pursuit of truth, his energetic introduction of new (aesthetic) methods into educational research *has* begun to change to definition of truth and the nature and status of what constitutes "research." Thus for Denis Phillips, Eisner is an artist but *not* a researcher because artists are not objective enough: rather, they *impose* their creative *will* on a situation. Artists do not create works that are either correct or incorrect, because they do not enlist *propositions* or *warrants* for truth; and artists work hard at descriptive or interpretive *artistry*, but not on the validity of their claims to truth (Phillips 1995, 74-77). In short, Phillips' argument illustrates to what extent Eisner's qualitative/aesthetic methods *have* altered discourses of truth and research (even though Phillips *discounts* these alternative interpretations of what truth and research can be).

While Eisner can be said to fall within a modernist aesthetic agenda of merely *inventing new methods* of finding truth, he does at times skirt close to a postmodern sensibility of the crisis in representation. In *The Enlightened Eye*, Eisner expounds the problems of (both ontological and procedural) objectivity, insisting the only secure knowledge of correct correspondence between our views of reality and reality itself requires direct knowledge of reality itself *and* of our representation; his comment "But if we knew reality as it really is, we would not need to have a view of it ... since we cannot have knowledge of reality as it is, we cannot know if our view corresponds to it" (1991, 45) expresses a very *central* view of the postmodern representational crisis. Similarly, Eisner is concerned that differing forms of representation (symbol systems) offer selectively different views of the world "Because any symbol system both reveals and conceals, its use provides of necessity a partial view of the reality it is intended to describe" (1991, 46). He even goes so far as to wonder, "Without an anchor, how can we maintain our stability?" (47). Eisner's response to these limitations of representation, however, falls firmly within a modernist stance, resorting to individual subjectivity to explain away (and simultaneously justify) the multiple perspectives engendered by the *representational crisis*. "To deny that we can have autologically objective knowledge," Eisner notes, "is to say that whatever we come to know about the world will be known through our experience. ... Indeed, I believe it is far more liberating to live in a world with many different paradigms and procedures than in one with a single official version of the truth or how to find it." (1991, 47-48). Eisner goes on to ground knowledge in the individual subjective experience of culture, language, experience, and genetic capabilities, missing the point that the subject who narrates such experience is itself constituted *by being narrated* (Readings 1991, 80). Eisner is apparently not able to engage in a postmodern willingness to *displace* the pursuit of truth, to question aesthetic production as something *other than* the self-conscious will of the artist, or to ask as Lyotard does, after the unpresentable or the capacity of indeterminate judgement (judgement *other than* that linked to his *instrumental* aesthetic criteria).

In the quote at the beginning of this essay, Paul de Man expresses concern that literary theory suffers more from internal methodological inconsistencies, and it is my contention that Eisner's insertion of aesthetic criteria into educational research renders the same problem unto qualitative educational research. His *instrumental* use of aesthetic criteria to display truth, and his recourse to a supposed "foundational" subjectivity to handle the crisis of representation are familiar modernist postures in the face of epistemological uncertainties. But there is a less obvious, and more insidious internal inconsistency that plagues Eisner's qualitative methods: his *instrumental* use of language (writing) in a research methodology purportedly devoted to furthering the importance of *aesthetics* and the *arts*.

The *social sciences*, for Eisner, use language in operational, propositional, non-affective and depersonalizing ways that can tend to diminish figural associations (1991, 28-29). But for all his acclaim of the richness of artistic forms, Eisner's description of the nature of language and how language is to be used in qualitative research appears rather mechanical. He writes over and again of one's ability to "use" language (1991, 3, 4, 36, 38), "exploiting" language (4), and the importance of craft and skill in constructing expressive writing (19, 21, 37, 89, 191). There appears to be little doubt for Eisner that language translates the world quite expressively – while some languages describe "literally," others "metaphorically," Eisner seems to view these as only more or less *effective* ways of expressing the world; there appears to him no dramatic difficulty with language as representational device *itself*. Here, Eisner refuses the postmodern concern that there *is* no pure expressivity to language, and that because language and the world do not share a common nature, to translate one to the other always involves an act of violence (Lyotard 1971, Derrida 1976). This would seem particularly odd, given Eisner's stubborn insistence on *defending* difference in the arts as he cites Dewey's (1934) assertion that science merely states meanings while art expresses them. Yet despite *this* difference, Eisner assumes language's clarity, its seemingly transparent *ability* to articulate experience, if only handled with the finesse afforded a skilled craftsperson. This erasure of difference in face of incommensurability will be reiterated in Eisner's introduction of art and the aesthetic into pedagogical practice as well.

In Paul de Man's terminology, Eisner's Enlightenment view of language betrays a "resistance" to the figurative or rhetorical aspect of language which de Man terms "aesthetic ideology".[1] For de Man, aesthetic ideology is precisely "the confusion of linguistic with natural reality, of reference with phenomenalism" (1986, 11), a supposedly *achieved* harmony unifying nature and mind which is closely associated with high Romantic or symbolist aesthetics. For Romanticists such as Wordsworth and Coleridge, de Man argues, *metaphor* and *symbol* became privileged tropes because both appear to assure the possibility of a state beyond the dichotomies of subject and object, mind and nature. For Hegel, *symbol* appears to be able to locate the general through the particular, the universal in the special; as an *identifying* force, symbol seems capable of restoring a sense of physical immediacy to seemingly abstract form or structure (de Man, 1982). Similarly, *metaphor* becomes a privileged trope because it implies a special power of the creative imagination to effect a transformation, almost a metamorphosis of otherwise dichotomous elements (1979, 57-78). What is essentially ill-informed about the Romantic investment in symbol and metaphor for de Man is how both are seen as the wellsprings of artistic creativity for their ability to transcend (erase) the particulars and everyday contingencies of place and time. de Man compares the Romantic preference for symbol and metaphor with the lack of interest in allegory:

> Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and, renouncing the nostalgia and desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this temporal distance. (1983, 207).

For de Man it is not surprising that readers should seek to create and overvalue moments of transcendental, visionary "insights" which language cannot because of its temporal and contingent nature ever hope to achieve. But it is crucial not to be swayed by such aesthetic ideology because of its effacement of temporality and thus its reduction of history to a myth. "For it is as a political force that the aesthetic still concerns us as one of the most powerful ideological drives to act upon the reality of history" (de Man 1984, 264).

De Man attributes a Romantic aesthetic ideology to Hegel's history of Mind (or Spirit) as a journey of ever-increasing self-consciousness. For Hegel, the mind initially resides in a "primitive" state, unable to distinguish subject from object and thus exist in a sort of harmonious state with nature.[2] Consciousness evolves from this state through the onset of *reflection*, separating subject from object and estranging the self from nature, relegating the subject to a knowledge of representation *about* the world. This evolutionary narrative sets the stage for

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[1] This term is used in de Man's texts *The Rhetoric of Romanticism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), and the posthumously published *The Resistance to Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), and *Aesthetic Ideology* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

[2] This state seemingly coincides with Lacan's "imaginary" stage, prior to the onset of Oedipal law.

Romantic nostalgia, for a *return* to this past, more communal state with nature through a higher dialectical stage of *interiorization* "*recollection* as the inner gathering and preserving of experience" (de Man 1982, 771). Such a recollection offers redemptive insight which appears to transcend time and change, fuelling a sentimental belief in the power of privileged tropes (metaphor and symbol) to reconnect language with the world.

A belief in the power of language to (re)connect over space and time cannot, however, allow for the nature of language to be anything less than quite dependable and predictable: hence a corresponding indifferent response to the undecideability of language exemplified in wordplay, puns, and other ambiguities (de Man 1986, 64-65). Thus while Eisner asserts that "different languages" are evoked in art and science (1991, 28-29), that there are differences between "literal" or "metaphorical" descriptions (ibid, 46), and that individual subjectivity and subjective experiences alter interpretations (48-49), he is unwilling to discuss the fundamental "play" or undecideability of language *itself*, opting instead to describe language in terms of its *use-value* as a *tool*, manipulated more or less skillfully. de Man warns that in such a position, where "the aesthetic is involved as an appeal to clarity and control ... a great deal of caution is in order" (1986, 64) for "all the obstacles to understanding ... belong specifically to language rather than to the phenomenal world" (ibid, 62).

While it is certainly important enough that Eisner's use *for* language contradicts his Romantic belief in language's expressive and creative power, de Man has a second concern: that such a belief in aesthetic ideology arouses suspicion that "aesthetic judgement has trespassed beyond its legitimate reach" (1986, 64). The ideas of aesthetic ideology expressed by Romantic thinkers (in this case, de Man speaks of Schiller's *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*), that harmony *can* exist between the sensuous and cognitive faculties, or that language and the world *can* be reconciled, extend *beyond* aesthetics and into questions of politics, power and authority. Such a reconciliation or balance of forces implies a state *beyond* conflict which de Man argues is not just a commentary on aesthetics but "a principle of political value and authority that has its own claims on the shape and limits of our freedom" (1984, 264). In Schiller, as in other Romantic thought, a state "beyond" conflict appears utopian, engendering a belief in a future, "perfected" state of human development available by recalling a long-lost cultural order through the (atemporal) tropes of symbol and metaphor. Such mystification constitutes for de Man a "potentially violent streak in Schiller's own aesthetic theory" (ibid, 280). In my reading of Eisner's *Enlightened (Enlightenment) Eye*, this may appear as a bit of a stretch, but whenever special claims for artistic language are made, despite a manifested *use* of language as an instrumental "tool," caution is in order. Any excursion into the aesthetic is not separate from political considerations, and de Man demystifies the desire of aesthetic ideology that texts should always make sense because of some aesthetic, historical or hermeneutical model which appears to remove any obstacles in the way. Instead, we are left with de Man's caution "We [only] think we are at ease in our own language, we feel a coziness, a familiarity, a shelter in the language we call our own, in which we think that we are not alienated" (1986, 84).

Functional Figuring: Articulating the Teacher as Artist

While Eisner may be best known for his (utilitarian) introduction of art and aesthetics into educational research, his use of the term "teacher as artist" (Eisner, 1983) is also significant, if not its original articulation in the educational field. Gilbert Highet (1950) also emphasized the artistry of teaching, but in North America the association of teaching with art might be traced as far or farther back than to Col. Francis Wayland Parker (1837-1902) (Korzenik 1990, 141). Parker, an influential American educator, developed the image of the *learner* as artist but his thinking easily exemplifies *pedagogy* as "artistic." Studying in Europe in 1872, Parker was familiar with and likely incorporated Romantic views on education and pedagogy from Rousseau, Wordsworth, and Froebel (Korzenik 1990, 144-148). Eisner, like others before him including Parker, understands pedagogy as a form of art-making: "Teachers," writes Eisner, "are more like orchestra conductors than technicians" (Eisner 1983, 5). For Eisner, there are four senses in which teaching is an art: (1) if performed with enough skill, it can be regarded as "a form of artistic expression"; (2) teachers, "like painters, composers, actresses and dancers" *perceive* and organize, control qualities in the environment, thus exercising qualitative judgement; (3) teachers do not follow simple prescriptions but react in situ to unpredictable contingencies; and (4) teaching is characterized by improvisation and constant (re)creation of means and ends (Eisner 1994, 155). Underlying these four definitions are assumptions about the nature of aesthetic experience, the capacities of the artist, and the nature of metaphor and the figurative language itself that Eisner borrows and configures quite often from *Romantic*[3] thinking and philosophy.

For the Romantics, sensory perception of nature stimulates the imagination, which in turn fosters artistic and creative expression. In Wordsworth's *The Prelude*, a sense of wonder is attached to the sheer existence of an object:

And the world's nature produce, as it meets
the sense with less habitual stretch
of mind,
is pondered as a miracle. (*The Prelude*, 1805, cited in Abrams 1971, 524 ftnt. 11)

As well as being a miracle, for the Romantics Nature is also *agentic* for the manner in which it provides an education for the senses, an educational *journey* of the imagination and conscious self, without always knowing what the end brings until it achieves a more unified state (Abrams 1971, 190-191). For Eisner, the teacher as artist must react to and "read" the *emergent* qualities of the classroom, often *without* preconceived goals in mind; for artists the "ends achieved are emergent" (Eisner 1994, 155). The importance of both the sensory journey, and the flexibility necessary during this journey are important to Eisner because they foster for the child a climate of *play*, of exploration, gaming, risk-taking and discovery (Eisner 1994, 162). In some sense this description recalls the Romantic insistence on a *return* to child-like perception and wonder: as Coleridge put it, a state "as if all had then sprang forth at the first creative fiat," as "Few adult persons can see nature ... the lover of nature is he ... who has retained the spirit of infancy even into the era of manhood" (Coleridge in Abrams 1971, 380, 413). But for the Romantics, as well as Eisner, this *return* is a *refined restoration*, not merely nostalgia: for Eisner, play is to be converted into *games*, with more defined *parameters* than simple play (Eisner 1994, 162), and for Wordsworth childhood creativity can only grow and mature with "the discipline/And consummation of the Poet's mind" (quoted in Abrams 1971, 381). For Wordsworth, this circular journey back *through* childhood is of particular importance, as "Nature's self ... led me back to earlier counsels between head and heart": thus an artistic education re-creates a unity and wholeness in the artist (quoted in Abrams 1971, 284).

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[3] The label 'Romantic' can often be used in a perjorative sense, but I refer here to the intellectual traditions and ideas of the historical and literary events of the Romantic period, after the European Enlightenment and before the French Revolution.

For Eisner, the teacher-as-artist is particularly interested in pursuing a more "organic" and wholistically growth-orientated existence (Eisner 1994, 169). Eisner's sense of the teacher as exercising the ability to "control and organize classroom qualities" (ibid, 155) suggests an authoritative *subject* separated from its perceived *objects*, and his sense that teaching is an art when "performed with such skill and grace" (ibid, 154) urges a strong Romantic sense of self-determination and individualism. His admonition to teachers to "put your own signature on your own work" and "take pride in one's craft" (Eisner 1983, 12) further cements his Romantic sense of the teacher as strong subject, and makes one wonder if he does not, as the Romantics do, see teaching as a means to reclaim the original unity lost, and thus dulling perception to a more *mechanical* response. As Coleridge in *Biographical literaria* suggests, poetry should:

> ...give the charm of novelty to things of every day, and to excite a feeling analogous to the supernatural, by awakening the mind's attention from the lethargy of custom, and directing it to the loveliness and the wonders of the world before us ... in consequence of the film of familiarity ... we have eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand (quoted in Abrams 1971, 378).

Eisner envisions the teacher-as-artist as one who *needs* to gain satisfaction from teaching, indeed he likens this to a universal "human need for pride in crafts" (Eisner 1994, 169). For Eisner this satisfaction is an *emotional*, if not almost religious experience of being "swept up in the making of something beautiful," a "kind of glow that says you have touched my life" (Eisner 1983, 12). It is possibly this type of *rewarding* event, for Eisner, that helps (re)achieve a sense of totality and fulfillment for the (teacher-as-artist) subject, returning the subject back to itself through aesthetic expression.

While there appear to be many lines of connection and similarity between major tenets of Romantic thought and Eisner's teacher-as-artist, it is important to read this image as a rhetorical strategy: teachers may appear to be (or be argued for as) artists, but "teacher-as-artist" itself is also a *metaphor*, a particular *sort* of rhetorical figure with a particular *productive* operational *structure*. Traditionally, language is understood as an *instrument* by which "clear" signification occurs; thus, by setting a sign into "context" one can "read" signs clearly. Under this stance, a metaphor would not be a complicated thing, but rather a productive mechanism by which one could spin out any number of similarities, *apparently* getting us closer to a "definition" of teaching. Under this assumption, art or artistry can be assumed to "cover" the experience of teaching through metaphor by making the "strange" (teaching—that ubiquitous activity) into something "familiar" (the work of the artist, which Eisner, as art educator, can explain to the reader).

The difficulty with this view of metaphor is the assumption that one term can "remain stable" while only the other is transformed in the rhetorical figure. The metaphorical linking of teaching to the artist does not simply render teaching clearly understood in terms of the familiar (the slippery, too-wide terrain of "pedagogy" into "the music a composer writes", or "the performance of an actress" but may actually turn into a somewhat *unfamiliar entity*. Is the "music of the composer" a literal, material *object*, or a more ephemeral, abstract *attribute* of music or composing itself? The so-called "familiar" term is rendered undecideable through its use in the metaphor: we are never sure if the composer's "music" is literal or figurative for its involvement with "pedagogy." Thus metaphor is a type of metamorphosis, negating any "simple" translation between the two terms: as Lyotard suggests, the terms are not one literal and "solid," the other figural and "translated," but *co-present terms* which *resist* any easy linking or explanation *in terms of each other* (Lyotard, 1971). The singularity of teaching cannot be translated into artistry. One term does not simply "stand in" for another.

While critiquing Eisner's rather traditional use of metaphor as a productive "engine" of meaning may seem a bit fastidious, important consequences follow from Eisner's conception of metaphor as an aesthetic device. If metaphor is *not* conceived as an easy rephrasing of one term in terms of another, more traditional uses of metaphor would beg *ethical* questions: what is left out in an easy translation between incommensurate terms? what purposes do these erasures of difference serve? By defining teacher "as artist," Eisner stands to gain a seemingly *clearer* explanation of pedagogical activity, and certainly one which (because clear) can *oppose* conceptions of teaching as more technical, instrumental, *mechanical* in nature. By harmonizing, *equating* "teacher" and "artist," we might, for example, argue *against* conceptions of teaching we find hierarchical, unduly restricting or demeaning of the professionalism of teachers. We could, of course, complain (in a rather facile, "relativist" manner) that such a practice would simply be bad form because concepts can't be "pinned down" as totalizing absolutes, that "you can't ever really define" anything as complicated as teaching, that efforts to do so are rather fruitless. (Such would be the case with such neopragmatist "strains" or "postmodernism," such as those of Richard Rorty or Stanley Fish.)[4]

But what is compellingly significant in objecting to Eisner's use of metaphor is not the outcry against writing what Lyotard calls "metanarratives" (Lyotard, 1984), a metanarrative in this case, of pedagogy. Instead, what should be questioned are Eisner's twin underlying assumptions about language and the subject: that language *can* signify the world completely intelligible, and that the subject is in *control* of the language. For Eisner, the subject must serve as a foundation of reversibility, functioning as an unchanging (atemporal) bridge or backdrop by which language *clearly* and *always* transforms material objects in the world into symbols and lucid meaning. This belief negates any sense of the subject as in-process, protean, changing, and being temporally and spatially located in experience. Is such a subject possible?

Second, and equally if not more significant, Eisner's use of metaphor renders the incommensurate compatible, in accord, and especially *accounted-for*. Given the fact Eisner is keen to describe teaching as indeterminate, contingent, something done "on the wing," metaphor seems an especially inappropriate figure to describe an activity so intangible, fluid, unanticipated, *emergent*. Deborah Britzman, in her work on teaching, highlights the pedagogical experience as "fundamentally scary," an event where "things do not go according to plan," surprising, even "uncanny" (Britzman 1991a, 60). For Britzman, pedagogy is a site of *fluctuating* subjectivity rather than an event where subjectivity forms a solid "platform" on which to *build knowledge*: "pedagogy has as much to do with fashioning desires, investments, and identities as it does with constructing and interpreting knowledge" (ibid, 78). As such, pedagogical sites are sites of *writing* identity, *performing* investments, but also writing "off" other identities, *erasing* other desires and investments (Britzman 1991b). In Britzman's study, the efforts of two critical student teachers in a 10th grade literature class to introduce supposedly liberating feminist discourses "go awry" because they fail to take into account their own investments as feminist educators, but also fail to see their students as subject-in-process with deeply-held desires and identities not necessarily compatible with, or receptive to, feminist knowledge or identities. If, as Eisner wishes to claim, teaching is (or should be) the site of invention, of teacher "growth" and play, his *harmonizing* of radical incommensurability through metaphor, and his *quieting* of the contingencies of subjectivity carries with it an investment in everything *but* fostering the type of "individualistic," creative and "developing" teachers-as-artists he claims to support. Eisner's use of metaphor is inappropriate not because there is "more than one definition of teaching," but because of the *erasures* in subjectivity he fosters in assuming a transcendent, universal teacher-subject in control of classroom qualities and meanings. The *important* question to ask of Eisner's metaphor is not "what other definitions of teaching might there be" but "who (or what identities) are "not allowed" or under erasure by Eisner's metaphor of teaching?" Why does Eisner write a site of unified and stable subjectivities that do not, in reality, exist? If Eisner wishes to shift the definition of the teacher from someone *constrained* by instrumental, mechanical approaches to teaching, he must re-write his teacher as subject with possibilities for shifting identity and identification, as never monolithic.

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[4] See Stanley Fish, *Is There A Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), or Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). See also the essay "Unlearning the 3R's (Relativism, Realism and Reflection): Narrative as Figural" included in this manuscript.

Possibilities for Art and Aesthetics in Education: from Nostalgia to Invention

> We have paid a high enough price [in the 19th and 20th C] for the nostalgia of the whole and the one, for the reconciliation of the concept and the sensible, of the transparent and the communicable experience.
>
> ... it is our business not to supply reality but to invent allusions to the conceivable ...
>
> A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by pre-established rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining judgement, by applying familiar categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and categories are what the work of art itself is looking for.
>
> The artist and the writer, then, are working without rules in order to formulate the rules of what *will have been done*. ... work and text have the character of an *event*; ... they always come too late for their author ... *Postmodern* would always have to be understood according to the paradox of the future (*post*) anterior (*modo*) (Lyotard 1989, 81).

What of the introduction of art and aesthetics into education, educational research, and pedagogy? Part of the answer to this question lies as much in the *approach* taken to *disciplinary* and *interdisciplinary* inquiries as it does to the specific paradigmatic themes and adjudicatory criteria within each discipline.

Eisner's work, for example, clearly indicates the *application* of criteria from art and aesthetics "into" education (with education conceived of as generally saturated with and structured by criteria from the *social sciences*). This is clearly the case when an author such as Denis Phillips suggests it is "controversial" that "methods from the arts ought to be incorporated into the expanding array of educational research methods" (1995, 72). Education is not the only field in which *several* academic disciplines (psychology, sociology, history, anthropology, and yes literature, psychoanalysis, the arts, etc.) may *apply their* disciplinary criteria to provide differing perspectives on a given problem or theme. It is a very common occurrence to see edited volumes of academic work on a central theme with chapters written each from a differing academic discipline, providing conclusions on the central topic based on criteria from each discipline. Thus, for Eisner, it is time to recognize and *appreciate* the contributions the arts and aesthetic criteria can make *to* education. In this sense, art can function as a *subversive* mechanism, undermining the dominant social science perspective in education in order to *expand* the "angles" or viewpoints afforded on education.

Besides merely *adding* a differing disciplinary perspective to a "central" philosophical or cultural problem, principal tenets of a particular discipline can be applied to multiple other disciplines to an almost "fad-like" degree.[5] Such was the case of the so-called "linguistic turn" which asserted language as a model of functioning in several other disciplines. Thus while de Saussure never set out to write a manifesto, his work in linguistics set the stage for structuralist formulations in anthropology by Levi-Strauss ("culture" is structured like a language), in psychoanalysis by Lacan ("the unconscious" is structured like a language), in cultural critique by Roland Barthes (cultural codes are structured like a language), by Louis Althusser (political and economic systems are structured like a language), etc. Both this "faddish" use of a central disciplinary tenet in other disciplines, or the infiltration of one discipline's criteria or framework's into another should properly be termed a *cross-disciplinary* performance. "Cross"-disciplinary here applies in multiple senses of the prefix: criteria or ideas from one origin move *across* to other destinations; a line (of thought) that has previously been drawn is intersected by a later line drawn over or under it; or even that one discipline enters another and acts at cross "purposes" or in opposition to it (such as Eisner's "subversive" artistic forays into education). As I will explain, most uses of the aesthetic in education (and indeed, most academic work in general) are *cross-disciplinary*: disciplines are crossed into, but the *method* remains recognizable as from one or another academic discipline. In this sense, being "innovative" is a matter of *applying* one discipline's knowledge or methods into another disciplinary or thematic space (forging a "new perspective"). This also, interestingly enough, in large part forms Eisner's conception of what aesthetic practice consists of.

But when we consider what *interdisciplinary* work could be, we must engage in an act much closer to Lyotard's sense of a *postmodern* aesthetic. Instead of providing a new *subjective perspective* into a discipline or topic, Lyotard focuses on aesthetic practice as that which *breaks* the frame of representation and *forces* one to invent new criteria *in situ* (1988, 79, 57). If we take the prefix "inter" to mean *in-between, among, in the midst of, carried on between*, truly *interdisciplinary* work would break the frames of disciplines rather than simply juggle the permutations and create new combinations of methods of one discipline into another. Foucault's work would be an example here, in his mobilization of several disciplines (linguistics, literary theory, philosophy and social sciences) to create an entirely new research object: *the subject (of history)*. Prior to Foucault, the (modernist) subject was simply *assumed*, but not taken as an object of study itself. Derrida's work in general explicating the *limits* of western philosophy and the *conditions of possibility* for philosophical concepts could be termed interdisciplinary as it exposes the *infrastructures* (Gasche 1994, 4) of western philosophy such as difference, logocentrism, Same and Other, etc. These are objects of study which remained tacit in their functioning until expressed by these authors, and which required the multiple methodological "engines" of several disciplines in order to be articulated. As such, they belong to no one particular disciplinary "home," nor were they created by the mere application of "foreign" disciplinary criteria, but broke these disciplinary frames to invent a new object, a new form.

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[5] See the work of Paul Bove, *Mastering Discourse: The Politics of Intellectual Culture* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992) for a discussion of the politics of discursive cultures.

Aesthetics as Nostalgia: Continue to Represent the Object

> ... the writer starts with qualities and ends with words. The reader starts with words and ends with qualities.
>
> Researchers must see what is to be seen, given some frame of reference and some set of intentions. The self is the instrument that engages the situation and makes sense of it.
>
> (Eisner, *The Enlightened Eye*, 1991, 22, 33-4).

For Eisner there is very little that is *disturbing* about representation. Objects or situations exist, we must represent them, if the representation is skillfully done we experience the qualities of the object or situation vicariously, almost "as if we were there." Art and language are the tools by which representations are formed; the only slight snag might be in the unfortunate misuse of a representational form which does not appropriately match the phenomena involved (*art* is perhaps a better form than science to represent teaching). While the cultural and genetic backgrounds of individuals may create a multitude of (and perhaps differing, or opposing) viewpoints on the object, *there is no real concern about representation itself*: the object, the representational forms/tools, the subject-author who uses them, the finished representation, the reader who understands it, these are all non-perplexing, uncomplicated events and structures.

Now it may appear that I have speciously or perhaps even smugly chosen to victimize Eisner as the sole advocate of art or aesthetics in education (and perhaps a contradictory one at that). Eisner is not the only writer to propose aesthetic criteria be used in education, and not the only one who firmly entrenches himself in Enlightenment hopes for representation. Cleo Cherryholmes (1994, 17) advises educational reformers to consider hopes and criteria for beauty, pleasure, well-being, and harmony in identifying the aesthetic in pragmatic school choices. This is still an aesthetic that perplexes Lyotard because it constrains aesthetics into an economy of the beautiful, posturing beauty as a criterion around which a consensus can (will) be reached and returning aesthetics to a representation in a scene of normative judgement. Is this school reform pleasurable/beautiful? Cherryholmes suggests this question be answered as part of an act of "choosing a way of life and society" (ibid), and it is precisely this recourse to a *consensus* on a *criterion* that Lyotard fears (Lyotard 1988, 169). Cherryholmes' aesthetic of the beautiful still depends heavily on the *representation* of the beautiful, and while innovative in its mention of the aesthetic, does little if anything to question such forms.

Indeed, there is much to commend in Eisner's (and other's) Romantic beliefs that representation captures the world and conveys it to our understanding, thus both (Romantically) renewing our connection to the world and furthering our (Enlightenment) belief in the development of self-consciousness and rational knowledge of the world. Eisner's representational economy is significantly a *productive* one: his use of the aesthetic as a representational apparatus is nothing less than an image *engine*, a machine capable of spinning endless numbers of representations from endless viewpoints and subjectivities, for endlessly numerous readers generating endless interpretations. Furthermore, there are few if any chinks in the mechanism to stop its operation: without questioning the relation between language and the world, or the nature of the perceiving researcher/subject or the reading/subject, or the political consequences of resorting to consensus on set aesthetic criteria, the representational machine has few brakes to slow it down. Indeed, for de Man, such a use of the aesthetic creates order (always necessary for the smooth functioning of an apparatus) *because* it controls and subjugates such questions, (as indicated earlier) *containing* the figurality or *difference* in the orders of language and the world, and of desires and investments which constitute the subject (de Man 1986, 10-12).

Aesthetics (Re)Figured: Don't Represent, *Invent*

While de Man and Lyotard's notions of the aesthetic are most often associated with "postmodern" theory, what is sometimes classified as "postmodern" can just as easily fall under Eisner's notions and use of "aesthetics." The postmodern is frequently reduced to "an" aesthetic, or a list of aesthetic *criteria* differentiating it from past traditions or aesthetic "styles": bricolage vs. purity, irony vs. assurance, multiplicity or polyphony vs. authorial unity, endless deferral vs. progress, reflexive self-consciousness vs. self-confidence, wholeness or truth vs. fictionality, playfulness vs. structure, and the list would go on.[6] For de Man this is simply another species of "aesthetic ideology;" for Lyotard it is a confirmation that even the sphere of art and aesthetics has been/can be commodified as a representation (Lyotard 1989, 18-23).

Against this or an aesthetic of the *beautiful*, Lyotard postures an aesthetics of the *sublime*, emphasizing the limits of phenomenal cognition and understanding. Critiquing what he sees as the more *nostalgic* aspects of the 3rd *Critique* (a yearning for re-connection between the subject and the phenomenal world), Lyotard opts instead to keep Kant's notion of the sublime which emphasizes the *incommensurability* between the ideas imagination can excite in us and our inability to represent these in sensory form:

> ... that which excites in us, without any reasoning about it, but in the mere apprehension of it, the feeling of the sublime may appear, as regards its form ... to be unsuited to our presentative faculty (Kant 1951, 83).

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[6] There is a rather exhaustive literature espousing "postmodernism" as possessing some or more of the formal qualities listed above. For a discussion, see Linda Hutcheon's chapter "Representing the Postmodern" in her *Politics of Postmodernism* (New York: Routledge, 1989, 1-29). In education, perhaps the most indelicate use of this type of formalizing narrative to define the postmodern would be in Jean Anyon's "The Retreat of Marxism and Socialist Feminism: Postmodern and Poststructural Theories in Education," *Curriculum Inquiry* 24:2 (1994), 120-121.

The sublime is for Lyotard "the unpresentable in presentation itself, that which denies itself the solace of good forms" (Lyotard 1989, 81), quite a different *situating* of the aesthetic than Eisner's *use* of representation/form to contain and express the phenomenal: indeed, Lyotard's sublime may even be viewed as a reflexive pronouncement on aesthetics as used by Eisner (and others) to see the nature of its own (easily commodified) productiveness. For Eisner, art and aesthetics are defined by sharp disciplinary boundaries, and this also contributes to their productiveness – art more than any other discipline (or methodology) *can* reconcile language and the world, *can* provide (as Habermas also desires) a new balance to the overvaluation of the cognitive. Lyotard, while certainly at times claiming autonomy for the aesthetic experience (the unpresentable) does so to posit it as an *event*, an occurrence for which there are no representational or referential frames, or which disrupts pre-existing frames leaving us without any normative criteria for judgement.

The most significant distinction of Lyotard's aesthetic of the "unpresentable in presentation itself" is the writing of the event as a *figure* for a representational aesthetics, *rather than a critique of them*. For Lyotard, the *figure* is a silent other that is *co-present* and *co-functioning* within discourse, but which interrupts discursive meaning (Lyotard, 1971). (Lyotard adopts the term *figural* as a counteractive, resistant trace which is incommensurate with discursive meaning or conceptual knowledge.) As such, the figure (or, what is "figural for" representation) does not resist in an oppositional or critical manner (art is not, as Eisner suggests, *subversive*), but rather that which cannot be understood through (in this case) the traditional form of representation (as that which it is "figural for." A term or space is always *figural for* some Other.[7] Because the figural is resistant to representation, it occurs too soon to be understood, and understood too late to be restored – it is to a certain extent the silent (unpresentable) underside to discourse that only by breaking the representational form of discourse can be understood. Lyotard's most poignant example of the event (the event being a figure for traditional historical time) is Auschwitz: Auschwitz interrupts traditional historical time by being a "past which is not over" – it cannot *simply* be represented as *another* part of history because this will never do justice to the Jews that were killed in the Holocaust, but neither can it be ignored (left unpresented) (Lyotard 1988b, 27). As an *event* Auschwitz "haunts" representation; it demands justice by being represented, but representation cannot (and ethically *should* not) carry it, cannot present it.

Lyotard re-envisions the aesthetic as such a presentation of "the unpresentable in presentation itself," an aesthetic whose function is to testify to the incommensurability of the figure, the event, and in doing so *break the frame of representation*. In a sense, the aesthetic does retain autonomy, not because it is protected by a disciplinary frame but because the event disrupts how time and history are understood, disrupts representation itself and so changes the status of the aesthetic object. The aesthetic object is thus ruptured from the temporality of its creation and therefore is not available as a criterion or any other easily-commodified entity. This aesthetic, as testament to the figural or the unpresentable, leaves us inevitably in a state of seeming chaos, for we are well beyond the transformation of aesthetic experience into *criteria* which can be used in *normative* judgement *against* these criteria. Lyotard's aesthetic as figural leaves us, each time, in a state where we can't simply read, interpret, or understand what is "there," but rather must *invent* and reinvent rules for judgement on a case by case basis in the face of a "nothing's there." This state of *indeterminate judgement* (judgement without criteria) is radically singular: each instance requires an invention to handle the particulars of the case. And this invention is provoked by an ethical imperative to *do* something: in the case of Auschwitz for example, an event "out of time," the ethical imperative to represent the unrepresentable is particularly strong; but one *must do so* in a way that does justice to the horror of the Holocaust.

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[7] In this sense, Lyotard's *figural* is very similar to Derrida's *supplement*.

Eisner's insistence on art and aesthetics fulfilling a mimetic capacity, to provide better, and new modes of representation leaves us with an ethical imperative to *truth*, but not necessarily justice. While he grounds representational truth in the subjective experience and background of the subject-author, Eisner must eventually concede that "we cannot have knowledge of reality as it is" and so at best remains mired in a representational crisis with art functioning as a subversive, but itself troubled device "troubling" the social sciences in education. Lyotard's aesthetics of the *figural* points us instead to a much more radical inventiveness than simple subversion: it offers instead a continual call for *creativity based on justice*, a call not simply to provide a "new" or "different perspective" on a pre-established object, but an ethical imperative to *act justly* in the face of wholly incommensurate regimes. Most profoundly, Lyotard's *figural* aesthetics situates representation as not simply a process, or a useful tool, but a (social) *responsibility* to present that which is erased or silent because incommensurate with representation itself. While Eisner worries that qualitative research will be seen as an attempt to "gussy up language so that it is 'humanistic' or 'artsy'" (Eisner 1991, 4), Lyotard *demonstrates* the power of the aesthetic as a means to *enact difference* through testimony to the figural. Lyotard's, then, is certainly a situating of the aesthetic which has much to offer the field of educational studies.

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Unlearning the 3R's (Relativism, Realism and Reflection): Narrative as Figural

During my masters' degree and early on in my PhD program, I developed a simply lurid fascination with the advent of narrative studies in education. I was particularly absorbed in how narratives of teaching could be used to help beginning teachers understand and *reframe* their histories and identities as they struggled through what Britzman calls the cultural myths of traditional teaching practices (1986, 1991). The further I progressed in this obsession, however, the more interested I became in the *epistemological* productions of narratives, in how the jaunty enthusiasm to "tell teachers' stories" was so often easily derailed by the random snipers of more "objectivist" social science who complained of relativism, the reduction of "real people" to "just text," and accusations of (at best) silliness or ineffectiveness, or (at worst), egoism or nihilism. What good were stories if told by teachers? Why would anyone listen? Weren't these stories just the biased perspective of one individual? How could her/his story be trusted? Authors in narrative studies in education seemed to me to have few, if any, convincing answers to these questions and it seemed as though narrative studies were increasingly becoming a righteous (if not almost hauty) assertion of teachers'voices, but little more than that.

"Unlearning the 3R's (Relativism, Realism and Reflection): Narrative as Figural" was an essay written in response to what I viewed as an *increasingly* papier-mache thin justification for narrative studies in education. Lost in the almost personal debates were the *epistemological* discussions necessary for those in traditional social science to "get it," to see possibilities for narrative beyond purely subjective tomfoolery. Writing narrative *itself* as *figural*, as a figure for (in particular) the modernist *temporality* conceptualized in most educational studies using narrative, is my poststructural attempt to address some of these epistemological issues that hopefully neither panders to a Romantic subject, nor lurks near a neo-pragmatist embrace of relativism.

Unlearning the 3Rs (Relativism, Realism, and Reflection): Narrative as Figural

> ...narrative inquiry has not fully developed its own contradictions (which may be enlightened by postmodern criticisms), nor has it yet exploited all its methodological tools.
>
> F. Tochon, "Presence Beyond the Narrative: Semiotic Tools for Deconstructing the Personal Story" *Curriculum Studies* 2:2, 224 (1994).

Opening Narrative

Narrative studies in education have enjoyed enormous popularity since the early 1980s (Carter 1993, 5) and in particular have been part of a strong movement to sponsor teachers' stories (Goodson 1997, 111).[1] A wide range of educational research practices have been developed which utilize story-structure and the epistemological assumptions of narrative, including autobiography, biography, personal narratives, life histories and oral histories (Casey 1995-6, 211-2); narrative forms pervade many types of empirical data collection including diaries, journals, memoirs, and chronicles. Narrative is an especially privileged device for teacher education because it both collects its "data" and presents its interpretations through narrative representational means (Connelly and Clandinin 1990). Narrative inquiry can be a captivating and alluring practice (both method and methodology), seemingly logical and compatible with our everyday experience. It is tempting to listen to its beginning to end structure, to reasonably follow its past-present-future tracing, to become interpolated into its organization of time and the self. Indeed, proponents such as McEwan (1997, 90) suggest "There is no point at which our actions can be said not to possess a narrative structure." If this is indeed the case, it is important not simply to utilize narrative in studies of education, but to consider their working *in formations of subjectivity*, and in constructions and operations of *epistemological* production. This will be the central task of this essay.

Educational studies have not been the only site strongly influenced toward narrative studies and narrative as a representational schema. Narrative can also be considered a classic and almost fundamental mode of representation in anthropology, history, philosophy, theology, and of course in literary studies. The "linguistic" or "literary" turn in the human sciences, developed since the 1960s, tends to regard objects of knowledge as being 'texts' susceptible to 'reading(s).' Postmodern and poststructural "literary" turns in particular have problematized humanist thinking by questioning methodologically and pragmatically settled unities of the objects of knowledge and their constituting or interpreting subjects. In so doing, many humanist scholars now wrestle with a subject and world seemingly "fully textualized": fields of study now appear to be just such a miscellany of *texts*, disjunctured, fragmented, interminable. Is the object of knowledge merely what is *told* of it? Are there *endless readings* of it? Is there no *truth* of it? These questions appear and reappear within the current human sciences, and educational studies are no exception.

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[1] Gregory Cizek (1995, 27) goes so far as to call narrative studies "hegemonic" in education. See his article "Crunchy Granola and the Hegemony of the Narrative" in *Educational Researcher* 24:2, 26-28.

I Relativism: The Never-Ending Tale

> Teacher stories are stories teachers tell while stories of teachers are stories told about teachers.
>
> Craig, 1999, 399

> We live out stories in our experience, tell stories of these experiences, and modify them through retelling and reliving them.
>
> Clandinin and Connelly 1994, 418

> It is clear that these particular school stories are closely tied to the story of school. The school stories thrive because of the story of school.
>
> Connelly and Clandinin 1996, 28

> Thus, we say that people by nature lead storied lives and tell stories of those lives, whereas narrative researchers describe such lives, collect and tell stories of them, and write narratives of experience.
>
> Connelly and Clandinin 1990, 2

How many stories can be told? Can anything other than stories be told? All the tellings and retellings, stories and restorying in educational narrative studies can seem to produce an overwhelming circuit of constantly exchanged, endlessly interpretable meanings and messages: there appears no way out. As Connelly, Clandinin and He (1997, 672) note:

> ...we believe we all live inside stories. We mean this quite strongly. We believe there is more of a sense of a person living inside a story than there is of a person living inside a theory...

"Stories," suggests Phillip Jackson, "actually make us what we are" (1994, 12, cited in McEwan 1999, 86).

If we turn to education writers who actively engage *postmodern* and *poststructural* texts, the situation at times seems to grow worse, or as Tony Whitson stated rather critically in 1991 (p. 77) "...the emblematic principle of postmodernism as such may be the 'principle' of never saying 'no' to anything." While admittedly this was an early engagement with "post" literature in the education field (later in the same article Whitson dismisses the complaint that Derrida believes there to be nothing "outside of the text"), Whitson's concern for the *place* of interpretation, the *place* of the stories and texts is important. Kanpol (1992, 28) has similar worries, defining the postmodern as a condition where meaning will be ruptured into endless interpretations, and references Bernstein in suggesting that in the postmodern, "there will always be infinite meaning" (ibid, 33). In an auspicious publication as the *Handbook of Qualitative Research* (1994), Denzin suggests "In the social sciences, there is only interpretation," and "interpretation requires the telling of a story" (p. 500). And Cherryholmes, in a quite strongly worded *Journal of Curriculum Studies* article entitled "Reading Research" (1993), contends the space of interpretation is infinite: "all texts…can be read differently" (4); "…there is no justification for restricting one's reading-interpretation-criterion to one perspective" (19); and "…we face the prospect of multiple readings because a privileged way to read remains undefined and unjustified"(20). Read in a general way, these statements are not *incorrect*, but they point the reader toward the conclusion that there are only interpretations/stories *all the way down*, that the stories we tell and the interpretations we render are unbounded, that Derrida means "free" play in the sense of freedom *from any constraint* when he speaks of reading and interpretation.[2]

While it is certainly the case that stories can be retold, or differing interpretations can result from the same text, it is misleading to simply *assert* this as an ontological given, without explaining how this comes about. There is always the possibility of a radical new reading/interpretation/story, but this not license for relativist euphoria. As Derrida suggests, it is for *structural* reasons that disparate readings or stories result from the same text. Briefly, every text (or one *could* say story, interpretation) possesses the *general* condition of iterability, a necessary repeatability which is nevertheless not repeated *exactly* as it contains no "essence" keeping it aloof from future potential contexts. In this way, the iterability of the text opens it onto new contexts, allows it to be read a-new (Derrida 1992, 64). This is Derridean "play" – more in the sense of the articulation of a joint than in entertainment or frivolity – which allows text to be "readable," to be read but never in the same manner again. This is a far cry from charges of nihilism or relativism that often accompany questions around interpretation and narrative. Unfortunately, some narrative educational researchers attempt to answer such epistemological concerns by recourse to neopragmatists such as Stanley Fish or Richard Rorty, both of whose approaches provide answers but not necessarily strong ones, to charges of relativism.[3]

For Fish,[4] it is a mistake to think that one can stand "outside" a context, culture, or interpretive situation (this serves as his critique of subjectivity). Because there is no privileged vantage point outside of human subjectivity, there is simply "no getting beyond" interpretation. Any *theory* (and it is important that Fish mentions theory here) cannot therefore claim objectivity, and so theory is really only disguised interpretation, *claiming* a superior objective status is simply does not have. Philosophically, Fish's treatment of theory is significant there, for *theory* is traditionally linked to Kant's notion of Enlightenment, which allows theory (as reasoned critique) a special separateness from, and a positive critique of mere *belief* or *doxa*.[5] For Fish, theory is just (one more) interpretation, and therefore has no special status as intervention into mere belief, no distinctive ability to improve (or enlighten) the moral and social spheres. Under such conditions, knowledge can amount to little more than true belief. This line of thinking has important consequences. For Fish, there is no sense in setting up two categories of knowledge, that of genuine knowledge on the one hand, and what we take for genuine knowledge on the other. For belief *is just* the condition of *accepting* truth claims, which are in no need of justification. Knowledge is belief, an interpretation we have come to believe.

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[2] Derrida writes in "Structure, Sign, and Play" of the play of substitutions, of a *supplement* to the center of any conceptual structure in the *human* sciences. He defines *play* in the following manner: "This field is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a center which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions." *Writing and Difference*, 1978, 289). Britzman (1992), also from a poststructural perspective, categorically states that our potential to tell and retell is limited, by virtue of being "set by the conditions of discourse…normative notions of what constitutes truth, power, authority, and knowledge."

[3] See, for example, Denzin and Lincoln 1994, Cochran Smith and Lytle 1992, Fecho in ibid.

[4] See Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).

[5] See Kant's essay, "What is Enlightenment?", and Michel Foucault's (1984) "What is Enlightenment?" in P. Rabinow, *The Foucault Reader*, London, pp. 32-50.

Fish continues in this vein by arguing the futility of any appeal to "rules" or "laws" which might govern interpretive conduct, for such arguments rest on the idea that one can get *beyond* interpretation to some firmer procedural ground where the problem of interpretation would just go away. For any "rule" one may care to construct, argues Fish, multiple interpretations of the rule will result, which will require supplemental rules, and so on.[6]

Because no appeal "beyond interpretation" is possible, the best Fish can posture in the way of justification are the concepts of *community*, *consensus*, and *conversation*. Judgements are rendered not by objective rules, "outside" interpretation, but rather within an *'interpretive community,'* a broad-based *consensus group* to whom only certain *communally acceptable* terms of debate will "count." No "critique" of this consensus, pointing out illogicalities or inconsistencies would be possible because such a critique would be outside the principles and ways of speaking endorsed by common assent of the community. The community alone would establish the validity of its knowledge, and endorse its own ways of speaking. For Fish, it is simply time for us to give up theoretical talk and get down to the business of speaking plainly our differences of opinion. Richard Rorty, also espousing a neo-pragmatist line, suggests this lack of any justifying "grounds" should similarly push us beyond giving *reasons* and rather engage in *conversation* for the purpose of *edification* (Rorty, 1979).

What is difficult about Fish's position is that it forces a split between a "good" type of interpretation or story (which *confirms* community norms and identity) against a "threatening" type of interpretation or story whose undecideability questions the very identity of a normative community. But the community's "good" definition of interpretation/story in fact *destroys the very conditions of possibility* for interpretation *by rendering choices as determined in advance by community norm*. Seemingly for Fish, stories are completely determined, and completely undecideable. Therefore the community must render the undecideability of the story invisible, illegal, under erasure, because only its absence will guarantee the community's continued identity.

Richard Rorty's neopragmatic attitudes toward interpretation and story are equally suspect. Rorty wishes to praise those like Derrida as a philosopher who has learned to "live with" the undecideability of knowledge, truth, or foundations. Rorty believes Derrida to be showing the bankrupcy of all epistemology as a systematic or privileged discourse, and instead wishes to treat philosophy as a type of edifying narrative conversation with no special claim to truth (Rorty 1979, 357-394). For Rorty, Lyotard's pronouncements against the "grand metanarratives" of modernity confirm his mistrust of transcendental, grand theories in favor of his sturdy common-sense pragmatic values and beliefs. Instead of analytic philosophy, Rorty would favor philosophy as "little narratives" – meaning for Rorty telling a new story or new language games to stimulate new intellectual thought (Rorty 1982, 220). But Rorty, like Fish, ends up producing a consensus-view of truth which reaffirms North American liberal culture as Rorty's interpretive community, excluding other culture's philosophical traditions with the same bifurcation of interpretation/story into "positive" or "negative" types depending on whether it confirms or disaffirms that community.

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[6] For interest's sake, this is a position almost identically espoused in educational circles by Joseph Schwab in his arguments against theoretic knowledge: that such knowledge would always require a method he terms the "eclectic" which prepares and assists (interprets, one might say) theoretical knowledge (Schwab, 1971).

Hermeneutics, like the neopragmatist arguments of Fish and Rorty, also provides a self-encircling "limit" or "boundary" answer to the charge of relativism in narrative's suspected "endless interpretation," relying again on reference to an enclosed "community" or "context." Hermeneutics, as the science or art of interpretation, was initially restricted to interpretation of the Bible until the 19th century when this area was broadened to include textual interpretation as a whole (Eagleton 1983, 66). While certainly not a uniformly agreed-upon theory, nonetheless several major authors in the field rely upon notions of a unified, fully present sender/author, a regularized sending-receiving model of communication, and a unified context or historical "tradition" that serves to ground interpretation even across generational distance. Schleiermacher, for example, writes of how a harmonious horizon of agreement or consensus exists between speakers so that the mechanics of communication resemble the regular reception and return of a ping-pong ball (Hamacher 1990, 180). Schleiermacher also assumes the author is fully present to him/herself, able to understand his/her own intentions *and* be able to divine other speakers' intentions (ibid., 191). For Gadamer, meaning is not synonymous with the author's *intent*, but the text is bounded by a shared horizon or "tradition," part of the 'great conversation of history' which he conceives of as an unbroken chain which bridges temporal distances (and differences) in custom and prejudice (Eagleton 1983, 73). Further, "tradition" *must* be followed: it "has a justification that is outside the arguments of reason"(quoted by Lentricchia 1980, 153). Given the hermeneutical insistence on a fully present subject, regularized communication (Gadamer speaks of the *conversation* as *the* model of communication), and a consistent context or "tradition" as backdrop, interpretation and text become harmonious wholes guaranteed by the hermeneutic circle: individual parts are intelligible because of the total context, and the context is knowable by its parts (Eagleton 1983, 74). Thus any indeterminacy would likely prompt a hermeneut to persistently clear away barriers to clear and endless communication, to foster "good will" between speakers (Michelfelder and Palmer 1989).[7]

Thus with narrative studies (and interpretation in general), we must be extremely cautious in making claims about reading and interpreting texts. Hermeneuts and neopragmatists all *extend* reading/interpretation/telling stories as possible *only* because of a "community" or "context" that *agrees*/reaches consensus, but this does not bode well in quelling fears of relativism; rather, it follows that there can be as many interpretations as there are communities, and *between* communities, interpretations may be interpreted as wholly incommensurate. While these approaches do *bound* meaning in a context, these boundaries may also seem politically and ethically suspect and essentialist, leaving the ability to re-tell and re-envision oneself an at best difficult maneuver from one community *completely* to another in order to be perceived as intelligible. Derrida's move is rather to explain the conditions of possibility for communication and language in general, thus articulating *structures* of language and text that enable it to be re-read and understood in *different* contexts and across contexts. For Derrida, stable *identity* is not the "ground" on which meaning and story stand, but rather the general and necessary *iterability* of the text.

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[7] *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter* (Albany: SUNY Press 1989), is a record of a 1981 conference at the Goethe Institute in Paris between Gadamer and Derrida. Some have characterized it as a non-encounter, for Derrida's performative response to Gadamer illustrates that communication is far from simple mechanics fostered by the intentional "good will" of speakers. Neither is communication a discursively organized event devoid of power relations.

Therefore, in considering the "anchor" of a strong, stable identity offered by neopragmatist or hermeneutical perspectives against a sea of relativism, I suggest this be understood not as an apriori but a *choice* made by educational researchers writing in and through narrative studies. Further, this choice appears to be made to massage a number of *fears* surrounding the turbulent *multiplicity* created by the problem of interpretation. Such multiplicity raises, among many insecurities, the spectre of *social* unease: the fear that identities might very well *not* be stable and therefore should not be relied upon, cannot be "counted upon" as fixed entities that shape and define the social world. With this comes the associated fear that the social *environment* itself may simply degenerate and disintegrate, that past social structures cannot hold, and future (relatively permanent) structures are not available. If identities are not stable, they could perhaps even be "put on" – put on like new clothes, change like fads on a fashion runway, or possibly "put on" in the sense of *faking*, lying to fit in with a group to which that identity "should not" belong. If identities are not stable, this undermines our confidence in the very *possibility* of a social environment – raising the fear of losing our ability to make and sustain, the fear that things might fracture and decay beyond our ability to prevent this from happening. At this point these fears need to be mentioned, but they will be elaborated later in the essay.

II Realism: Let it Tell its Own Tale

> ...it is not productive to think about teachers by applying one or another favorite philosophy or theory. Rather, it is necessary to work directly with teachers...One consequence is that research results have a strongly authentic, insider feel to them. Such research makes clear that the research has been "real" and ...that the researcher has been there.
>
> Clandinin, Connelly and He 1997, 666-7

> It is not our intention to make judgements about this landscape nor to take sides on issues as they evolve, but, rather, to map out this complex, narrative, historical, interwoven and constantly changing landscape on which teachers, administrators, and childrens' lives are lived out.
>
> Clandinin and Connelly 1996, 30, footnote

While the so-called "linguistic turn" may seem to push narrative toward a flight into relativism, an equally agitated reverse push drives into *realism*. Purporting to tell the "truth" of an event, to represent (empirically) *exactly* what occurred without acknowledging narratives as representations of an event, some educational researchers engage in what Britzman (1992, 28) calls the "glorification of first-hand experience," forgetting that "experience does not 'tell' us who we are or what we see: we are tellers of experience" (ibid., 26). Lather notes that most narratives in educational research are usually "victory narratives" which reassure and lend certainty to our work (Lather 1994). Ivor Goodson, while sympathetic to the desire to step'outside' representation, nonetheless worries "There is a belief that we can facilitate the genuine voice of the oppressed subject," calling it the "nirvana of the narrative," the "valhalla of voice" (Goodson 1997, 112). What are the desires behind such a move toward narrative as realist text? Why is this version of narrative so seductive?

As one of the preeminent forms of representation, it is easy to forget narrative is a form of representation. If we follow a basic distinction in narrative between *recit* and *discours*, it is easier to see why this is the case. The *recit* is generally thought of as the content or "story itself," whereas *discours* is the logic of the story, its organizing principles. This split may appear artificial, however, if we forget the *recit* is not innocent; it is always subservient to the *discours* and does not exist "prior to" it. Thus, even a simple statement such as "The teacher walked to the door" is discursively *organized* and subject to the assumptions and structure of the *discours*. It is also important to recognize that some authors, adopting research processes admitting a "multiplicity of voices," a "dialogue" or "polyphony" (cf. Bakhtin) can still offer little more than a mimetic narrative method. Whether one or several participants' "voices"/"data" are admitted to the narrative, if the underlying desire is to offer the *recit* a special status while forgetting the effect of the *discours*, there is little difference in the end result. The adoption of "polyphony" as a research strategy be more ideological than stricter narrative "naturalism" in the former's denial of discourse and the effects of representation.

A second response to the question of narrative's seductiveness as a realist text may be the way such a text constructs positions for authors and readers. Borrowing from Roland Barthes, texts can be said to be more "readerly" (lisible) or "writerly" (scriptible); that is, they can be reduced to a *consumptive* process of reading or a more active, productive approach in constructing ("writing") meaning (Barthes, 1970). Sadly, the focus in many narrative studies in education is upon a realist strategy of inserting a unified, controlling producer/author, and a reader whose task it is simply to *consume* the text. Concern over whether an account "rings true," whether the experiential detail "puts you there," or how "convincing" the theme interpolates one into the position of *consumer*, simply deciding if the text lives up to high enough standards of taste, intrigue, plausibility, reliability. It is certainly seductive to sit back and adjudicate the narrative's overall effect, and it is a short step as the *consumer* of the text to allow oneself the pleasure of forgetting narrative as representation in the rush of the "reality" displayed.

But there is a third seductiveness to narrative as realist text and one which depends less on whether the reader views realist texts as "real" or "constructed": narrative as realist text often seduces us into forgetting realism as a *cultural* practice.

In her work *The Social Construction of American Realism* (1988), Amy Kaplan redefines realism in American literature as less invested in how mimetic representations of society *preserve* the status quo than in how they *define* it. Kaplan challenges the romance thesis of American literature which *opposes* realism to romanticism, arguing against those such as Richard Chase who contends that fiction is written only in the context of a class-entrenched, established and stable society, or Lionel Trilling, who suggests the function of literature is not to mechanically reflect the cold hard reality of the world, but rather to infuse events with the "moral imagination" necessary to surpass this reality (Kaplan 1988, 3-4). Kaplan even suggests that to a certain degree poststructural theory contributes to this bifurcation of realism and romance, because it assumes realistic texts are powerful only in their capacity to self-reflexively deconstruct their claims to the "real" (ibid., 5). Focussing on realism as a cultural practice, Kaplan asks how it is that realist texts get read as a seedy, brutal and gritty "how the world is," as compared to romantic novels, on which we as readers *never* seem to place these demands.

Kaplan refuses the position of "consumer" in her response to the realist text. Rather than seeing romantic literature as "fiction" or "constructed" in comparison to realist texts as "true," Kaplan considers realist texts as discursive practices played in a social context. Her study of 19th century U.S. literature argues that increased urbanization and industrialization forced realist texts to become both "an imperative and a problem" in American fiction (ibid., 8). As strategists of "imagining and *managing* (emphasis mine) threats of social change," Kaplan argues, realists "do not naturalize the social world to make it seem immutable and organic, but *like contemporary social reformers* (emphasis mine), they engage in an enormous act of construction to organize, reform, and control the social world" (ibid., 10). Here, Kaplan places contemporary realist writers *alongside* social reformers, for neither are innocent in their desire to circumscribe and control "the real." But faced with new, threatening urban spaces and shifting configurations (think of the rhetoric surrounding "urban" schools[8]) American realist novelists have often responded by constructing visions of a social "whole" through an appeal to "common ground." While some may view this as simple conservative nostalgia for a lost social unity, it is also a discursive maneuver to mediate and manage competitive claims to social reality, an effort to efface differences and reinscribe social hierarchies through an appeal to a 'common ground' or experience, or a common vision of the good community (ibid., 10).

What is particularly interesting about Kaplan's work for educational research is how Kaplan explodes the myth of opposition between romanticism and realism, and also how she warns of appeals to "community" as efforts to contain and script the social order. While narrative studies have been criticized for their romanticist tendencies, a "heroes-and-villains type thinking," (Donmoyer 1996, 23), Kaplan reminds us that a swing toward realism is not any less of a strategy to imagine and inscribe cultural practices. Further, Kaplan situates appeals to "common ground" or the "common good" firmly within a nexus of power relations, whether proposed by conservatives or social reformers alike. This latter point might raise some particularly interesting questions for social reformers in education who insist on promoting social justice through a call for unity and "democratic community" (Kanpol 1992, Giroux in Giroux, Lankshear, McLaren and Peters 1996).

III Romanticism: Looking Back to See the Tale, the Whole Tale, and Nothing But the Tale

The *label* "romantic" can often be a pejorative one, used to dismiss an idea or text (Kaplan suggests) as "unrealistic" or impractical, "over"-emotional, even *sentimental*. My use of the term here is in the sense of intellectual traditions and themes traced through the historical and literary events of the Romantic period.[9] There are numerous characterizations and dispersed themes within the Romantic period, but a sampling of them would include the Romantics' engagement in the language of experience, expression and (at times) naturalism; their celebration of the works of the imagination; their revolt from reason; and their glorification of self expression and the individuality and autonomy of the Romantic artist, leading to judgement of the aesthetic realm as possessing an almost redemptive power to heal and perfect the world.[10] While several of these themes infuse not only narrative studies of education but the education field more generally, to certain degrees the influence of Romantic tenets in narrative studies in particular seem *overabundantly* (and not unproblematically) prevalent.

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[8] See Lisa Hennon's paper, "The Construction of Discursive Space as Patterns of Inclusion/Exclusion: Governmentality and Urbanism in the USA," paper delivered at the American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, April 1997. She essentially argues that "urban" in this rhetoric tends to connote "multicultural," violent, and social unstable.

a. The Mirror Cracked: The Genuine Self *Fractured*

> We restory earlier experiences as we reflect on later experiences so the stories and their meaning shift and change over time...We become "plurivocal" (Barnich, 1989)...Yet in living...the narrative inquiry we are one person. We are also one in the writing...
>
> Clandinin and Connelly 1990, p. 9

While not all narrative research in education explicitly states the relationship between *reflection* (or remembrance) and the construction of the narrative, both Elbaz (1997, 75) and Carter (1993, 8) suggest of necessity, the two are closely related. There are possibly as many definitions of what constitutes reflection in teaching and education as there are of narrative or story (Lyons 1998, 116-7; Korthagen 1993, 317; Copeland et al 1993, 348; Gore 1987, Calderhead 1989). The notion of "reflection," reflecting" on teaching "experience" is also closely linked to the use of metaphor as a way of knowing and making sense of teachers' lives and work (Munby 1986, 1990, Bullough 1991, 1992; Bullough and Stokes 1994, Tobin 1989, Munby and Russell 1990, Carter 1990, Korthagen 1992). If reflection is an important metaphor to describe the process of how teachers develop knowledge for teaching and how teachers' narratives are constructed, then it is important to take note of the possible relationships between "reflection" and narrative acts of "experience." Through a reflection in a mirror or pond, we "see ourselves" or represent ourselves *to* ourselves. The mirror "plays back" a sense of self, "returns" the self to us. Tobin (1989, 123) suggests such metaphors are a "master switch," a way of representing what teachers do so vividly that it can form the basis for changing teachers' entire belief structures and teaching practices.

But not all educational researchers remain so sanguine about metaphor as such a direct and vital influence on teachers' thinking. As Flinders cautions (1991, 93), all metaphorical correspondences "break down" at a certain point, because they can have such wide ranges of connotive meanings. While the mirror "reflects," the correspondence is never *exactly* the same. Mirrors reflect images backward and some reflect upside-down. Mirrors turned at angles to the individual reflect wider or slimmer profiles. Bullough and Stokes (1994) for example, asked their student teachers to generate metaphors that captured themes in their teaching stories, in order to generate the *coherence* necessary for the actualities of teaching (p. 199). While it appeared that Bullough and Stokes wanted student teachers to choose a central metaphor for their teaching identity and to *value* this process of using metaphor, some students reported "struggling" to find a metaphor at all, or to find one that "fit": one student "drifted" among metaphors and was said not to "settle" on a teaching role (p. 213). Metaphor can also 'break down" by unduly *restricting* thought or attempting too rigid a definition, thus *emptying* meaning. Carter (1990, 113) reported that some cooperating teachers in her study felt using metaphor to discuss teaching knowledge *restricted* conversation and "arrested" thinking. Smyth (1992, 274) describes a study by Richardson (1983) in which metaphors were even used prescriptively in order to promote a "one-best" *formula* to analyze teaching.

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[9] Generally, this encompasses the period after the European Enlightenment, but before the major thrust of the Industrial Revolution in Europe.

[10] Arthur Lovejoy suggests the idea of a Romantic or Romanticism is so diverse it means practically nothing (quoted in Willinsky 1990, p. 2).

So it seems that few educational researchers would adhere to the 'literal' belief of the mirror metaphor, that it can imply a direct and "perfect" reflection of the self. Goodson's (1997, 112) worry that "there is a belief that we can facilitate the genuine voice of the oppressed subject, uncontaminated...beyond the representational crisis," however, reminds us there certainly are those who assert that reflection (in thought or writing) produces a genuine "essence" of the self or other. Kathy Carter (1993, 8) suggests that on a certain level, "voice" is a measure of whether a research language allows for "authentic expression of teachers' experiences" even while she asserts "stories...are not videotapes of..reality." But Bullough (1991, 44) cites Ball and Gordon (1985, 18) as suggesting metaphor can "capture" student teachers' "core self-perception" and Bullough himself suggests metaphors can "authentically represent[s] who they are as a teacher" (1994, 5). Even critical social theorists are not exempt from a literalization of the mirror metaphor, as Kanpol (1992) suggests "narratives...[need to] retrieve authenticity for actors" (p. 48) and states we "use narrative as a means to *capture* [emphasis mine] the discursive conditions of marginalized people" (p. 46). Giroux (1990, 378) desires students to "recover their own voices so they can retell their own histories". Conle (1996, 309) believes the correspondence between stories told (resonance) can lead to an "awareness" of self and situation.

In such texts, the narrative author appears as a whole and consistent subject who reflects and writes, who subscribes to the possibility of reasonably certain knowledge about the self. But far *more* educational and narrative researchers are inclined to wander amidst the *effects* of writing the self, attempting to deal in a more or less manifest manner, with the multiple I's encountered through the reflective process. For once it is acknowledged that reflection and writing processes do not react as a chain of mirror-relays, language being little more than a transparent medium by which reflective knowledge is "transported", it must also be acknowledged that the subject of a narrative analysis cannot be completely guaranteed by the author's signature, by an author who attempts to sign for the "authenticity" or "genuine essence" of the subject. Instead, the subject must be recognized as more than singular, *by virtue of the effects of the reflective process itself,* for any subject of narrative "is subjected to" an *organization* in terms of *discours* and *recit*. In a certain way, the *recit* (that is, the "subject") *does not exist*: it appears only when written, uttered, articulated and hence *represented* by the organization of the *discours*. Therefore even in autobiography the "subject" represented by the *discours* (the one that writes) *is not available* as the "subject" of the *recit*, *cannot be* this desired subject "before" representation: the "I" does not *coincide* with the "I" but rather "I" talks about "me." This opens up a gap or *space* between the two, ensuring the speaking "I" never has complete possession of "me," the *articulated* subject. Further, this split can conjure up a third I"," one which strives to *sign* for, or *guarantee* one "whole" subject, rendering the subject non-innocent, *ideological* through and through. Paul de Man notes the determination with which autobiographical writers try to avoid the indeterminacy of this split by reference to the "reader," who is called in to adjudicate the "authenticity" of the narrated subject and co-sign for the third "I" (1979). But as he suggests, "the specular structure has been displaced but not overcome, and we recenter a system of tropes at the very moment we claim to escape from it" (p. 923). It seems that narrative researchers are all too keenly aware of the split when the "subject" of the *discours* speaks the "subject" of the *recit*, and their response can often be, as de Man suggests, an attempt at escape by insisting on the "unity" of the subject. While for many narrative researchers, the focus is on the subjective perceptions of the researchers "interfering" with the 'truth' of the participant's story, even autobiographical accounts (as we have seen) suffer from this splitting of the subject which must be rendered through representation. Thus while Clandinin and Connelly (1990, 9) speak of the need to "reduce" the voices of multiple "I's" down to one dominant voice based on *roles* that the *people* involved in the research can take ("...researcher, teacher, man or woman, commentator, research participant..."), Bullough and Stokes (1994) are concerned within *individual* narratives to achieve coherence so that "predictability and stability in interactions " are not compromised (p. 199). Clandinin and Connelly's earlier work (1987) stresses narrative unity within each individual's narrative: "We define narrative unity as a continuum with a person's experience...Unity means the union, in a particular person and particular time and place, of all that he [sic] has been and undergone..." (p. 307). This struggle to somehow "re-unify" the subject is not without its critics, however: as Willinsky (1989, 259) states of narrative method, "I am concerned that a research process intended to recover the personal and experiential would pave over this construction site in its search for an over-arching unity in the individual's narrative."

Narrative researchers advocating a more postmodern approach to story often utilize one of two responses to this crisis in/of the subject. The first of these is to write a "de-centered" subject. Thus Kanpol (1992, 39) speaks of "decentered [political] struggles," Usher and Edwards (1994, 12, 17) present postmodernity as a "decentering of the subject"; in a recent article Popkewitz (1997, 293-7) speaks of decentering the subject as he constructs a Foucaultian social epistemology. In some cases educational researchers have been accused of decentering the subject even though not claiming the procedure per se (see, for example, Burbules and Rice's 1991 critique of Ellsworth's 1989 article in *Harvard Educational Review*). Unfortunately, this strategy of *actively* "de-centering" the subject does not forego the very humanist, intentional, *will-full* subject that is the concern of many poststructural writers. As Spivak (1993, 10) notes: "Deconstruction considers that the subject always tends toward centering and looks at the mechanism of centering...it doesn't say there is something called the decentered subject". She also goes on to quote Derrida on the topic:

> ...one can doubtless decenter the subject, as is easily said, without challenging anew the bond between, on the one hand, responsibility, and, on the other, freedom of subjective consciousness or purity of intentionality,. This happens all the time...one denies the axiomatics [of the humanist subject] *en bloc* and keeps it going as a survivor...one accounts, and becomes ccountable, for nothing" (Derrida in Spivak 1993, 287n13).

Thus for Derrida, "de-centering" or a "loss of the center" is not what he intends when he speaks of play as the disruption of presence in the subject, and this cannot serve as a "permanent" state of affairs in answer to the split subject.

A second postmodern response to the crisis of the subject has been to write a conventional narrative, but then to critique or "deconstruct" the narrative to show its workings, in a sort of Brechtian manner of showing bias or subjective processes involved in the construction of the narrative. Fenstermacher, for example, seems to imply that critique or "deconstruction" is imperative for the believability of a narrative (1997, 123). But we can also appreciate George Marcus' comments on ethnography as he wonders "just how much" reflexivity a writer must produce (or, seemingly, a reader must tolerate reading) in order for the account to be believable (1994, 568). Marcus differentiates between the essential reflexivity of all discourse, and what he terms the "ideological reflexivity," the politics of how an author attempts to justify a research text. He wonders if ethnographers are not caught up in a game of being competitively "more reflexive than thou" (ibid.). While the notion of reflexivity will be explored in greater detail in the remainder of this essay, suffice it to suggest here that of the *multiple* forms of reflexivity, the variety Marcus refers to cannot "guarantee" a narrative account of a subject nor guarantee the truth of any research text. In "The Purveyor of Truth" (1975) and *The Post Card* (1987), Derrida critiques psychoanalysis for engaging in Marcus' "ideological reflexivity." Here Derrida describes how psychoanalysis initially frames itself as "scientific" and therefore "outside" of literature, only to claim later as Freud says, that psychoanalysis at bottom can only discover the truths the "poets already know" (Freud, S.E. v 21, 133-4). Thus by framing psychoanalysis as both inside and outside of literature, psychoanalysis can stage the finding of a truth already framed within itself (Derrida 1975, 32).

In addition to the notion that deconstruction can reconcile the split subject by *functioning* as self-reflexivity, some educational researchers claim deconstruction serves as *critique* (and presumably, as a critique of narrative). Thus Phelan, for example, suggests deconstruction is analysis by "unmasking metaphors" (1994, 105); likewise Barone, in an insightful article nevertheless suggests deconstruction is an analytical reading process of making visible (1992, 143). While Derrida certainly engages the Western tradition of critique and analytical philosophy, his project goes much beyond this to *understand* this cultural tradition of critique and therefore deconstruction does not serve simply as antithesis (or "de-struction") to the constructed nature of narratives.[11]

While many view all of this worry about the split self created through reflection as a *recent*, and distinctly "postmodern" crisis of representation, reflection was an equal concern for the Romantics. In particular, I have named the entanglements and anxieties of narrative researchers "romantic" because they, like the

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[11] The simplest "definition" of deconstruction might be found in a quote from Derrida's doctoral thesis "The Time of a Thesis," in Alan Montefiore (ed), *Philosophy in France today* (Cambridge University Press, 1983, 34-50). (His thesis was completed years after he had begun many of his now seminal works in philosophy and literature): "My central question is: how can philosophy as such appear to itself as other than itself, so that it can interrogate itself in an original manner?". Taking this statement apart, in Derrida's de-construction, philosophy must *appear to itself* (reflexively) but as "other" than itself (implying a re-stiuating or dislocating of philosophy). In order to interrogate itself "originally," such philosophy must be interrogated *in situ*, in the process of "doing its [normal] work," the "normal" workings of western philosophical thought, rather than as an essentialized "procedure" or "method."

Romantics, seek *unity* in the subject. "So long as I myself am *identical* with nature," writes Schelling, "I understand what a living nature is as well as I understand my own life...As soon, however, as I separate myself...from nature, nothing more is left for me but a dead object" (cited in Abrams 1971, 181). Romantic writers tended to view philosophical reflection as a process of understanding through analytic division, and equated this separateness with evil; according to Schelling reflection is "a spiritual sickness" because it divides that which "nature had permanently united" (ibid., 181). Humans develop consciousness by reflection, which separates them from nature, and also from their original state of mind, destroying the mind's original unity with itself (ibid). For Fichte, the subject or "I" arises only in its *awareness* of itself, of positing itself, which is accomplished by *limiting* itself ("consciousness works through reflection, and reflection is only through limitation" -- Fichte in Honderich 1995, 278). As the I reflects on itself, then, it separates itself from the world to create a "non-I" (antithesis), producing a *limited* I (synthesis) which can then be transcended by yet another reflection. Romantic philosophy as a whole is marked by such efforts at restoring unity, reconciling antimonies by, as Schelling remarks "recalling the condition in which we were at one with nature" (quoted in Abrams 1971, 182). It seems that with concepts such as narrative unity, voice, and resonance, many narrative researchers in education can properly be termed "romantic" in philosophical attitude, symptomatically revealing the split in the subject caused by reflection through two primary fears: the fear of *fragmentation*, and the fear of *simulation*.

For narrative researchers, the anxiety of fragmentation *begins* with the notion of the subject as a naturalized "whole," but seems to *end* with a destabilization of narrative notions of "construction" and the power to "make" or "create." Blum (1995, 50) describes writing (for us here, the writing of the self) beginning *as if* it were a fragment from a suppressed dialogue, aspiring to achieve finality and totality with respect to its self-description as an element of the wholeness from which it came. For many narrative researchers, it seems, writing the story of an individual teacher is a struggle to "piece" together "fragments" of a life that, at some *deep* level, *can* be fully mediated, *can constitute* an unbroken truth. Here the fear is a *procedural* one: "how" to narrate, to get the "real story," to get to the "essence" of a life without, as Clandinin and Connelly note, getting lost in the details (1990, 7). In this sense, the fragment must be "endured" as a vital piece of the puzzle, but also as an annoying reminder of the *constructed* nature of narrative: you could always have told the story differently.

But fear of fragmentation in narrative goes much further than this, if we take seriously the notion of the subject *split* by reflection. In order for the subject to be *produced*, the self must reflect on itself, developing consciousness but also *splitting* into the "I," "me," and other I's which attempt to "heal" this split. Indeed, we can think of all talk of fragmentation as connected in the same way to the notion of production or making (McHugh 1993, 5). But if what we *make* loses its capacity for wholeness (its capacity to "endure"), this casts doubt upon our powers of production. For all the narrative talk of making, writing, composing a life (Bateson 1990), we must juxtapose the fearful instance of schizophrenia, the un-doing of the self. It is much easier to relegate fragmentation to a more contrived role in making (of the self or anything else): when we "control" fragmentation, such as in the re-ordering or disturbing of conventional structures ("making to break"), we are simply within the realm characteristic of artistic production (ibid., 3). But the fragmentation associated with narrative *remains* as a *state of production*;

the split self does not miraculously reunify without the grimaces and contortions of "narrative smoothing" (Clandinin and Connelly 1990, 10). Within this making of the self, then, fragmentation is indeed perhaps more an *anxiety* or a hesitation rather than a fear or extending mourning: fragmentation is not a *stable* condition and so its twists and turns of subjectivity surprise, puzzle, and scare us. As a *condition of possibility for making* then, the anxiety of fragmentation is incurable and interminable.

Reflection generates a second and opposite fear of the split subject: the fear of imposters or fakes that disquiet the boundaries between the "genuine" self and its reflection. As Clandinin and Connelly worry: "Falsehood may be substituted for meaning and narrative truth...Not only may one "fake the data" and write a fiction but one may also use the data to tell a deception as easily as a truth" (1990, 10). While Clandinin and Connelly here are vexed by the apparent misuse of *empirical* "data," it is easy to extrapolate this situation to a concern for the "fiction" (their words) which seems more believable that the "life lived." For if we only know the real through representation, is this referent (the "life lived") gone? Baudrillard (1983, 126) speaks of a time when the subject's reflecting mirror has vanished, where subject/object and private/public oppositions are no longer equated with the referent/signified subject. Increasingly, as teachers are invited (and sometimes mandated[12]) to participate in reflective teaching practices, the narratives of experience they tell are circulated as research texts, collaborative school planning and restructuring texts, and teacher evaluation texts. *Traditionally*, much of this private reflection was unwritten, and never the basis for school planning (which was conducted largely by administrators) nor teacher evaluation (traditionally measured by adherence to 'external,' school or district-determined standards). In humanistic educational discourses, the telling of personal narratives leads to emancipation and collaboration but there is also a down-side: as Foucault suggests, 'confession' (bringing forth the 'truth' of an individual) creates an object of *knowledge* about the self and can be used as a means of *self*-regulation, an exercise of power/knowledge which normatively teaches which subject positions and constructions are acceptable and which are not (Foucault, 1981). Through narrative as "confession," the traditionally private is transformed into public, and more importantly into *information*, which can be circulated virtually without connection to the referent. As Baudrillard claims, there could be an interruption of "interior and intimacy" where the subject becomes "pure screen" (Baudrillard 1983, 133). In such a case, it would be difficult (if not a moot point) to tell representation from referent (or in Clandinin and Connelly's words "fake" from "truth"). Is the caricature of school principal Joe Clark in the movie "Lean on Me" more real that the principal of Paterson High School in New Jersey? Are narrative studies of education unwittingly transforming teacher knowledge into a scene where "all secrets, spaces and scenes [are] abolished in a single dimension of information" (Baudrillard 1983, 131)? The "fear of the fake," unlike the fear of fragmentation, views production/making as all *too powerful*, rather than frail and fleeting.

b. Reflexivity Through The Mirror

> The breaking of a mirror, according to the superstitious saying, announces

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[12] Reflective practice has become a focus in U.S. national teacher assessment initiatives, such as the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS), a goal in state educational departments, and the goal of many teacher education programs (Lyons 1998, 116).

> seven years of misfortune…the misfortune of the narrative, this distress of a fabulous discourse able only to reflect itself without ever moving out of itself. In this case, the misfortune would be the mirror itself.
>
> Jacques Derrida, "Psyche," in *Acts of Literature*, 1992, pp. 328-9.

The contortions of our reflective, and therefore split subject of narrative studies in education are numerous: attempts to Romantically reunify, "de-center," or narrativize and then "deconstruct" the subject *while* worrying over either fragmenting the subject beyond repair, or losing the ability to tell "real" from "false" selves create a rather dizzying field of maneuvers within the narrative. Reflection enacted to identify or *guarantee* a subject will always *be subject to* the uneasy condition that, despite these maneuvers, it can never fully complete its mission. The mirror does not allow one to fully reflect or return *back* the gazing subject. As Merleau-Ponty notes, the condition of possibility of self-knowledge lies with self-*perception*: the distance between the self and the object of its gaze opened up by the body does not allow full reflection. In his famous example of touching and being touched, Merleau-Ponty demonstrates the subject's *inability* to be both subject and object at the same time, an ability needed for self-perception: "If my left hand is touching my right hand, and if I should suddenly wish to apprehend with my right hand the work of my left hand as it touches, this reflection of the body always miscarries at the last moment: the moment I feel my left hand with my right hand, I correspondingly cease touching my right and with my left hand" (1968, 9).

Indeed, far from a naïve belief in perception to guarantee the subject, many educational researchers utilizing narrative studies refer rather to self-*reflexivity*, the series of reflections that are assumed to give consistency and coherence to the self (Lenzo, 1995). The self *as reflexive* both reflects itself and contains the reflexion, claiming status as a system closed in on itself, as if it could encapsulate and contain the workings of the mirror and thus know and predict itself completely (Hobson 1998, 75). As Britzman notes, such a process is an attempt at mastery, an act designed purely to banish doubt (Britzman 1998, 32). And as Derrida notes, reflexivity does more to *produce* an event than to witness and account for both the event and the subject's perception of it: America's Declaration of Independence, for example, constitutes the American people as an entity by *referring* to a "nation" which exists paradoxically only in and because of the *reference* and the *signatures* listed on the Declaration (Derrida 1984, 54). Reflexion, therefore, does not guarantee a stable subject, despite the existence of the *effects* of presence as the subject (here, a "nation") is narrated: despite Derrida's insight however, we still consider the American people as a "unity," an organized society and culture.

In spite of such critiques, the belief that self-reflexivity can succeed, and even that it can reveal gaps or (ethical) failings of a text, discourse, or method, persists. The American reception of deconstruction, taken up by such authors as Paul de Man, clearly indicates the equation of deconstruction with the self-reflexivity of the text. For de Man, Derrida's reading of Rousseau in *Of Grammatology* should be understood as a "Rhetoric of Blindness": all *literary* texts can provide their own reflexive moments, but for those not so 'literary,' deconstruction can *supply* the reflexive moment to the "blindness" of all critical texts (de Man 1983). De Man writes: "the text…accounts for its own mode of writing…the text also postulates the necessity of its own misreading. It knows and asserts that it will be misunderstood" (ibid., p. 136). This is a text seemingly in total control of itself, able to write its own intentions or at least have deconstruction write these intentions for it, should the text be less than 'literary.' For Derrida, however, writing *disrupts* all reflexivity:

> Constituting and dislocating it at the same time, writing is other than the subject...Writing can never be thought under the category of the subject... however it is endowed with consciousness or unconsciousness, it will refer...to a presence unperturbed by accidents, or to the identity of the self-same.. (Derrida 1976, 68-9).

Thus deconstruction does *not* "show the blindnesses," does not *reveal* its own principles of organization or desire, is not the moment where a text "undermines" or contradicts itself. Deconstruction cannot be used in this way to "inject" self-reflexivity into a narrative text.

Despite the strong criticism against the pure self-reflexiveness of the text (or that deconstruction can uncover a text's *lack* of reflexivity), deconstruction does assert the self-reflexivity in texts; it simply cannot agree that this constitutes the entirety of the text or allows the text to "speak for itself." In asserting the inability of a subject (author) to be completely self-perceptive or self-present to itself, deconstruction also asserts that *texts* are haunted by the same difficulties in (self) perception. Thus while American literary critics sympathetic to deconstruction often focus on studying tropes such as similes, metaphors, and imagery, deconstruction declares the basic problem to be that of *representation*, not a question of how well a text "stages" its self-reflexivity through figurative language. Derrida's goal is not to support a continuing tradition of American formalism. Nevertheless, there is a certain amount of reflexivity in the text, and while the act of producing a text will never completely coincide with its reflection, this basic reflexivity is not to be denied.

What Derrida is most concerned with is not to conflate the reflexive components of the text with the text as a whole. By asserting texts as self-reflexive, the conditions of possibility for the text are rendered completely internal, and text become autonomously self-referential. For Derrida, texts must be *iterable* to be understood; that is, they must be minimally repeatable, readable in their openness to new contexts, new readings (Derrida 1992, 43). This means there exists an "outside" or boundary to the text which limits its reflexive workings, makes what is "inside" reflexive and yet limits it.[13] This allows the text a degree of "play," *articulation*[14] within and against these limits of the text. This understanding of textual self-reflexivity is a far cry from claiming texts are purely self-perceptive and under the totalizing, conscious control of either an author, or of the text "itself." Reflection is *not* therefore a perfect return to the original event. As Merleau-Ponty puts it,

> ...because it is a reflection, re-turn, re-conquest or recovery, it cannot flatten itself that it would simply coincide...that it would travel the very route that the constitutive principle had followed in the opposite direction... (1968, 44-5).

What does constitute the reflexivity of the text (in our case here, the narrative)? If reflection recuperates everything except its own acts of recuperation, its texts are not in control of, or the staging of, their own reflexivity, how does narrative function? The gap between the event and reflection which initiates the split subject and (in Derrida's words) assures the *iterability* of the text is called by Merleau-Ponty *hyper-reflection*, by Derrida the *supplemental* relations of the text, and by Lyotard *the figural*. For it is not that the text is constituted purely by its own self-reflexivity: (for Derrida) the *trace* of what *contains* that reflexivity is what makes reflexivity possible. This notion is similar to Lyotard's claim that visual depth *limits* the oppositional system of the linguistic order. The figural describes relations between the non-reflexive and reflexive aspects of the text, the nonreflexive inserting a trace into the *seeming* self-presence of the other in order to apparently constitute that self-presence. Therefore it is not that reflexivity *guarantees* the subject or the text, but that reflexivity becomes figural *for* or figural *in relation to* something (and that the nonreflexive becomes figural for self-reflexivity), paradoxically allowing and yet limiting the play of relations in the text. We will see in the next section how the notion of the *figural* applies to narrative and how this installs a very different understanding of narrative *function* and narrative *temporality*.

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[13] "Outside" here does not mean an empirical outside, but an outside as that which structures or boundaries conditions of possibility.

[14] In the sense of a joint, allowing two surfaces to connect and yet move freely.

IV Narrative as Figural

> Scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is the true knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of knowledge, which from its point of view is not knowledge at all.
>
> (Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition* 1984a, 29)

Narrative studies in education are reportedly thriving: Lyotard, on the other hand, is concerned about the status of narratives and believes they are in a state of crisis.[15] And if our aporetic sneer at metanarratives were not enough, our belief that we could simply "tell another (newer) story" is also in crisis. We no longer believe that a total rupture with the past will "liberate" the subject of history – modernist claims to the "new" or "revolutionary" are seen as mere rhetorical moves within larger political games (Lyotard 1984a, 27-31). Lyotard is instead bent on rewriting aesthetics, politics, epistemology, history and temporality in terms of narrative's *effects*, and narrative as a *figural* condition. Lyotard is keenly aware of the modernist use of narrative, where

> Experience is a modern figure. It requires first a subject, the instance of an I, someone who speaks in the first person. It requires a temporal disposition...where a perspective on the past, the present and the future is always taken from the point of view of an actual ungraspable consciousness. (Lyotard, 1984b, 7)

Instead of a subject-based (split or not) narration of an empirical event claiming to "capture" the essence or reproduce the "reality" of a past experience, Lyotard postures narrative as figural condition for discourse itself, as that which enables, but also troubles discourse (Lyotard 1984a). The *figural* function of narrative is as *other* to discourse, appearing as a remainder or "left-over" element of discourse, and paradoxically serving as a condition of possibility of discursive meaning while seemingly not enabled to "mean" itself – at least not in the same terms as discursive meaning is enacted. Therefore "the scientist questions the validity of narrative statements...he classifies them as belonging to a different mentality: savage, primitive, underdeveloped, backward, alienated...Narratives are...fit only for women and children..." (Lyotard 1984a, 37). But while the scientist may scoff at the validity of narratives, "...what do scientists do when they appear on television or are interviewed...after making a 'discovery'? They recount an epic of knowledge that is in fact wholly unepic. They play by the rules of the narrative game..." (ibid., 27-8).

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[15] Lyotard characterizes the postmodern condition as that of "incredulity toward metanarratives" in *The Postmodern Condition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiv.

For Lyotard, narrative as a figural function for discourse displaces current epistemic practices of classical and modernist scientific knowledge. Classical positivism postures knowledge as centered upon the proof and evidence of the *referent*: scientists are recognized as such not by any subjective claim to know (or to reflexively know that one knows), but by the truth of the *referent* they narrate (Lyotard 1984a, 23-4). Therefore *any* sender or receiver could join in scientific debate in Lyotard's argument, or of Copernicus' theory on the circular paths of planets – *provided*, s/he can provide the proof and refute the falsehood of the referent. Classicism privileges the narrated referent over the subjects involved in the description. Narrative here is forgotten as the (narrated) referent ascents to the status of 'truth.' In modernist science, the *subject* of the discourse is priviledged: the question becomes "How do *you* prove the proof?" or, more generally, "*Who* decides the conditions of truth?" (ibid, 29). Either by recourse to reason (the subject's *ability* to know), or to romantic will (the subject's *desire* to know), knowledge about the referent is transmitted to the audience by a conscious, intending subject/author (ibid., 29-37). Narrative here is merely the tool of the author, "used" instrumentally to transmit knowledge to a (real or imagined) audience.

Narrative functions as *figural* in Lyotard's discussion of the postmodern (ibid., 53-67 and 71-82) as a condition where neither the author nor the referent are privileged, where no subject or referent can stand outside of the narrative that produces it. Rather, narratives function metonymically, one *displacing* the next: no one narrative can claim to contain the entire truth of another narrative, nor can any narrative claim ultimate status as truth over all other narratives.

Narrative as figural also implies that the temporality of narratives (and thus notions of story and history) is also radically different than that associated with a modernist, self-conscious and intending author "telling" the story. *History*, for Lyotard, is a narrative temporality to a structure of oppositions (a narrative *sequence*). Modernist History in the postmodern becomes impossible, as there would be no one transcendental narrative of it that could outweigh all others and ultimately no criteria for *judging* between competing narratives of History. As figural, one narrative cannot contain or evaluate the legitimacy of the next *completely*: this is another way of suggesting there exists no objective vantage-point from which events can be witnessed and represented. Instead, Lyotard writes of the *event*[16] in the condition of the postmodern. The event is a "happening," an incident after which nothing is the same again (Readings 1991, xxxi). The event does not occupy a simple place in (chronological) time, but is that which *cannot be represented* in a general history without being *reduced* to simply another *date* in such a chronology. The event is radically *singular*: this means the event *overruns* the frame of reference in which it could be understood. History, for example, is not the same after Auschwitz. The event is postmodern in that it is figural for the frame of reference, for discursive meaning: it cannot be comprehended at the time of its occurrence. Freud's notion of understanding only by *deferred action* applies here: the event happens too soon to be comprehended, and recognized too late to be recovered.[17] (This notion will be further explored in a subsequent essay.) The importance of the event as postmodern temporality is this respect for singularity, for the telling of the narrative in a way that respects the singularity of the event. Far from being a justification for relativism, Lyotard's rendition of narrative as figural and the event as the temporality of narrative addresses the importance of writing history *responsibly* in the crisis of representation. In his work *The Differend* (1988), Lyotard's example is of the Holocaust. It is to this different telling, temporality and history-writing that we now turn.

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[16] "Event" does not refer to a "moment" or the brevity of time, but rather as an occurrence which is not able to be represented (Lyotard 1988, 79).

[17] Freud's classic analysis of deferred action occurs through his "Wolf Man" case, "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis," 1914/18.

Narrative as Witnessing in a Crisis of Representation

> His argument is: in order for a place to be identified as a gas chamber, the only eyewitness I will accept would be a victim of this gas chamber; now, according to my opponent, there is no victim that is not dead; otherwise this gas chamber would not be what he or she claims it to be. There is, therefore no gas chamber.
> (Lyotard , *The Differend*, 1988, 4).

While it may be well and good for Lyotard to suggest within the postmodern condition no narrative surpasses another, it becomes important to address the *political* and *ethical* concerns that arise from such a con/figuration of narrative. If narrative as figural does not privilege the referent or the subject/author, how can issues of social justice be addressed through narrative? If no one narrative can dominate another, then should the claims of oppressed groups be given no more status that those of dominant groups? The status of testimony, of *witnessing* the event becomes crucial if narrative is considered figural.

Lyotard addresses the question of competing narratives and judgement in *The Differend* (1988), particularly addressing the issue of testimony in relation to Auschwitz. For Lyotard, competing narratives of history arise because an *event* has taken place, but the event as such is not yet understood: by its very nature, the event *breaks* the frame of reference which might make it intelligible. Auschwitz would be one such event. For Lyotard, the knowledge brought about through witnessing forms an *intersection* between epistemological issues and the *political-ethical* context in which witnessing occurs.

The difficulties of testimony (in particular, to violent or inhuman historical events), of narrating potentially unspeakable acts of cruelty make the knowledge testimony engenders *traumatic knowledge*: as Laub puts it, "...such knowledge dissolves all barriers, breaks all boundaries of time and place, of self and subjectivity" (Laub in Felman and Laub 1992, 58). Such knowledge is traumatic in its telling/reliving, in the burden of proof the victim must bear (particularly if the audience is hostile or in opposition to the victim's position), and in its very nature: the trauma can center around a "known" occurrence (with historical evidence) but yet not be truly witnessed, accepted, incorporated into consciousness. Like Lyotard, Laub focuses on the Holocaust, citing an example where a woman narrated part of her experience at Auschwitz. The woman intensely described a scene where she saw four chimneys exploding during a revolt at the camp, only later to have this testimony "discounted" by historians who had evidence that only one chimney was blown up. One of the psychoanalyst interviewers took issue with the historians' critique:

> The woman was testifying...not to the number of the chimneys blown up, but to something else, more radical, more crucial: the reality of an unimaginable occurrence. One chimney blown up at Auschwitz

> was as incredible as four. ...The event itself was almost inconceivable. The woman testified to an event that broke the all compelling frame of Auschwitz, where Jewish armed revolts just did not happen...That is historical truth. (Laub in Felman and Laub 1992, 60).

For the historians, this woman's knowledge was not acceptable because it was not empirically-based, bound as it was to the trauma of the camp. But for Laub, the woman's knowledge was of infinitely more value: "She was testifying not simply to empirically historical facts, but to the very secret of survival and of resistance," therefore "...breaking out of Auschwitz even by her very talking" (ibid., 62).

Lyotard discusses a similar situation at length in *The Differend*, where Robert Faurisson (whose argument against the Holocaust was referred to at the beginning of this section) suggests the lack of empirical evidence of gas chambers at Auschwitz is enough to warrant the dismissal of claims about the Holocaust. Lyotard develops several reasons why this line of thinking is flawed: it restricts "evidence" to purely eyewitness, empirical accounts; it forces the *victim* to carry the burden of proof alone; and it places the victim within an either/or result – either there is empirical evidence, or you are not a victim. But the most crucial of all problems with this line of thought for Lyotard is how it places the victim in double binds of every nature. Lyotard makes an important distinction here between "victim" and "plaintiff": a plaintiff is one who incurs damages and lays claim to be compensated for these damages. A victim is one who has lost the ability to prove s/he has been done a wrong (Lyotard 1988, 8). Lyotard also complains of how "wrongs" are reduced under a jurisdictional context to "damages": if the "wrong" a victim suffers is unspeakable, cannot be explained or proven, it does not exist. If it can be borne witness to, it is not a wrong but *damages* which took place (ibid., 5). The double bind sets in if the victim chooses to testify to a *wrong*: "...either the damages you complain about never took place and your testimony is false, or else they did take place, and since you are able to testify to them, it is not a wrong that has been done to you, but merely a damage, and your testimony is still false" (ibid., 5). Thus it is the nature of a victim to not be able to prove a wrong, "reality" always being the plaintiff's responsibility: reality is therefore never a given, but must *be* given existence (ibid., 8). This situation of impossible testimony is named a *differend* by Lyotard, an "unstable state of language where something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be," as there are not the words for it (ibid., 13). The differend is signified by the victim's inability to prove victimization, for differends, unlike damages, cannot be litigated: there is no common idiom by which both can be compared or normatively judged. This is what makes and keeps a victim in the position of victim: a lack of ability to bear witness to the wrong, which by its very nature cannot be established by common norm or consensus.

It should be noted that Lyotard is careful to differentiate the differend from *silence* and *keeping* silent. The differend is signified by a *lack of ability* to speak, not of choosing not to speak (ibid., 10). Further, silence itself testifies to a multitude of possible explanations: it *might* mean that the gas chambers at Auschwitz didn't exist, but it could also mean the witness may not have (or consider herself to have) the *authority* to testify, that the situation is inexpressible, or that it is not in the witness's jurisdiction to talk of it, or possibly, silence may signal a differend: *language* does not have the ability to signify what happened to me (ibid., 14). In order to *establish* a referent, Lyotard suggests these four silences must be refuted: someone *can* testify, someone *can* hear and understand, the referent *can* be signified, and the referent exists. "Only then," states Lyotard, "can the existence of a reality which might suit as a referent for that expression be "shown" by means of a phrase in the form: *this or that is a case of a gas chamber* (ibid., 16).

In particular, the case of Auschwitz serves for Lyotard as an example of the difficulties in exposing a differend. While millions of Jews were exterminated in the camps, much of the empirical means to prove this were also disposed of. The Nuremberg trial's authority was disposed of because it required an Allied victory to enforce it, and because the lack of consensus in international relations allowed criminals to see judges as simply those who won the war (Descombes 1981, cited in Lyotard 1988, 56). Later, as the State of Israel was formed, "wrongs" became litigated as damages through the normative consensus of international law and authorized world politics. But the reality of Auschwitz has yet to be established, argues Lyotard. "The differend attached to Nazi names, to *Hitler*, to *Auschwitz*, to *Eichmann*, could not be transformed" by litigation or verdict (ibid., 56).

Narration as figural, therefore, serves to legitimate testimony but in ways contrary to a subject-based or empirical framework of knowledge. As figural, narrative displaces science's strong emphasis on empirical modes of knowing, opening a space for the traumatic knowledge of testimony. Narrative as figural also belies the temporality of the *event*, which accounts for the distance between the occurrence and its narration/comprehension, but also identifies the *ethical* moment in narrative, the distance between the victim and the possibility of bearing witness to injustices, to *wrongs*, to *differends*. And it is precisely this act of *testimony*, of testifying to the differend, that Lyotard charges is the task of 'philosophy': "One's responsibility before thought consists...in detecting differends and in finding the (impossible) idiom for phrasing them. This is what a philosopher does" (ibid., 142). While Lyotard is sometimes accused of "reducing" politics to language, he is quick to add of this emphasis on the differend: "You don't play around with language...there are no language games. There are stakes tied to genres of discourse...There is conflict, therefore" (ibid., 137). Our charge to detect differends and find idioms for expressing them is not a simple directive to get the 'real,' true or 'authentic' story, but to (ac)knowledge the inexpressible event of injustice. Historians as well are under this challenge:

> ...the historian...must venture forth by lending his or her ear to what is not presentable under the rules of knowledge... Auschwitz is the most real of realities in this respect. Its name marks the confines wherein historical knowledge sees it competence impugned. ...the alternative is not: either the signification that learning [science] establishes, or absurdity..." (Lyotard 1988, 57-8).

By finding the *idiom* for the differend, Lyotard is not suggesting we place injustice back into the space of determinate judgement, into a language or legal system of consensus. What is at stake is not the *resolution* of a differend, but an acknowledgement that the event contains its own rules, indeed, is in search of its own rules, its *phrasing*. The nature of the social is not fixed but remains to be judged, warns Lyotard; it is "a judgement to be always done over again" (ibid., 140). *Justice* is similarly an open question, never predetermined but *singular* for each event. This is why Laub speaks of the trauma of re-telling an event: "...the Holocaust from which one had been hiding may come to life and once more be relived; only this time around, one might not be spared or have the power to endure...[one might not be] truly heard or listened to" (Laub in Felman and Laub 1992, 67). But while the indeterminacy of justice in telling the differend may be disconcerting, the necessity of hearing the differend and searching for its idiomatic expression is compelling. For Laub, "Trauma survivors live not with the memories of the past, but with an event that could not and did not proceed through to its completion, has no ending, attained no closure, and therefore, as far as its survivors are concerned, continues into the present..." (ibid., 69). For Lyotard, the just person, the judge, does not make judgements but is made by them (Lyotard 1985, 25-6); so too, it seems for the victims of injustice, and hence the overwhelming obligation to testify *through narrative as figural*, to the differend.

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Occasioning Relations: Writing History as Deferred Action

Poststructural writings in education have never sat well with many critical pedagogues, neo-Marxists, or feminists. Having worked with/in poststructural works for all of my doctoral program, in 1998 I presented a paper at the American Educational Research Association's Annual Meeting in San Diego designed to "stir up a bit of trouble" about this, and hoping to instigate a dialogue about how poststructural (and some postmodern) works were being *appropriated* in an almost developmentally conceived history of *critical* educational studies. It is probably best to just include a quote from this presentation (which was actually part of a journal I kept) to get a sense of this unease:

> Today I read myself described as a reader of "foreign theories," a writer of elitist language and stylistic arrogance," a philosopher of "nihilist freeplay" [that's an old one], "late capitalism," and an "overly-aestheticized approach to politics." In short, I read myself described by critical studies of education(which includes a sometimes dizzying mix of neo-Marxists, critical pedagogues, some feminist and race-theory writers) as a "postie," a supposed overly-theoretical writer busily ignoring the materiality of real people in real schools, and happily denying the strong subject agency necessary for social change. Not as inventive or path-breaking as the older 60s rebels, "posties" are written as "young bucks" ignorant of 60s milestones,a sad sort of "weak sister" to earlier pathfinders of social justice. "Posties" might even be working to betray such efforts, if only be their misguided and downright foolish theories of difference and displacement, and their talk of limits and boundary crossings. In these readings, I felt Gen X, or what Douglas Coupland calls *shin jin rui* – in Japanese, *new human beings*. In Western culture "new" tends to mean special, strong, youthful, *fresh* – but in Japan, the "fresh" new ideas of *shin jin rui* don't cut any slack compared to the wisdom of the ancients. One's status as *shin jin rui* is not to be flaunted in public, but rather what one tries desperately to hide.

With this mood in mind, I sought (and found) a way to describe the temporal connections and reconnections between critical and "post" studies of education *beyond* narrating a simple developmental history which could only appropriate other agendas into its mass, and found it interestingly enough in the writings of Sigmund Freud on deferred action and trauma. Alternate writings of temporality are most definitely figural to (and for) the sort of linear, chronological history narratives seeking to ingest all other lines of thought into themselves, and the uncertain, hard questions between critical and post which really *should* be asked are *evaded* in such a move.

OCCASIONING RELATIONS: WRITING HISTORY AS DEFERRED ACTION

If invention is never private, what then is its relation with all the family dramas?

> Jacques Derrida, "Psyche: Inventions of the Other" in Lindsay Waters and Wlad Gozwich (eds), *Reading deMan Reading* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989)

It is thus the delay which is in the beginning.

> Jacques Derrida, "Freud and the Scene of Writing," *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966)

Who's Afraid of the Post?

In a 1988 essay entitled "Success and Failure in Educational Reform: Are There Historical 'Lessons'?," Herbert Kliebard raises an important pedagogical question: can *anything* be learned from educational history? While Kliebard's intent is to analyze efforts at school reform, his question could also be extended to our efforts at curriculum theorizing. Often accused of being a field of successive paradigm shifts[1] and fads, does the history of curriculum studies have any lessons to teach, and do paradigms themselves inform each other in any way? Certainly if we take seriously the claim we are either living in a socio-economic 'period' of postmodernity[2], or experiencing a postmodern condition, an aesthetic/cultural movement[3], the "post" has been accused of being a cultural logic grounded in a market-mentality[4], compulsively generating and regenerating retro-styles and cultural costume-changes removed from (if not subversively eliminating) any progressive or cumulative sense of "historical" learning. Can "post" theorizing in curriculum studies be similarly accused of simply striving to be the "latest" or most avant garde fad of the moment?

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[1] William Pinar, for example, suggested in the late 1970s and following that the curriculum field was at that time undergoing a "paradigm shift" which he termed "Reconceptualist." An anthology and history of Reconceptualist curriculum theorizing appeared as *Contemporary Curriculum Discourses*, edited by Pinar (Scottsdale, AZ: Gorsuch Scarisbrick Publishers, 1988). For a discussion of whether "paradigm shift" was an appropriate term for this movement, see Theodore Brown's "How Fields Change: A Critique of the 'Kuhnian' View," published in the same volume.

[2] See David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*(New York: Blackwell, 1987), and Scott Lash and J. Urry, *The End of Organized Capitalism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).

[3] See Frederic Jameson, *Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), and Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

[4] See Frederic Jameson, "Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture" in *Signatures of the Visible* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 17-20.

No more important and valuable is an evaluation of "post" theorizing than in relation to critical studies of education (neo-Marxist, feminist, critical pedagogy and race-theory studies).[5] Following the New Sociology of the 1970s, the literature and paradigms of neo-Marxism and critical pedagogy in the 1980s and early 1990s attacked positivistic, ahistorical and apolitical analyses of education proposed by liberal and conservative educational writers alike. Concerned that education be emancipatory and transformative in its effects, critical studies of education at times was startlingly said to be in "retreat" by the early 1990s, fading before the "new" paradigms of postmodernism and poststructuralism (Anyon 1994, 115-133). Had/has critical studies been *supplanted* by the "posts"?

Accusations against "post" theorizing from critical pedagogy and neo-Marxists have included the "post's" elitist language and stylistic arrogance[6], its "anything goes" pluralism (Anyon 1994, 118; Bordo 1990, 133-156), and most commonly, the "post's" supposed overly-theoretical orientation which ignores the materiality of real people in the education system and denies the agency necessary for social change. One almost gets the sense from the critical camp that the post is somehow a failed present compared to a more heroic and "political" past.[7] Not inventive or path-breaking, and too complicit with faddish theoretical flourishes (notably "French theory"), "post" theorizing is perhaps simply not oppositional or transgressive enough for many critical pedagogues and neo-Marxists. Pompous and unrealistic, "posts" appear as a sort of weak sibling to earlier pathfinders of social justice; characteristic of many commentaries, Jean Anyon's 1994 article entitled "The Retreat of Marxism and Socialist Feminism: Postmodern and Poststructural Theories of Education" even suggests a sense of betrayal by "posts," of a younger generation "gone wrong" in its misguided and even foolish theories of and for social change (Anyon, 1994).

While such antagonism between (neo)Marxist and poststructural (and postmodern) proponents appears *in education*, these antagonisms can be traced to some of the *earliest* encounters of Frankfurt School Marxists (Adorno, Horkeimer, and later Marcuse and others) in what they would designate as the prototypical embodiment of "the" postmodern environment: their WW2 exile Lotusland home in Los Angeles. While it may seem a bit of a divergence, briefly reviewing the history of these German exiles in L.A. may provide a comparative background to some of the current struggles between critical and poststructural (and postmodern) positions in education and curriculum studies, for the Weimar diaspora who wrote some of the most *foundational* works conceptualizing modernism did so while in exile in Los Angeles, and *by conceiving* Los Angeles as the "most advanced" (and therefore "bellweather") location of capitalism's future.

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[5] I use the term "critical studies of education" realizing there is no simple way to define the term. Critical pedagogy draws upon various sources, including neo-Marxism, critical theory, structuralism, and to some extent, feminism, and more essentialist studies of race. More recently, this list could be extended to include poststructuralism, postmodernism and postcolonialism, but arguably these last three are used in critical pedagogy in an appropriative manner that is often problematic. Feminist studies and feminist pedagogy should be considered a separate, if related area (see Carmen Luke and Jennifer Gore, *The Struggle for Pedagogies* (New York: Routledge, 1992). Theories of race and racial difference are similarly related to critical pedagogy but should not be considered completely within the latter's scope. Other authors are more likely to use the term "radical pedagogy," but my use of "critical" is a specific attempt to evoke connections with critical theory and Frankfurt school philosophy. Transformative pedagogy is a broader term, concerned with challenging social inequalities as they emerge in school and other cultural settings; but it does not in all cases trace origins to critical theory or Frankfurt school theorizing.

[6] For recent examples see Michael Apple, "Power, Meaning and Identity: Critical Sociology of Education in the United States," *British Journal of Sociology* 17, no. 2 (1996), 125-144 and Gaby Weiner, *Feminisms in Education: An Introduction* (Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1994). For an earlier discussion of this criticism, see Henry Giroux's response to those complaining of elitist language in, "Language, Difference and Curriculum Theory: Beyond the Politics of Clarity," *Theory into Practice*, 31 no. 3 (Summer 1992), 219-227. See also Patti Lather's response to such complaints in "Troubling Clarity: The Politics of Accessible Language," (paper presented at the American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA, April 1995).

[7] Lois Weis seems to agree with Jean Anyon's claim that postmodernism is "nonpolitical." See Weis, "Qualitative Research in Sociology of Education: Reflections on the 1970s and Beyond" in William Pink and George Noblit eds., *Continuity and Contradiction: The Futures of fhe Sociology of Education* (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1995), 169, 14ff.

For European intellectuals and artists escaping the Gestapo of the concentration camps, the opulence of their new home in Los Angeles offered life-saving contracts from the movie studios, but also an alien landscape seemingly far removed from their *nostalgic* memories of pre-Fascist Europe.[8] Years later after returning to Frankfurt, Theodor Adorno suggested it was scarcely an exaggeration that any contemporary consciousness contained something reactionary to the American experience (Jay 1985, 123). Indeed, the new Santa Monica address of the Institute for Social Research at the beginning of the war brought with it a profound impact on these European intellectuals' theorizing of modernist culture. In *Minima Moralia: Reflections From a Damaged Life*, Adorno wrote of the isolation of these intellectuals from native Angelenos, but in many cases this segregation was little more than self-imposed, the emigrees content to cling to their high European ideals and biases like a cultural life-preserver (Heilbut 1983).[9]

Los Angeles was viewed by these exiles as a "wasteland," a lowbrow fleshpot robbed of its leisurely public spaces by the influence of the automobile, and containing little of the sophisticated high culture or historical ambience of central Europe – indeed, only able to produce sad, façade landscapes of Parisian boulevards or cafes (Wagner, 1935). In their *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno focussed on the aestheticization and sublimation of their favored proletariat by radio jingles and a "washing-machine-in-every-house" suburban consumerism:

> ...the new bungalows on the outskirts are at one with the flimsy structures of the world fairs in their promise of technological progress and their build-in demand to be discarded after a short while like empty food cans...Movies and radio need no longer pretend to be art. The truth that they are just businesses is made into an ideology in order to justify the rubbish they deliberately produce.
> ...A technological rationale is the rationale of domination itself.
> ...Automobiles, bombs, and movies keep the whole thing together... (1989, 120-1).

The Marxist aesthetician and playwright Brecht was so despondent in his Angeleno existence he wrote "...on thinking about

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[8] Some 10-15,000 refugees (many professionals) were allowed to settle on the West coast during the war. See Gerald Nash, *The American West Transformed: the Impact of the Second World War* (Bloomington, IN: 1985).

[9] Interestingly, the European intellectual exiles completely *ignored* labour struggles in the aircraft industries, conditions in the working class areas of downtown LA, and the struggles of the Mexican-American neighborhoods. See Anthony Heilbut, *Exiled in Paradise: German Refugee Artists and Intellectuals in America* (Boston: Viking Press, 1983).

Hell, that it must be/Still more like Los Angeles" (1976, 367).

Indeed, the situation of the European intellectual exiles in Los Angeles seems nothing less than *bizarre*: to imagine a renowned playwright such as Brecht shopping at a strip mall, or a sophisticated philosopher such as Adorno picking up canned beer at a corner grocery store puts into perspective their collective horror at (what we would now term) "postmodern" culture. There were, of course, "proper" Marxist concerns at the proletarianization of intellectuals by Hollywood; Gabler (1988, 324) quotes Milton Sperling as complaining of Taylorization in the studio writing departments:

> They would walk around and see if everyone was typing. ...When Warner or Cohn would be seen coming toward the building, someone would say 'He's coming' and all the typewriters would start. ...He [Jack Warner] couldn't understand why people weren't always typing.

But the exiles' despair was also to a large extent that of being immersed in, and possibly rendered insignificant by, a total "pop" (and *American*) cultural environment. Schoenberg taught studio composers who wrote music for monster movies and suspense thrillers; Stravinsky's big break came when he revamped the *Rite of Spring* for Disney's dancing broomsticks in *Fantasia* (MacDonald, 1978). Schoenberg was apparently incensed when tour guides on the buses that drove by his Brentwood home ignored it, but pointed out Shirley Temple's across the street (Newlin 1980, 42). Adorno wrote scathing critiques of the astrology columns of the L.A. *Times*. These reactions portray an alienated *disgust* with (or a "takeover" of high culture by) "low" and mass culture. The arrival of Herbert Marcuse in the 1960s (to anchor the philosophy department at UCSD) seemed to mark a change in attitude from the Frankfurt School as Marcuse *welcomed* "low" and popular cultural opposition to his 'one dimensional society': unlike Adorno before him, Marcuse praised jazz and soul music and supported the Black Panthers. Mass culture however, was not as supportive of Marcuse and performed its own killing critique of the cultural critic by writing him first as celebrity, and then as passing fad.[10]

Thus Marxist critics of the culture industry (and of Los Angeles in particular) have never fared well in the postmodern environment, whether reviling it in an oppositional stance as a distasteful, anti-intellectual phenomena, or embracing elements of it only to continue oppositional arguments for social change and social justice. Perhaps feeling "out of their element," unable to adjust to the *social* impact of consumer capitalism and worldwide popular culture, the antagonism between critical and "post" developed during wartime in L.A. continues today in almost every disciplinary field, and education is no exception.

Returning to Kliebard's question then, can anything be *learned* within *educational* studies between critical and "post" orientations? Is their relationship only that of a critical camp 'fading' before the 'dawn' of a "post" era? What is the nature of *genesis* in the "new" post paradigm of curriculum studies? Does the "post" present and the critical past refocus one another, or do they have nothing in common but status as fleeting fads? For what is at stake between these two orientations is nothing less than the question of *value* (can the "value" of a theoretical practice be articulated? can it be compared?) and the question of *difference* (how must the institution of curriculum studies *react* to and understand difference? do we shout past each other, descend into a static silence, affirm pluralism, or what?). Between the critical and the post is also the question of *theory* itself, for the critical claim that theory *be applied* to enlighten and emancipate marginal groups clashes with the post claim that theorizing itself is a type of practice (Lather 1995). The former renders theory ornamental and politics external, while the latter argues theorizing itself as a type of political (political-epistemological) practice. So what is the nature of the relationship between critical and post? And who's afraid of the "post," anyway?

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[10] Marcuse was described early in the 1960s as *Time* magazine's "Pied Piper of Insurgent Youth" but faded into unimportance.

History as Return

Returns are nothing new to history and historical discourses. In a sense, all history is a return, a repetitive representation which results in an account of the event. But such a statement hides the fact both change *and* repetition are inevitable elements in such returns. For while the representation of an event aims to be an *exactly repetitive* return, it is inevitably a return which also *changes* the event through its representation. In "What is an Author?", Michel Foucault writes of returns made to the texts of Marx and Freud (while Foucault never specifies this, clearly he is referring to the "return" readings of these authors by Althusser and Lacan) (Foucault 1977, 113-138).

For Foucault, a return is not a "rediscovery" which unearths past "treasures," nor is it a "reactivation" which inserts a past discourse into a totally different practice. Foucault states, "If we return, it is because of a basic and constructive omission...[which] can only be resolved by a return" (Ibid, 135, my emphasis). A return in this sense is not a supplement, but a reading that cuts through supplemental translations and commentaries to question the very structure of the discourse itself. Lacan "returns" to Freud not by identifying therapeutic contributions to an ego psychology, but to the Freud who disclosed a decentered self and the *language* of the unconscious. Althusser's return to Marx exposes not an ideological Marx intent upon humanistic problems of inequality and alienation, but a *scientific* Marx making an epistemological break toward "scientific history," toward historical materialism. In both these examples, the return is prompted by an omission, what Foucault variously names "gap," "absence," or "empty space," an omission that is "concealed" and "nonaccidental" (Ibid). And in both these examples, the significance of the discourse is radically altered by the return. This is not the passive or consumeristic repetition of much postmodern culture -- nostalgically repeating in the 90s clothing fashions like bellbottoms of the 70s, or cocktail parties of the 50s, in order to create new markets for goods. Foucault's returns are returns with a purpose -- not the slavish extraction of lost ideals or forgotten wisdoms, or even the inventive creation of new practices from old discoveries, but a rehearsal and a restoration of integrity to a discourse which resituates its status in the present. Such returns are, then, launched by questions posed to the discourses, seeking answers to the discourse's inherent gaps and "constructive omissions."[11]

With Foucault's sense of history as return, I am suggesting a process quite different from more traditional narratives of historical process between differing theoretical orientations. There is, I believe, a tendency within critical traditions to narrate (intentionally or not) a *developmental* history for themselves which negates any sense of history as return, or a history that is open to, and influenced by, gaps and nonaccidental omissions.[12] While some trace lines of influence upon critical studies of education back to the social reconstructionists of the 1920s and 1930s,[13] many histories narrate more immediate and precursory developmental influences in New Sociology, (in particular M.F.D. Young's 1971 *Knowledge and Control*), through to reproduction theory (notably Bowles and Gintis' 1976 *Schooling in Capitalist America*, and Bourdieu and Passeron's 1977 *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*), to resistance theory[14], to the transformative intellectual and the critical and transformative pedagogy of the 1980s and early 1990s. While the mere chronological narration of this history *appears* to draw it into the realm of a linear, continual formation, at times some authors bluntly state an almost progressivist history. A recent mapping of sociology of education by Pink and Noblit, for example, recounts that the New Sociology of education "was a response to the failure of other sociological approaches," (Pink and Noblit 1995, 13) -- thereby implying previous "phases" of critical studies "cause" or bring about the "next" phase. Even without writing causal links between "phases" in a developmental sequence, historians of critical studies in education can narrate a "family-resemblance" generalization designed to encompass differences between theories, thus drawing authors and orientations together into a large movement. Pink and Noblit state their historical project aims to "illustrate in what ways seemingly disconnected and contradictory work have both common roots and in many cases similar goals," indicating their intent to narrate a common movement headed in similar directions (ibid, 25-26).

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[11] The method I am generally describing here is quite similar in this regard to Foucaultian genealogy. For Foucault, by asking a question or posing a problem, the *event* is constituted and events are arranged in a series to produce the genealogy. History in this regard is really just an attempt to conceptualize the event, whereby differentiated histories, with their own concepts and their own senses of temporality, arrive. This does not mean that Foucault's project is to create a general theory of history, but it is more the case he engages in historical inquiries, historical practices.

But other, less obvious rhetorical practices have been employed to create the appearance of a developing and developmental paradigm-in-process. Other recent histories of critical studies in education emphasize such history as a "record of specific struggles for liberation and a source for building a theory of political ethics"(Stanley 1992, 113, my emphasis). While not linear or specifically progressivist in nature, nevertheless this rhetorical move implies critical studies of education *develop* by utilizing a static past historical record to improve current practices. Stanley, for example, cites Henry Giroux as one who has done the "good work of history" to find examples and direction for critical pedagogy from social reconstructionism, using history (as Giroux puts it) as a "liberating remembrance" (Giroux 1988, 81). The nostalgic sense of history-as-archive waiting to be (as Foucault reports) romantically "reactivated" feeds a developmental attitude toward critical studies where the good lessons and wisdom of the past develop present studies in unproblematic ways.

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[12] I use the term "development" cautiously, in the sense that I do not wish to imply all such narrated histories advocate linear, teleological, or predestined "progress;" but quite deliberately utilize "development" in the sense of *purposeful connectedness between events* which *builds identity* over time. "Development," like "evolution," can be a shaky, unstable and at times discontinuous process, but nonetheless one which appears, *in retrospect*, to have a logic of epistemological self-correction -- the sense that future stages, having reflected fully on past stages, react by *correcting* past *errors* in future theories. This creates a circular identity story of "failures," "change," "succession," and "succession's causes," narrating a (seemingly) closed loop of argumentation and thus guaranteeing the identity of this *one* "developing" paradigm or theory apart from the identities of *other* theories.

[13] See William Stanley, *Curriculum for Utopia: Social Reconstructionism and Critical Pedagogy in the Postmodern Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). See also William Schubert's claim that reconceptualists (Pinar's term) should *not* be considered "neoreconstructionists" by tracing a lineage between 1980s theorizing and the reconstructionism of the 1930s and 1950s. William H. Schubert, *Curriculum: Perspective, Paradigm, and Possibility* (New York: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 319-326.

[14] For examples of resistance theory, see Henry Giroux, *Theories and Resistance in Education* (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1983); Michael Apple, *Education and Power* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982); Michael Apple and Lois Weiss, *Ideology and Practice in Schooling* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983); Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* , trans. M.B. Rames (New York: Seabury Press, 1970); Ira Shor, *Critical Teaching and Everyday Life* (Boston: South End Press, 1979); Paul Willis, *Learning to Labour* (Westmead, England: Saxon House). See also Henry Giroux, *Teachers as Intellectuals: Toward a Critical Pedagogy of Learning* (Massachusetts: Bergin and Garvey, 1988).

Given the animosity in the earliest encounters between critical studies of education and "post" studies,[15] it seems clear that "post" studies fit uneasily at best into a critical historical narrative. Even some of the most recent critiques of "post" studies continue these earlier adverse encounters.[16] And this is precisely the problem. Narrating critical studies of education as developmental process goes hand in hand with condemning "post" studies as a cheap copy, or "failed" "new" project in transformative education. For by modelling historical narrative as developmental process, critical studies of education can easily become a metanarrative appropriating all else into its developmental sequence and assigning value and difference according to generalizations which describe its all-encompassing paradigm. Further, such a rhetorical move monolithically creates "critical studies" as a self-present discourse where all else is repetition of an original, or worse, commodification of a nostalgically more "heroic" or "historical" paradigm.

Changing Signs of History

If then, the manner in which we *write history* has a significant impact on the history that is written, what can be the nature of this "history" between critical pedagogy and "post" theorizing? If this history is *not* narrated as naturalized, "developmental sequence," how then *can* history be narrated, and where does that leave Kliebard's "history lessons"?

Earlier, I suggested history as *return* implied not a static or exact repetition of past events, but repetition *and change*. As LaCapra notes, historians typically accept an opposition between *synchrony* (atemporal, "pure" repetition) and *diachrony* (change), rendering repetition nothing more than a fixed and static "ahistorical" process, while "History" becomes an equally idealized diachronic process of change (LaCapra 1987, 12). Such an opposition unduly and decidedly separates history from philosophy and eliminates the duplicitous nature of representation from the practice of writing history. By creating a naturalized, developmental history of critical studies in education, the *mimetic* dimension of writing is missed, and strategies of mimesis utilized in "post" theorizing can be overlooked.

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[15] One of the most widely known of such encounters is Elizabeth Ellsworth's "Why Doesn't This Feel Empowering? Working Through the Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy, *Harvard Educational Review*, 59 no. 3 (1989), 297-324. Peter McLaren's rejoinder was published in "Schooling the Postmodern Body: Critical Pedagogy and the Politics of Enfleshment," *Journal of Education*, 170 no. 3 (1988), 53-83 and Henry Giroux's in "Border Pedagogy in the Age of Postmodernism," *Journal of Education*, 170 no. 3 (1988), 162-181. See also Jennifer Gore, "What Can We Do For You! What *Can* We Do For You? Struggling over Empowerment in Critical and Feminist Pedagogy," *Educational Foundations* 4 no. 3 (1990), 5-26; Carmen Luke, "Feminist Politics in Radical Pedagogy" in Carmen Luke and Jennifer Gore, *Feminisms in Critical Pedagogy* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 25-53; Patti Lather, "Post-Critical Pedagogies: A Feminist Reading," *Education and Society* 9 no. 1-2 (1991). While it is clear that Luke, Gore, and Lather's critiques of and commentaries on critical pedagogy are mightily argued from feminist perspectives, it is nonetheless important to note the original debate between Ellsworth, McLaren and Giroux was quite specifically about the role of poststructural and postmodern theories for critical studies of education.

[16] As mentioned previously, Apple complains of the relativism and stylistic arrogance of post theories (see note 6); McLaren senses an anti-materialism and a loss of human agency (Gert Biesta and Siebren Miedema, "Provisional Utopias in a Postcolonial World: An Interview with Peter McLaren" in Peter McLaren, ed., *Revolutionary Multiculturalism: Pedagogies of Dissent for the New Millennium* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 228-9; Philip Wexler complains "post" theorizing smacks of commodification and consumerism (Wexler, "After Postmodernism: A New Age Social Theory in Education" in Richard Smith and Philip Wexler, eds., *After Postmodernism: Education, Politics, and Identity* (London: Falmer Press, 1995), 76.

Homi Bhaba, for example, suggests a performative strategy of mimicry which plays upon the colonial desire to assimulate the native Other only in order to turn the colonial gaze back upon itself. Rather than resisting colonial efforts at assimulation, the native mimics this position, aiming to appear (in Bhaba's case) as "English as possible" and thus partially reassuring colonial power. But the production of mimicked ("not quite/not white") Englishmen is also profoundly disturbing, for "mimicry is at once resemblance and menace" (Bhaba 1984, 132). As the once familiar identity of the colonizer is relocated to the native Other, it returns uncannily distorted and subverts any return of the same to the colonial gaze; instead it proves an unsettling, return gaze of *otherness* which disrupts fixed colonial identities. Bhaba's strategy of mimesis *enacts* agency by refusing to separate and idealize mimetic processes of repetition and change, *mobilizing* power rather than reifying it into stable locations of oppressive colonizer and native Other. History as narrated in developmental sequence would miss not only the *agency* articulated in the ambivalence of mimesis, but similarly miss the (differently performed, but nonetheless) *utopian* dimension of such a mimetic strategy, whereby Bhaba posits not what can be, but articulates what *cannot be* (in this case, "pure" colonial power and domination). By registering the *unsaid* of colonial relations, mimesis *can* serve as a performative strategy of utopian critique. But both this utopian critique, and a potentially useful strategy of agency, are simply overlooked within a developmentally narrated critical history.

A second shortsightedness of history-as-developmental-sequence entails the missed pedagogical point of "post" historical practices -- that discursive "gaps" or "constructive omissions" cannot simply be remedied in time with the quite *rational, conscious* "returns" implied by a developmental sequence which analyzes "past" stages of the sequence to correct "errors" and reformulate future stages in the development of theory. If we accept the proposition that knowledge is not objective but *self*-knowledge (not just knowledge *of* the self, but the self's *relation to knowledge*, complete with the anticipations and resistances the self has to certain knowledge), it seems strange to narrate a historical "pedagogy" where history has none but rational and consciously-deliberated lessons to teach. This seems a doubly strange history for critical studies in education which has loudly proclaimed that identity "matters," that differential subjectivities are produced and continued between genders, races, classes, sexes, and other cultural groupings, and that such differences imply differential lived experiences,including affective elements in and of such experiences. Indeed, as Jane Kenway points out in the work of teaching feminism to men, "deep psychic sensitivities are involved" (Kenway 1997); Deborah Britzman (1995, 159) argues that knowledge and ignorance always imply and implicate the manner in which a subject consciously and unconsciously imagines him- or herself as "normal" (or not). A narrated history of critical studies in education must then come to grips with the effect of *unconscious* gaps and omissions, with the psychic economy which produces effects not consciously intended or rationally predicted and "useable" to create logical and developmental lessons from past theories and paradigms.

A third difficulty with narrating history-as-developmental-sequence stems from the effect of *balkanization* such histories produce. By narrating themselves as developmental sequences, paradigms or theoretical orientations strive to specify themselves as unique and original, separated from any other than minimal connection with other orientations. Debates surrounding the relationship between critical and "post" studies have tended (on both sides) to emphasize differences (which in itself is neither good nor bad), but to the effect that these paradigms are seemingly on historically isolated trajectories with self-contained beginnings and therefore substantial (and potentially antagonistic) conceptual and theoretical "differences." This in turn can lead to the overly-simplistic characterizations common of descriptions in the educational research field as a whole: the field is a story of "competing paradigms," *or* a story of "pluralization," with concurrent calls for "tolerance" and "inclusion" across differences. Again, it is my contention that how we tell the historical tales of theoretical orientations and paradigms is as significant as the tales themselves, and I would not wish to fall into the sentimental trap of *simply* calling for more "tolerance" between critical and "post" studies in education. Instead, what I would like to suggest in the remainder of this paper is an alternate practice of narrating a history and a relationship between "post" and critical studies of education using psychoanalytic models of trauma studies and the related concepts of repetition, recollection and *deferred action*. While there are those who have suggested in general ways that critical and "post" studies are or should be somehow connected,[17] exactly what this relationship is, or how it might operate is not particularly clear. I argue a psychoanalytic narrative practice provides a more specific (and coincidentally, less oppositional) account of the turns and returns between "post" and critical research in education. By narrating history as a psychoanalytic history, a *history-as-subject* acting out and working through[18] events and processes, certain atavistic elements of critical scholarly history can be articulated without losing or rendering "unsaid" the unconscious processes which conjointly figure histories. Such a psychoanalytic history could also allow for a wider *range* of signification practices and strategies under the sign of the "political" than are currently articulated under a developmental history of either orientation.

Freudian Temporality: Deferred Action

In order to narrate a new genealogy I need to elaborate a proposition basic to the remainder of my argument: that history, particularly modernist history, is often conceived unconsciously or not, *as if it behaved like a subject*. Indeed, the custom of narrating history in evolutionary, de-evolutionary, progressive or regressive terms, and the teleological rhetorical strategies implicit in many historical practices seems to indicate this subject-like assumption.[19] Given, then, that narrated history has and could be modelled as a subject capable of repression, recollection, or resistance, a different temporality than linear, chronological time is implicated.

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[17] See, for example, the interesting verb used by Michael Apple, who suggests we should "let these traditions 'rub against each other'." Apple, "Power, Meaning and Identity: Critical Sociology of Education in the United States" *British Jounral of Sociology of Education 17:2*,133.

[18] I use the terms "acting out" and "working through" in their psychoanalytic register. For discussion of the former, see Freud's "Remembering, Repeating and Working Through (Further Recommendations on Technique)" (1914), *Standard Edition*, 12, 150-153. For development and use of the latter term, see Freud's *Studies on Hysteria* (1895); see also Nicholas T. Rand, "Introduction" in Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, *The Shell and the Kernel* vol 1. ed Nicholas T. Rand (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 8-9.

For Freud, the subject appears neither intact nor progressively achieving a fulfilled and integrated end; rather, the subject is structured by and through expectations and resignifications of traumatic events. Despite only scattered references throughout his writing, *deferred action (Nachträglichkeit)* in Freud is just such a form of repetitive temporality. Mentioned in both his *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (1895) and in his *Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defense* (1896), "deferred action" appears as a concept most prominently in the *History of an Infantile Neurosis* (1918), Freud's discussion on the "Wolf Man," Sergei Constantinovitch Pankeiev.[20] For Freud, deferred action describes how the subject's initial failed efforts to bind an overwhelming, traumatic rupture are finally worked through only by a later event that recodes the initial rupture *retroactively*. As Jean Laplanche (1989, 88) suggests, "it always takes two traumas to make a trauma"; a traumatic *event* can only be articulated by another which resignifies it, and the *subject* is constituted only in deferred action. This last point is of particular importance to poststructuralists such as Jacques Derrida, who claims Freud's discovery of deferral is precisely that which interrupts the claim to a self-presence of the present: "To defer (*différer*) thus cannot mean to retard a present possibility, to postpone an act, to put off a perception already now possible. [*Différer* must be]...determined outside any teleological or eschatological horizon" (Derrida 1978, 203).

Clearly, Freud did not consciously develop fully the concept of *nachträglichkeit* to any significant extent. Referred to as "retention hysteria" in Freud's *Studies on Hysteria* (1895), deferred action was most fully explained in his *Project for a Scientific Psychology*: "Here we have the case of a memory arousing an affect which it did not arouse as an experience, because in the meantime the change [brought about] ...had made possible a different understanding of what was remembered" (Freud, *SE*, 1, 356) He goes on to state on the same page: "We invariably find that a memory is repressed which has only become a trauma by *deferred action*." In *Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defense* , Freud suggests "the traumas of childhood operate in a deferred fashion as thought they were fresh experiences" (ibid, 3, 166-7). And in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, deferred action receives only short mention (ibid, 4, 205), but receives a large revisit in *The History of An Infantile Neurosis (ibid, 17, 45ff)*. With this latter "Wolf Man" case, Freud clearly indicates deferred action as a unique experience of repetitive temporality, as he explains how the patient, as a child, received "an impression to which he is unable to react adequately; he is only able to understand it and to be moved by it when the impression is revived in him at the age of four; and only twenty years later...is he able to grasp...what was then going on in him" (ibid). The consequences for analysis are clear -- "And in this, we follow him since, ...the effect must be the same as though the distance between the second and third periods of time could be neglected" (ibid). But did Freud fully seize the extent to which his *nachträglichkeit* relation was a revolutionary *philosophical* and *theoretical* concept of temporality? Listen to Derrida's gloss: "Let us note in passing that the concepts of *Nachträglichkeit* and *Verspätung* (delaying- author), ...govern the whole of Freud's thought and determine all his other concepts" (Derrida 1978, 203). It was left to the future, and to a future generation of poststructural authors, to elaborate the full import of deferred action.[21]

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[19] While I could devote an entire volume toward supporting this thesis, there are numerous examples inside and outside academia which illustrate the subject-like practices of history (which for my argument, include repression, resistance, recollection, and deferred action) -- from the rather over-zealous efforts of Hollywood's Oliver Stone to narrate repression in American history in films like *JFK* and *Nixon*, to the more specific claims of a writer like Toni Morrison, who claims in *Playing in the Dark* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993) that the literary history of American fiction betrays an "Africanist presence" which is repressed, to a intellectual historian like Dominick LaCapra who advocates for a productive exchange between psychoanalysis and history (LaCapra, "History and Psychoanalysis," in *The Trials of Psychoanalysis*, ed. Françoise Meltzer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 9-38.

[20] All references are from Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. and trans. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: 1953-1974).

Deferred Action: Trauma

The study of *trauma*, and the subject (history-as-subject) as profoundly structured by *traumatic events* and the returns of such events renounces any notion of progressive growth, and has significant implications for the role of *knowledge* in relation to history and the subject. On this view, the subject can never be fully aware of itself (or in my investigation, "newer" theoretical paradigms or orientations can never be fully significant in their initial moments) because this subject *is traumatic* -- a rupture or disruption in the symbolic structure leaves the subject unprepared to accept or integrate it. As Britzman puts it, what the subject (or a previous theoretical orientation) cannot bear to know is truly a *resistance* that becomes *constitutive* of that subject (or in my case, that current state of knowledge) (Britzman 1995, 154, 159). This resistance may take the form of conscious (emotional, perhaps even hysterical) opposition or disengagement, but also and importantly, in an unconscious manner, as a *failure to signify*. And it is precisely this notion of trauma as producing resistance which raises the question of the *status* of claims that a "trauma" has occurred, or that a return implies a previous "real" trauma. Freud was profoundly taken with the question of the reality of past traumas, particularly in the Wolf Man case where his description of deferred action is the most detailed. He admits in *An Autobiographical Study* that he was "for some time completely at a loss" upon the discovery that patients' accounts of seduction were "only phantasies" (Freud, 20, 34). If the "trauma" never "really" happened, could its validity as a rupture to the subject's previous knowledge structure still hold?

Clearly here, and for purposes of my argument for history as influenced by a repetitive temporality, I would suggest that such trauma studies not take the "actuality" of a traumatic event as the only defining role in determining the workings of deferred action. For it must be recalled that, even if the event "really" took place, it must become the object of phantasmatic *investment* and desire to become traumatic (a "second" trauma must reconfigure it). While Freud insisted in early years upon the necessity of a "real" event, he had to admit in "On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement":

> Influenced by Charcot's views of the traumatic origin of hysteria, one was readily inclined to accept as true and aetiologically significant the statements made by patients ... At last came the reflection that, after all, one had not right to despair because one has been deceived in one's expectations; one must revise those expectations. If hysterical subjects trace back their symptoms

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[21] Notably, Jacques Lacan is the most conspicuous author to elaborate *nachträglichkeit*. For reasons stated later, my analysis does not focus on Lacanian traumatic returns largely because he associates such returns with the ontological status of the Real and I do not wish to make this claim in the relationship between critical and "post" theorizing.

> to traumas that are fictitious, then the new fact which emerges is precisely that they create such scenes in *phantasy*, and this psychical reality requires to be taken into account alongside practical reality.[22]

Deferred action, by its very description, implies that in the time between the unsignified, unarticulated earlier event and the later event which recalls it, the earlier event *must have been transformed* through the work of fantasy. While some might argue this is a poststructural "repression" of the real, it should not be read as merely a textualist dismissal of materiality.

Jacques Lacan worked extensively to link the real to trauma and traumatic events, particularly in his 1964 seminar "The Unconscious and Repetition."[i] While in his earlier work Lacan theorizes trauma as merely that which cannot be symbolized, his later work reflects an understanding of *the real as traumatic*, a hard "rock" or "kernel" that resists symbolization altogether. Particularly as read through Slavoj Zizek, Lacan's real becomes a counterpoint to what Zizek terms "discourse theory," the unrestrained assumption that the subject is exclusively an effect of prior discourses.[23] Trauma in the later Lacan takes the form of a traumatic return of the real, an enigmatic "outside" that persists and renders contingent any discursive formation claiming to describe reality. For Zizek, signifiers do not represent any kind of reality but are rather empty, containing only phantasmatic investments which create the false impression of unity and fulfilment for the subject. This failure of discourse is a *symptom*, pointing to a trauma, an outside to discourse -- the Lacanian real. Further, the origin of this trauma is presupposed (by the effects of its disruptions in the symbolic reality of subjects) to be the unsymbolizable threat of castration in the classic oedipal narrative (Zizek, 1989).

The difficulty of positing the real as the unsymbolizable, and hence trauma as an *originary* and *universal* "bedrock" event are several, as is the Lacanian move in asking the reader to trace this trauma exclusively to an origin such as castration anxiety. As Judith Butler (1993, 190) reminds us, the production of an unsymbolizable is "always a strategy of social abjection" and wonders about the production of castration as the invariant origin of trauma: "...there is always a question of what constitutes the authority of the one who writes those limits, ...[and a question of] what will and will not qualify as a discursively intelligible way of being." For Butler, to write trauma exclusively and immutably as castration anxiety, to tell a "final," originary tale, cuts certain signifiers (notably here, as "woman") incontrovertibly off from symbolization, rendering *this* trauma as an ontological and permanent one. Butler suggests the effect of trauma could rather be that *certain* signifiers are cut off from symbolization to avert the trauma, but the trauma could also be worked through and the once abjected signifiers resymbolized: "If we concur that every discursive formation proceeds through constituting an "outside," we are not thereby committed to the *invariant* production of that outside as the trauma of castration (nor to the generalization of castration as the model for all historical trauma.)"[24]

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[22] Freud, "On the History of the Psycho-analytic Movement," *Standard Edition*, 14, 17-19.

[23] Michel Foucault's work on subjectivity can often read this way, as if discourse alone brings about the process of subjecthood.

[24] Butler, 204-5. The term "worked through" implies the Freudian sense of "working out," a term used to describe the psychical assimulation of trauma in *Studies on Hysteria* (1895). This term is similar to Freud's later "work of mourning" in *Mourning and Melancholia* (1917).

Some may wonder about the use of trauma itself as a figure for narrating history. My focus away from progressive, linear history and towards discontinuities, returns, and deferred action also belies certain theoretical motivations. There is certainly within critical studies of education a widespread dissatisfaction with "textualist" models of culture and subjectivity, even if a naively empiricist model will not do, either. There is as well a sense that desire is perhaps being used in too celebratory a fashion, providing a performative license for virtual total mobility across a sea of discourses. While perhaps nostalgic, a persistent question remains around the real, and relations between bodies: the social body, the broken social contract and the loss of the welfare state, the bodies of AIDs patients, war-ravaged bodies in Bosnia, hunger striken bodies in former Eastern Bloc countries, the differential life chances afforded raced and gendered bodies. Trauma as a structuring device for the subject provides a potentially provocative theoretical perspective because it both *continues* the poststructural *critique* of the subject (the subject cannot be present to itself if wracked by traumatic returns; the subject does not develop in a progressive manner, "learning" from past "mistakes") and yet *returns* the subject in popular culture as survivor, witness against power, even the one who testifies to the trauma on *Oprah* and lays claims that must simply be believed, or not. In the gap between theory and popular culture, deconstruction and identity politics, the traumatic subject can be both radically split and yet at the same time guaranteed, paradoxically both glorified and simply gone.

Deferred Action: Repetition

In addition to being a *traumatic* subject, the subject of deferred action is also constituted and constitutive of *repetition*. Faced with the initial traumatic event, the subject (history-as-subject) *repeats* the traumatic event -- whether one takes the position of Freud, seeing repetition as a process by which one gradually integrates the trauma into the subject and eventually *recollecting* or working through contradictions,[25] or whether one takes the claim that postmodernism is a loss of, or a repetitive defending against, affect.[26] Perhaps Warhol has the best description of this latter, non-restorative function of repetition: "When you see a gruesome picture over and over again, it really doesn't have any effect."[27] However, Warhol is only partially correct, for in the repetition of the traumatic event the trauma is warded off only at the expense of *revisiting* it again and again; repetition *produces* trauma as much as it defends against it.

As with the subject as a subject of trauma, the repetitive subject is fractured, no longer the modernist unified subject and complete in self presence to itself, but neither is it a completely vacated subject, "beyond" questions of affect. And in this regard, the repetitive subject can also fall into the gap between identity politics and deconstruction as a constant producer *and* annihilator of affect in the subject -- producing neither a totally integrated nor totally disintegrated subject. "I never fall apart because I never fall together," states Warhol (1975, 81).

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[25] Freud, "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through: Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis II" *SE* 12, 147-156.

[26] Lawrence Grossberg's studies on affect in youth might be read as corresponding somewhat in this fashion. See Lawrence Grossberg, "Teaching the Popular" in C. Nelson, ed.*Theory in the Classroom* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986) and Lawrence Grossberg, "Rockin' with Reagan, or the Mainstreaming of Postmodernity" *Cultural Critique*, 10 (1988), 123-149.

[27] Andy Warhol, as quoted in Gene Swenson, "What is Pop Art? Answers from 8 Painters, Part 1," *ArtNews* 62 (November 1963), 60.

Critical and "Post" Studies of Education: A Narrative of Deferred Action

Thus far I have elaborated several key (and mostly) psychoanalytic concepts and arguments surrounding Freudian temporality and an (albeit hasty) overview of the implications of deferred action on the subject (subject as traumatized, subject as repetitive). While a complete argument for a deferred action narrative between critical and "post" studies of education would likely fill an entire volume, I will attempt to sketch out an initial presentation of this hypothesis, and explicitly address three areas of deferred action events between "post" and critical studies of education.

As mentioned previously, linear and developmental histories of the relationship between critical and "post" studies of education have had the effect of neatly separating the two into (more often than not) competing or even conflicting theoretical orientations, often with critical studies rendered the historical ancestor of social and political analyses in education and "post" theorizing a failed or weaker repetition of this lineage. Rather than invert or cancel the critical and neo-Marxist critiques of technicist and liberal humanist education, I wish to argue that "post" theorizing has in fact *worked to extend these critiques*, nonetheless in a deferred action manner.

Critical, feminist, and neo-Marxist critiques of the 1970s can certainly be termed avant-garde in the sense of its radical critique of, and opposition to, the prevalent discourses of cognitive science, social behaviorism, and humanistic psychology of the decade. Critical studies of education charged that no value-free knowledge, curriculum, or pedagogical methods existed[28]; that schools were populated not with universal subjects but with students of differently treated based on class[29], race[30], and gender[31]; and that processes of schooling from the classroom to the school district were sites for exercising *power*.[32] Central to these critiques was the reality of *oppression* and the necessity of *liberation* and *emancipation*: only by liberating students from hegemonic power structures would critical educators be able to reconnect students to a more emancipatory education.

Such claims would indeed be traumatic to those pursuing "scientific" and behavioral models of teaching and curriculum development, and some authors contend there has been persistent resistance to radical education proposals and marginalization of critical studies of education.[33] Without overly romanticizing such marginalization, I would like to focus on the *effects* of such potential trauma by suggesting how a deferred action process might explain the later reconnections "post" theorizing makes with earlier critical studies of education.

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[28] See Michael Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979); Paulo Freirie, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* , trans. M. B. Rames (New York: Seabury Press, 1970); H. Giroux and A. Penna, "Social Education in the Classroom: The Dynamics of the Hidden Curriculum" *Theory and Research in Social Education* 7:1, 21-42; Ira Shor, *Critical Teaching and Everyday Life* (Boston: South End Press, 1979).

[29] For example, Jean Anyon, "Social Class and the HIdden Curriculum of Work," *Journal of Education* 162; R. Sharp and A. Green, *Education and Social Control: A Study in Progressive Primary Education* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); and Paul Willis, *Learning To Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs* (Farnborough: Saxon House, 1977).

[30] R. Bell, "Lower Class Negro Mothers' Aspiration for Their Children" in H. Stub, ed. *The Sociology of Education: A Sourcebook* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1975), 125-136, cited in Cameron McCarthy and Warren Crichlow, eds, *Race, Identity and Representation in Education* (New York: Routledge,1993), xxviii.

[31] A. McRobbie, "Working Class Girls and the Culture of Femininity" in *Women Take Issue: Aspects of Women's Subordination*, ed. Women's Studies Group Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (London: Hutchison, 1978), 96-108.

[32] Pierre Bourdieu and J. C. Passeron, *Reproduction in Education*; Bowles and Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America*; M. Arnot, "Male Hegemony, Social Class and Women's Education" *Journal of Education* 164, 1 (1982), 64-89.

The traumatic subject is characterized by *repetition* of the event; so much so that Freud was inclined to remark in his "Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through: Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis" that psychoanalytic practitioners need not worry about the patient's inability to remember the trauma because the patient will *compulsively repeat* it (of course in an unknowing fashion). As Freud says, "...he cannot escape from this compulsion to repeat; and in the end we understand that this is his way of remembering" (*SE*, 12, 150-1). It is not only until later in the treatment that the patient's compulsion to repeat is curbed and turned toward processes of *recollection* and *working through*. For my purposes, this implies not a *monolithic* identity for "post" studies, but more of a two-stage process of repetition followed by recollection.

This said, let me suggest a possible process of how "post" studies of education *return* (through deferred action) to critical studies of education: rather than cancelling or *negating* the traumatically disruptive political critiques of critical studies of education, *the "post" enacts its project for a first time*. As the first stage of "post" studies *returns* to earlier critical work in education, it *repeats* this traumatic critical knowledge. As Freud explains, this repetition is not "critical" in itself; it does not have the aim of *understanding* or *comprehending* the trauma but merely returns to it again and again, in an unknowing manner. This does not mean that the theoretical *language* remains the same as previous critical studies, but that key tenets remain similar. This can be evidenced, for example, in the uneasy adoption of postmodern and poststructural theories by critical pedagogues, and in particular the earlier bifurcation of "post" theories into good/bad postmodernism. McLaren and Hammer (1989) and Giroux (1991) in their early apprehensive use of postmodern theories suggest there are *reactionary* forms of postmodernism and *oppositional* forms, approving only the latter as a "postmodernism of resistance" and stating only *this* portion of postmodern theory as acceptable for "critical appropriation" (Giroux 1992, 73) by critical pedagogy. By retaining the tenets of resistance, subject-based agency, and a fairly essentialized sense of identity within "difference," this first "post" theorizing stage *repeats* critical studies of education without the effort of *recollection*, or working through. But this repetition is not without effect: the continuing repetition of critical tenets works to transform critical studies of education *into an institution* which will be analyzed by a second "post" stage. This transformation is, of course, a *reification* and makes critical studies of education appear historical *before its time*, before concepts can be fully explicated and elaborated. This is consonant with Jean Anyon's claim in "The Retreat of Marxism and Socialist Feminism":

> By 1985 the body of work produced by the Left in education had reached substantial proportions. ...It was not until the spring of 1990 that I reentered the

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[33] William Stanley, *Curriculum for Utopia*, (1992) 2-3, cites Larry Cuban, *How Teachers Taught: Constancy and Change in American Classrooms 1890-1980* (New York: Longman, 1984), John Goodlad, *A Place Called School: Prospects for the Future* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1984), and Ken Sirotnik, "What Goes On in Classrooms? Is This The Way We Want It?" in *The Curriculum: Problems, Politics, and Possibilities*, eds. Landon Beyer and Michael Apple (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), 56-74 as educators who have demonstrated this resistance.

> scholarly arena [and found] the ideological scene had shifted dramatically ...There was only one Marxist-orientated session... Moreover, the Marxism of the papers I critiqued seemed simplistic and mechanical... The authors addressed issues ... all of which had been discussed the very same way...ten years earlier. ...It seemed to me ...the discourse of Marxism in education...had failed to develop. Other sessions at the 1990 AERA conference suggested that the interesting critical work was not being done in "postmodernist" and "poststructuralist" modes... (Anyon 1994, 115).

The second stage of "post" theorizing, prompted by the reification of critical studies of education, critiques this repetitive accommodation and seeks rather to transform it through *recollection*. Here, the acclaimed 'transgressive' aspects of critical studies of education are investigated for their enunciative and articulatory practices; critical practices are deconstructively mimicked to reveal the *discursive structures* of their construction.[34]

This second wave of "post" theorizing, however, should not be seen as valiant or more enlightened; in deferred action the effect of knowledge operates such that the distance between first and second time periods is neglected or collapsed. The second wave is, however, tempted to rather *apocalyptic* pronouncements; such is the case with several misplaced efforts to apply the term 'post' as in *after*, or *superseding* -- post-feminist, post-critical, post-pedagogy. This rhetoric sounds more often than not like the macho language of *modernist* time and succession, and an unfortunate "return" to a developmental history. For the most part, however, the second "post's" recollection activities focus on strategic displacements as opposed to grand oppositional movements.

To demonstrate this thesis of a two-stage repetition and recollection process, let me narrate three potential examples of deferred action between critical and "post" studies in education.

1. While never stated in "post" terminology, critical studies of education did in many ways begin the critique of the transcendental subject through its introduction of (in particular) class, but also gender and race as differences that make a difference in how, and to whom, curriculum is addressed. Critical studies of education were not content to allow "scientific" curriculum development or "neutral" pedagogy to remain undisturbed but rather *politicized* curriculum, pedagogy, and schooling as *social practices*. Early "post" discourses in education tended to *repeat* many of these claims as an agenda of *identity politics*, but it is not until later "post" theorizing that a fuller and richer critique of subjectivity is surfacing. This is evidenced by a self-proclaimed "feminist poststructuralist" critique of emancipatory discourses of earlier "post" theorizing,[35] but even more completely by the growing use of psychoanalytic perspectives on subjectivity. Such recent (and what I would term second stage) "post" theorizing includes the insights that identity is not fixed by *articulated* in relation to the unstable and

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[34] See, for example, the differentiation Tony Whitson makes between "oppositional postmodernist rationales" as *extending* the range of curricular courses offered in schools, while a "post-structuralist perspective" points to dichotomies that structure such a discourse in the first place. Whitson, "Post-structuralist Pedagogy as Counter-Hegemonic Praxis (Can We Find The Baby in The Bathwater?)" *Education and Society*, 1 (1991), 81.

[35] See Ellsworth, 1989, and Luke and Gore, 1992, in note 15.

uncanny discourses of desire,[36] and that the unconscious interrupts any supposedly straightforward inscription of social norms onto and into the subject.[37]

2. Critical studies of education also surfaced the existence of power relations, domination and oppression in educational institutions and processes. While appropriating the language, first stage "post" studies of education vacillated from later "post" insights and often repeated a rather macho language of subject-based choice, agency and individualist power in order to rectify the "post's" apparent exit from activist concerns. Indeed, while critical pedagogy itself was exposed as a discourse not exempt from power, early "post" theorists often enacted this critique while still attempting to extract *themselves* to a supposed "powerless" or de-centered positions, or positions of shifting and changing power that might appear more innocent.[38] It has not been until more recently that second stage "post" work has utilized Althusser's warning against claims to "innocent" readings.[39] And it has not been until far more recently that second stage "post" theorizing works through the understanding that academic discourses themselves are implicated in power relations, and understand more fully Foucault's insight that power and knowledge are *coupled*, that claims to knowledge imply power and that power is constitutive of particular knowledges. Erica McWilliam, for example, critiques critical studies of education for its adoption of a "missionary position" with respect to power/knowledge, seeking not to demonize or extricate herself from power but to embrace power in teaching as an erotic practice, as a response to a demand for material engagement (McWilliam 1997, 217-236).

Third, the critique of knowledge as less than value-free brought by critical studies of education, it could be claimed, initiated the discursive space to advance the "post" critique of rationality assumed in the teaching and learning process. While far from denying the import of emotion and affect in the constitution of subjectivity, first stage "post" theorizing could occasionally be accused of *valorizing* affective over cognitive elements of subjectivity, thus reinforcing a separation between the two.[40] Again, with the recollective efforts of second wave "post" theorizing, knowledge was fully inscribed *within* subjectivity, and the subject's cognitive activities with respect to knowledge, learning and ignorance were properly and closely identified with affective investments.[41]

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[36] See Sharon Todd, "Looking at Pedagogy in 3-D: Rethinking Difference, Disparity, and Desire" in Sharon Todd, ed. *Learning Desire: Perspectives on Pedagogy, Culture, and the Unsaid* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 237-260 (see also other essays in this volume).

[37] James Donald, *Sentimental Education: Schooling, Popular Culture and the Regulation of Liberty* (London: Verso, 1992), 89-97; Stephen Appel, *Positioning Subjects: Psychoanalysis and Critical Educational Studies* (Westport, Conn. : Bergin and Garvey, 1996), 7-11; Deborah Britzman, "Decentering Discourses in Teacher Education: Or, The Unleashing of Unpopular Things" *Journal of Education* 173, 3 (1991), 60-80.

[38] Such, I believe, is the case in Elizabeth Ellsworth's 1989 "Why Doesn't This Feel Empowering," where her exposé, while rightly encompassing emancipation itself within a regime of truth, still resides within a moral framework of scale -- who is this more oppressive, who is less oppressive, etc.

[39] Louis Althusser, *Reading Capital* trans. Ben Brewster (London: Verso, 1979). For an example using this concept of innocence, see Deborah Britzman, "Beyond Innocent Readings: Educational Ethnography as a Crisis of Representation" in William Pink and George Noblit eds, *Continuity and Contradiction*, 133-156.

[40] See William Stanley's critique of this move by Peter McLaren in "On Ideology and Education: Critical Pedagogy and the Politics of Education" *Social Text* 19 & 20 (1-2), 175. Stanley, *Curriculum for Utopia*, 204.

[41] Deborah Britzman's "Structures of Feeling in Curriculum and Teaching" *Theory into Practice* 31, 3 (Summer 1992), 252-258 indicated curriculum *to be a question of identity*; her 1995 "Queer Pedagogy" clearly explained connections between knowledge and affect.

Conclusion

Certainly, my analysis of possible examples of deferred action between critical and "post" studies of education is not exhaustive, nor can it be in the span of a short paper. However, I do believe it both important and necessary work to consider carefully and with a great deal of thought the performative effects of writing histories, for as Donald (1992, 96) claims, the categories and discourses we choose and use return not only as identifications, but also *agencies* indeed, the rhetorical returns themselves enact strategic agencies that are inherently useful, but of course never innocent. To revise Kliebard's question, are histories (narrated as events of deferred action) pedagogically useful? History-as-return, as with all narrated histories, certainly has "lessons" to teach, but lessons which can only be recorded on Freudian time. Whether such a decidedly different sense of temporality proves theoretically useful remains, as Derrida (1978, 203) claims, *a-venir*, for the future; for "it is thus the delay which is in the beginning."

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Race, Singularity, Context: Reading Epistemology in Tyler's Rationale

"Race, Singularity, Context: Reading Epistemology in Tyler's *Rationale*" is the most recent of the essays and marks my attempt to follow up with Jim Scheurich and Michelle Young's work in epistemological racism. The structuralism of Ralph Tyler's *Basic Principles of Curriculum* seemed a rather apropo topic in 1999, my attempt at marking the 50th anniversary of his book. My interest here was to explore Scheurich and Young's challenge that race *matters* to epistemology in relation to my own evasions of race in theorizing poststructuralism and research methodology. It seemed to me what was figural for/in current education writings on race (and many by white authors) was the *singularity* of race, the historical specificity that *should*, but rarely does impact our epistemology and research methodologies. *Why* this is the case remains unanswered, but this essay at least *attempts* to open up a Deleuzian line of flight as to how race could matter for educational research.

RACE, SINGULARITY, CONTEXT: READING EPISTEMOLOGY IN TYLER'S *RATIONALE*

One of the most interesting characteristics of the curriculum field is the many returns that are made to classic or canonical texts. The occasion for this paper is the 50th anniversary of Ralph Tyler's *1949 Basic Principles of Curriculum*, the published syllabus for his Education 360 course at the University of Chicago and often referred to as the Tylerian *Rationale*. Widely read by curriculum scholars even to the present day, Tyler's 1949 classic has been credited as a "reigning model for curriculum planning" (Kliebard 1995, 81), a dominant rationality upon the field of curriculum theory and design (Pinar 1975, 397, Giroux in Pinar 1975, Pinar 1988, 3, 7), a book widely used in college courses and influential "in the theoretical development of the field itself" (Pinar 1975, 4), an educational metanarrative (Cherryholmes 1988, 11) and even granted the status of powerful educational myth (Huebner in Pinar 1975, 217).

From my poststructural perspective, texts are, as always, read *alongside, in and through*, other texts. My-rereading of Tyler on this 50th anniversary follows in the wake of two important bodies of work: the criticism levelled against the Tylerian *Rationale* in the 1970s and 1980s, including those by the so-called "reconceptualists," (Pinar 1975), and work on racial and racist educational epistemology developed by James Scheurich and Michelle Young (1997, 1999). Since Scheurich and Young challenged the educational research field in 1997 to "have a fierce row" over the issue of racism in educational research epistemologies, it is perhaps time to revisit the style and manner of critique levelled against the Tylerian *Rationale* in the past two decades to add to the current debate over epistemology developed in the 1990s, and also to take seriously the claims of recent Tyler apologists such as Peter Hlebowitsch (1992, 1993) and William Wraga (1999).

Epistemological Racism Revisited

In their opening 1997 article, Scheurich and Young outline four "levels" of racism, with evidence of epistemological racism arising at the fourth, or civilizational level. At a most basic level exist acts of individual racism (whether overt/conscious or covert/unconscious); Scheurich and Young charge that most individuals in the U.S. resort to such personal or individual explanations or racist behavior. At a deeper level, entire institutions or organizations generate (overt or covert) racist structures and procedures. Educational researchers have in the past used labels such as "culturally deprived," or concepts such as "at risk" or "dysfunctional" to describe non-white students, reflecting such entrenched institutional symbols and knowledges. On a broader social scale, entire societies exhibit practices where one race is favored or disadvantaged in relation to another. Conceptions of what a good leader, or good family is can be drawn from only certain segments of society but imposed upon all (eg. the white, middle class view of success). At Scheurich and Young's deepest (and likely unconscious level) exists civilizational racism, priviledged attitudes toward the nature of reality, or the construction of knowledge. Such attitudes and beliefs become naturalized to the extent that they become everyday practical reality for the entire population when in fact these beliefs have been historically constructed by the dominant societal group. Edward Said's (1978) depiction of how "the West" constructed and legitimated its ideas of "the Orient" to not only westerners but also "Orientals" would be an example of civilizational racism.

From these four levels of racism, Scheurich and Young contend that epistemological racism arises when the social history of a particular group is priviledged over others, and that epistemic view of the world becomes dominant. They contend "all of the epistemologies currently legitimated in education arise exclusively out of the social history of the dominant White race" (1997, 8). They further contend that this unduly restricts the range of possible epistemologies, rendering non-dominant knowledge construction suspect, pathological, sensational, or simply illegitimate.

The important question to this definition of epistemological racism, however, is voiced by editor Bob Donmoyer in the same issue of *Educational Researcher*: doesn't this view of epistemological racism essentialize race? Further, how would on bring a charge of epistemological racism? Under what circumstances? How can we claim to know epistemological racism when we read it? While Scheurich and Young utilize Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) as an example of reading epistemological racism, they do not address the important methodological questions raised by such an approach. Said's *Orientalism* uncovered how colonial European epistemology *created* "the Orient" as an object for appropriation and cultural domination by the West. Interestingly (and unlike Scheurich and Young's (re)quest for "new" race-based epistemologies), Said has *refused* to offer an "alternative" to western representational practices, because this would mean accepting "the Orient" as a real object, rather than a fiction created to convince the West of its own supremacy. The difficulty with Said's approach, however, is the methodological question of how he purports to separate himself from the dominant white racist epistemologies he claims (and Scheurich and Young claim) are so pervasive in society. How can an "outside" method be found to examine epistemological racism, given that such racism arises as a larger social ("civilizational level") condition of knowledge? If dominant epistemological structures are so powerful as to pathologize or "other" alternate epistemologies, how could we ever know these alternates "outside" of dominant knowledge structures?[1] And still, we are no further with the question: how can we bring a charge of epistemological racism?

The Tyler *Rationale* Revisited

At first blush, Ralph Tyler's *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction* seems to have little in connection with questions or charges of epistemological racism. While Tyler's work has often been interpreted as a more or less prescriptive guide to curriculum development (Schubert 1986, 171-183; 188-189), it should be noted that Tyler's intention was for this work to be used as an analytical tool for making choices and asking questions of curriculum. Indeed, Tyler himself writes in the Introduction, "This small book attempts to explain a rationale for viewing, analyzing, and interpreting the curriculum" (Tyler, 1949, 1, my emphasis); he goes on to argue "It is not a manual for curriculum construction," and "This book suggests methods for studying these questions (ibid, my emphasis).

In a certain way, Tyler's work can almost be viewed as a manual of research methods and methodology in how he answers his first of the four questions (what educational purposes should the school seek to attain?) by describing activities to be undertaken by teachers that are almost reminiscent of teacher-research or action research methods. Tyler enjoins teachers to use such (qualitative) procedures as interviews, open-ended observations of students and classrooms, and even "social investigation," which reads distinctly like modern ethnography. Tyler also suggests teachers gather and interpret quantitative research such as populational and health statistics, and statistics related to school achievement. Taken together, Tyler's *Rationale* appears to make a significant statement on the construction of knowledge, an epistemological perspective on how to analyze and interpret data, experiences, and social existense as they relate to curriculum. While Scheurich and Young appear to want to investigate more "academic" or "scholarly" educational methodologies in defining epistemological racism, a text such as Tyler's can address this same issue at both university and school levels.

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[1] Michel Foucault ran into the same problems writing his *Madness and Civilization* (1961), which he claimed was a "history of the Other," of how "madness" falls completely outside the sphere of reason. Derrida questioned such a work, asking how if the dominating structure of reason worked to "other" madness, and history merely reflected this dominant structure of reason, could Foucault ever hope to write the "history" of madness?

If, then, the Tylerian *Rationale* can be seen as making a significant epistemological statement, what sort of statement does it make and how can we address (and hopefully expand) Scheurich and Young's concept of epistemological racism through a reading of Tyler? (By attempting to read Tyler through Scheurich and Young I am, as they caution, not relegating Tyler himself to the level of individual racism or naming him on a personal level as racist, but rather attempting to read their "civilizational racism" through the epistemological assumptions of the *Rationale*, and hopefully in a manner beyond a merely essentialist reading). Further, I will choose at this juncture to approach a reading of Tyler from a poststructural perspective to address this issue of "race essentialism," and also because poststructuralism as an epistemology specifically redresses the problem of how to situate the knower inside/outside the effects of racism, a problem I believe Scheurich and Young have yet to identify or explain in their current definition.

Epistemology refers to our theories about knowledge: how it is produced and articulated, and under what conditions something is knowable. While Kliebard (1992), Pinar (1975), Macdonald (in Pinar 1975), Giroux (in Pinar 1975) and others have developed historically important critiques, it is Cleo Cherryholmes in his 1988 work *Power and Criticism: Poststructural Investigations in Education* which has given one of the most reasoned and viable critical commentaries on the Tylerian *Rationale* to date. Cherryholmes is one of a very few scholars who attempts to perform something like an immanent critique of Tyler's work, in the main trying to examine the workings of the *Rationale* not from an "outside" or "radical" perspective of what the *Rationale* should contain but whether or not the *Rationale* achieves the goals it sets for itself and the consequences that reasonably follow from its premises.[2] Cherryholmes, attempting to mount a poststructural investigation, claims Tyler's is a process created with structuralist epistemological assumptions. Three key descriptions of the Tylerian *Rationale as structural* follow from Cherryholmes' analysis:

1. The Tylerian *Rationale* is structuralist because Tyler's four fundamental questions have meaning only as a system of elements; elements do not have substantial meanings, but only relational meanings (Cherryholmes 1988, 23, 25, 137). Cherryholmes gives only scant examples to explain, but this assertion is key to understanding the *Rationale* as invested in a structuralist epistemology because what is known is not the world as it "really" is, or even

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[2] Immanent criticism is defined by Theodor Adorno in *Prisms* trans. S. Weber (London: Neville Stearman, 1967) as comparing a culture or discourse against its ideal.

that individual elements of a system correlate to empirical "truths," but that the structure and its interrelationships are said to create meaning. (One of the criticisms of this theory is, of course, that it cannot be sufficiently demonstrated that the structure accounts for meaning if each element has no individual meaning. In the *Rationale*, for example, evaluation has no meaning except in relation to planned objectives and would not indicate any transformations in knowledge ("learning") without preselected objectives; "learning experiences" can't be defined without objectives or evaluation, and would not even be understood as "learning experiences" if they were not properly "organized." Under these structuralist assumptions, Cherryholmes rightly critiques the *Rationale* for the dependence of meaning purely on form, with no attention to the force needed to operationalize the system. As Derrida suggests, in structuralism "form fascinates when one no longer has the force to understand force from within itself...[structural] analyses are possible only after a certain defeat of force (Derrida, 1978, 4-5). Cherryholmes suggests the *Rationale* is not helpful because discussions of decision-making, politics, ethics and social responsibility (some of the factors of force) are not present (1988, 40). It is the structuralist nature of the *Rationale*, not Tyler specifically, which explains the structure's questionable assertions of meaning or value.

2. By emphasizing the structure's form and function, Cherryholmes describes the Tylerian *Rationale* as "decentering the subject" (1988, 19, 25). This is also one of the central features of structuralism, that it observes and asserts the system autonomously without reference to an acting or conscious subject (reader, writer, sender, receiver, teacher, student). Structuralist Claude Levi-Strauss, for example, asserts it is possible to describe the myths he studied "unconcerned with the identity of its occasional bearers" (1970, 49). Nothing is said in the four steps of the *Rationale* itself about the social identity of the teachers, students, and other individuals who operationalize its steps, or, for that matter, the positioning of the subject how reads and interprets the *Rationale* itself. With reference to a section where Tyler suggests "the school" should decide whether tracking should be instituted or condemned as undemocratic (1949, 36), Cherryholmes comments "schools don't have beliefs, people have beliefs." (1988, 41).

3. As structuralist epistemology asserts the system's form over its force and its abandonment of the subject, it easily follows that the system is best described as synchronic rather than diachronic. Cherryholmes calls it "ahistorical" (1988, 25, 41). The Tylerian *Rationale*, by its very lack of references to historical setting and historical, social subjects, seems to establish a model or system that is timeless, that exists regardless of social or historical circumstance. Cherryholmes attempts to critique this synchronic system, suggesting it must be seen as "an object of history" that "reflects the dominant ideology of its time" (41) but he is overstepping here. As structuralist, the *Rationale* is inherently ahistorical and to place it within a historical context, while certainly plausible in a radical critique, does nothing to critique it based on its own merits. Indeed, some have even heralded the *Rationale*'s timelessness and generalizability as a positive virtue (Hlebowitsh, 1993, 28). As Derrida comments of structuralism, "This is why literary criticism is

> structuralist in every age, in its essence and destiny...these [structural] analyses are possible only after a certain defeat of force...a reflection of the accomplished, the constituted, the constructed...crepuscular by its very situation (1978, 5).

To recap, Cherryholmes' efforts to analyze the Tylerian *Rationale* are laudable because they identify the workings of its structuralist epistemology; Cherryholmes does, however, go beyond this level of immanent critique to impose upon the *Rationale* conditions and desires outside of its intentions which make his reading look more like a buttressed ideological critique at times. Indeed, some have charged that much analysis of the Tylerian *Rationale* is little more than intemperate, "friend or foe" attack (Hlebowitsh 1993, 20). In order to get beyond applying external criteria to judge the *Rationale*, it is necessary to review some of the history of this criticism with an eye toward understanding its acrimonious and somewhat circular nature.

Reading the Aporias of Structuralism in Tyler

Following a rather long and honored tradition in academia, William Pinar proclaims one tradition dead of obsolescence in order to herald the new. He wonders, "Who asks them [Tyler's questions] in 1973?" (Pinar, 1975, 397). In 1988, he concludes the following regarding the Tylerian *Rationale*:

> ...Tylerian dominance has passed. Like a disappearing star in another galaxy, however, it takes some years for everyone, depending upon his or her location, to see this. The fact is that to a remarkable extent reconceptualization has occurred. (1975, 8)

It is one strategy to declare theory and tradition dead, and yet another to work through a reading at the limits of the actual text(s). While Cleo Cherryholmes develops one of the most useful critiques of the Tylerian *Rationale*, Peter Hlebowitsh provides one of the most insightful questions about the *Rationale*, amid his protest of the 70s and 80s criticisms of Tyler. Hlebowitsh (1993, 25) complains:

> ...the message to Tyler from the critics was not always unified. Kliebard (1975b), for instance, flatly asserted that the rationale failed to delineate enough boundaries to be used in deciding what should be included (and, byimplication, excluded from) the curriculum. ...Such a view, however, is difficult to reconcile with the claims of other critics that the rationale uses a controlling, prescriptive language (Huebner 1975; Pinar 1975) or that the rationale represents a repressive recipe for curriculum planning (McNeil, 1986).

While critics of Tyler can hardly be fairly chastised for not presenting a single, unified complaint, the dissonance Hlebowitsh identifies is significant. Is the Tylerian *Rationale* a model of strict, repressive social efficiency and engineering, or is it instead a "value-free" framework with liberal goals of promoting any (or multiple) philosophical bases? And how can it stand accused of both simultaneously?

The Tylerian *Rationale* as an example of a technical rationality invested in repressive social control was a thesis largely ventured by so-called "reconceptualist" theorists in the 1970s and early 1980s. While Pinar (1975) proclaimed the Tylerian *Rationale* old-fashioned, he also advanced some of the strongest views of the *Rationale* as a factory/industrial mentality which inhibited curriculum thought, used a prescriptive language, and was invested in a "managerial concern for smooth operations" (Pinar 1975, 1978, 1981). Other allied writers, such as Dwayne Huebner (in Pinar 1975, 221) and James Macdonald (in Pinar 1975, 223) suggested the *Rationale* use a controlling language and promoted a means-ends rationality, an almost economic model of control. Giroux (1981, 99-102) argued that the *Rationale*'s technocratic orientation replaced philosophical considerations with only technical problems to be solved. Macdonald and Aoki (in Pinar 1988, 406-410) believed such an instrumentalist mindset emphasized certainty, predictability, and an intense need to demonstrate man's power over the world. Many of these, as well as Kliebard (1970) considered the *Rationale* to be intellectually consonant with the same behavioristic and efficiency-driven functionalism as Franklin Bobbitt's (1918, 1924) production models for curriculum development. (In particular, the *Rationale*'s focus on specific objectives seemed to these writers blatantly behavioralist (Kliebard 1986, 220)). Indeed, even some of Tyler's own comments in the *Rationale* support these accusations, as he states: "Education is a process of changing the behavior patterns of people" (1949, 5-6) and "...it is clear that educational objectives, then, represent the kinds of changes in behavior that an educational institution seeks to bring about in its students. A study of the learners themselves would seek to identify needed changes in behavior patterns of students..." (6).

But while the technical rationality of the Tylerian *Rationale* is criticized as repressive social control, these very same authors will also expose it as a "value-neutral" curriculum development model that denies ideology. Macdonald (in Pinar 1975, 7) suggests the technical production model of the *Rationale* "begins with an acceptance of contemporary social values (thus eliminating the value question of what to teach)". Michael Apple (1979, 115) accuses the systems thinking of the *Rationale* of "conceptual emptiness," which is then applied "in a supposedly 'neutral manner.'" Kliebard (1970, 78) was probably the first to offer the "value-free" hypothesis, charging in his famous statement "the rationale offers little by way of a guide for curriculum-making because it excludes so little." He further charges that for Tyler, the philosophical basis utilized to make decisions means little:

> One may, therefore, express a philosophy that conceives of human beings as instruments of the state and the function of schools as programming the youth of the nation to react in a fixed manner when appropriate stimuli are presented. As long as we derive a set of objectives consistent with this philosophy...we have developed our objectives in line with the Tylerian *Rationale*. ...Tyler's central hypothesis that a statement of objectives derives in some manner from a philosophy, while highly probable, tells us very little indeed. (1970, 78)

As with the previous interpretation of the Tylerian *Rationale* as repressive social control, Tyler himself also offers direct evidence of a seemingly value-neutral intent. He writes:

> Again, it is clear that the nature of the philosophy of the school can affect the selection of educational objectives. ..."Should there be a different education for different classes of society?" If the answer is "yes," then the practice of setting up different objectives for children of lower social classes...may be justified. ...if the answer to this question is "no," ...then...the

> school [makes] an effort to select common objectives... (1949, 36).

It seems also that more contemporary critics of Tyler exhibit some of these ambivalent and discrepant tendencies. Cherryholmes (1988) asserts both that the *Rationale* is a product of the dominant social and political structures of its time (and thus is silent on issues such as "feminism, racism, poverty, and social injustice" because these were not important in the 1950s), and that the *Rationale* is "not helpful in making choices" because it includes "no discussion of decision-making, politics, ethics, social criticism, social responsibility, or critical reflection" (41). Does the Tylerian *Rationale* repress through the specificity of its objectives and its problem-solving mentality, or does it leave us with no basis for judgement, because of a lack of philosophical grounding? And how can it be said to do both at the same time? As a structuralist epistemology, is the *Rationale* an open or closed system? Does it function to restrict possibilities through a set of prescribed sets, or does it open endlessly onto multiple texts and contexts? The question of how the Tylerian *Rationale* "depends" on context (whether it attempts to "control" its social context with a problem-solving mentality, or attempts to "deny" them by being open to "any" philosophical persuasion) seems at the heart of these questions.

Context, Subject, Iterability

Peter Hlebowitsh (1993) undertakes as his apologist task a rehabilitation of the Tylerian *Rationale* from its critics primarily through its supposed attentitiveness to context, particularly the context of local educators making local decisions. Hlebowitsh admits the neutral quality of the *Rationale*, arguing Tyler left the choice of philosophy "open" for discussion and choice by local educators (1993, 31). He further argues this neutrality can actually prevent some of the so-called "repressive" elements of the *Rationale* because such neutrality forces local educators to make choices and be accountable for them (32). This strategy of leaving the *Rationale* as a system "open-ended" at first glance seems preferable to the harsher determinism of the *Rationale*'s critical analysts who wish to charge it with forms of political conservativisim and anti-democratic, anti-egalitarian tendencies. Leaving it to the local seems more positive, agentic, and less in the grip of large bureaucratic and managerial powers. In short, leaving it to the local may be a reaction against the loss of subject and its attendent agentic powers inherent in a structuralist system such as the Tylerian *Rationale*.

In sharp contrast to the structural assertions of the *Rationale* (that meaning depends on the relations between elements in the system rather than intending "actors"), reference back to the "real people" in school systems reintroduces a humanist subject acting within a defineable environment. Such a move has also occurred in the field of American literary criticism, where response to the antihumanist epistemology of French structuralism quickly moved to theories of an active reader constructing meaning (Berman 1988, 145-150). Stanley Fish (1980) premised textual meaning on the interaction of the reader who brings expectations to the text, and the beliefs shared or not shared with other members of society. The work of Hans Robert Jauss (1982) relies upon Gadamer's notion of a "horizon" consisting of the reader's prejudices and past experiences that determine the text's meaning in the reader's social context, and Wolfgang Iser's (1974) work suggests texts are structured to "imply" an idealized reader for them. All of these works reintroduce a strong humanist subject with intents and agentic qualities to escape the "subject-less" implications of structuralism. They offer psychological descriptions of epistemology, without fully confronting the consequences of structuralist thinking. Likewise, Hlebowitsh's apologetic may simply be "filling in" a subject in an otherwise subjectless, structuralist world.

From a poststructural perspective, however, this subject would not only not be reinstituted, but further questioned, along with its unassuming social "context". Tyler's discussion of social context (as well as Hlebowitsh's) seems merely to assert its existence – as if it were against commonsense knowledge to ask questions about the nature of this "context." But we cannot be so naïve as to believe context simply "there," outside of any epistemological discussion of how we can know this context. In contradiction to a structuralist, or reader-theory perspective, a poststructuralist would wonder how a subject could come to know the context objectively, if the context implies and depends on the beliefs and values of this same subject? And if the subject (here, a local educator) him or herself forms part of the context (if the subject is the object of analysis), how can that educator be situated with regard to this analysis?

Tyler (and Hlebowitsh) make a number of assumptions regarding how one can know (and depend on) the context to ground choices about the curriculum, but the most obvious of these is a strong belief in empiricism. In order to "depend on" a context, the local educator must be able to obtain the truth of that context definitively through an analysis or observation. In this way, the context is rendered an "outside" object of study by an agentic educator/observer. But how can this empirical study and knowledge be "set in the context" of a structuralist system like the Tylerian *Rationale*, with its focus on the interrelate elements of objectives, content selection, organization, and evaluation, which is said to work in all context because it is content-neutral (Hlebowitsh 1993, 28) and used to create "general modes of reaction" (Tyler 1949, 43)? As Derrida suggests, "structuralism justly claims to be the critique of empiricism," but then observes how (in his study of Claude Levi-Strauss' anthropology) structuralist works claim to be able to discover objective facts about their objects of study through scientific method (Derrida 1978, 284 check page). By asserting that the Tylerian *Rationale* works regardless of context (in all curriculum development situations), the *Rationale* as structuralist denies empirical contexts; by then reasserting we can observe and know the local context, the *Rationale* reintroduces and relies upon empiricism to ground its claims.

This simultaneous denial and reactivation of "context" still leaves us with two perplexing questions:

1. Tyler assumes the *Rationale* can be placed in any context and still have and produce meaning. How is this possible?
2. It is possible to determine with a strong measure of certainty what the "context" is? Can it serve as a foundation for judgement?

Jacques Derrida's discussions of context in *Limited Inc.* (1988) and "Signature, Event, Context" (1982, 307-330) can serve to explain how context articulates in and with the Tylerian *Rationale*.

While criticized as a means of administrative control from above, the Tylerian *Rationale*'s mobility across contexts can also be explained due to the general iterability of language. For Derrida, every text must contain this general iterability or communication would be so tightly bound to context as to be nonunderstandable to anyone but the speaker who created it (Derrida, 1982, 316-7). Derrida shows how writing remains an act of communication even if the receiver is absent; writing does not "fail" if the receiver is not present or deceased, but remains a written communication (Derrida 1982, 311-3). This is, for example, what allows text written centuries ago to still be considered acts of writing, able to be read even today. In this sense, Tyler is correct in suggesting the *Rationale* can have meaning in multiple contexts, and it always will, for it can be sutured onto new contexts, read by new readers. Every sign (and the *Rationale* as a collection of signs) can be cited, broken from its original context but called for in a new situation, generating an infinite number of new contexts (Derrida 1982, 318-21).

This suggests that the Tylerian *Rationale*, as a text, contains a general iterability, an ability to be recognized regardless of context, an ability all texts possess. This general iterability, the force of which allows signs to break with context and be cited (sited) differently however, means that the demand for an exhuastively determined context, an empirical context that we can firmly "know" and use as a philosophical foundation, does not exist. Every citation of the *Rationale* then, engenders a context where it is (potentially) readable but a context cannot guarantee that a citation will be perfectly readable or comprehensible. Derrida encourages us to accept that while there are "effects" of context (1982, 327), "there are only contexts without any center of absolute anchoring" (320). There is no context we can "depend on," no "grounding" of a local situation that can firmly establish meaning for the *Rationale* in one context or another. Tyler perhaps more rightly names such effects of context a "philosophical screen," (effects but not a sure grounding); Hlebowitsh is certainly inaccurate in suggesting context serve as a philosophical "foundation" (Hlebowitsh 1993, 32). The very nature of writing demands that it "live on" beyond its very limited generative context, that it be available for citation, inscription and thus in turn generate new context for reading (Derrida, 1979). "Local context," therefore, cannot save or justify the structuralist tendencies of the Tylerian *Rationale*.

Conditions of Possibility: For a Different Reading...

How then can we discuss the "effects" of social context in the Tylerian *Rationale* if context cannot be used as a foundation? Again, the significance of epistemology, of how we can and what we can know about social context plays a crucial role in discussing race in the *Rationale*. While Cherryholmes gives perhaps some of the best insights of all past criticism of the *Rationale*, his attention to epistemological questions at times lapses from what might be more fruitful and more poststructural views into how to read social context. *While Cherryholmes rightly critiques the structuralist tendencies of the Rationale, he himself can be accused of reducing poststructural readings to structuralist precepts in a kind of "Tylerization of deconstruction."* While Cherryholmes' work appeared quite early in the educational studies field for a poststructural analysis, his lack of attention to the workings of singularity and difference prove to be less useful, and even misleading, for a poststructural study of social context. Cherryholmes makes of deconstruction (or, more precisely, of Derrida) an easy "method," reducing it to a few sturdy steps and techniques for a critic to "apply." Indeed, he comments, "sets of methodological rules and guidelines are available...yes, even [for] deconstructive readings of research findings." (1988, 182). It is this focus on procedures for deconstruction without simultaneous attention to the content/context matter studied (indeed, irregardless of it) that unfortunately leads Cherryholmes to miss the importance of singularity (of what Derrida calls the idiomatic, the particular) of the context that informs the epistemology and the methodology behind the reading. Before addressing this issue of singularity, however, it is still important to review Cherryholmes' reading strategies in its search to study the social.

While Cherryholmes importantly identifies the structuralist assertion of fundamental binary oppositions which exist to structure meaning (and the theoretical assumption of fundamental binarism in thought itself), his claims about what is to be done with these binary oppositions proves problematic. For Cherryholmes, the binary oppositions that create meaning (in the *Rationale*, for example: purposeful/purposeless, organization/disorganization, evaluation/nonevaluation – the first of each pair a priviledged or valued term, the second rated "inferior", 1988, p. 22, 25) are fictions which do not actually exist but are idealizations and totalizations not in opposition but dependent upon one another (1988, 39). (With regard to race, for example, the binary pair white-black is less opposition than proposition in the form a—not a; white is white because it is "not black" and vice versa.) While this explanation is admirable, it remains to be said that deconstruction is not a process of merely flipping or reversing the hierarchy ("priviledging" the inferior term) because the difference between the two elements is undecideable. For example, many interpreters of Derrida have stated that Derrida claims philosophy is literature, elevating the inferior term (literature) to discredit the arrogance of philosophy as the founding discipline; the relation between these two, however, is what philosophy and literature are in their respective difference, what difference is created as literature and philosophy become what they are in their respective difference (Gasche in Haverkamp 1995, 116). Cherryholmes asserts that the Tylerian *Rationale* just simply "is" a "historical" product, reversing and priviledging diachrony over the *Rationale*'s "ahistorical" or synchronous structuralism (1988, 40-1). The "difference" between the *Rationale*'s ahistory or history (its acontextuality or contextuality) is not a simple or totalized difference, but rather how that difference arrives, how it becomes difference. (More will be said about this relation between the "arrival" of difference, and singularity, in the next section.)

By simply inverting the oppositions (the Tylerian *Rationale* "should" be or "is" contextual, "is" social and therefore reflects its racist values of the 1950s), the idealizations and totalizations that binary oppositions are become real and take on meaning in a manner antithetical to a poststructural perspective. Instead, what is crucial in handling the oppositions that structuralism assembles is to reinscribe or displace the "inferior" term of the dyad such that it will never have been given in the conceptual opposition in the first instance (Gasche 1994, 39).[3] In an important example for our purposes, Cherryholmes suggests that "deconstructive critics" would argue against emancipatory schooling because emancipation may require coercion (to retract benefits from the priviledged), which is contradictory to the very efforts of, and definition of emancipation in the first place (1988, 164-5). He suggests, "the emancipation/oppression distinction thereby deconstructs" (165). This is little more than inverting the inferior term of the opposition, with no consideration of the inscription (almost the contextualization) of the terms "emancipation" and "oppression". Without this reinscription, deconstruction (and Derrida's work) loses its force and becomes little more than a structuralist focus on form, on the reversibility of a text. Cherryholmes similarly sets up an opposition of deconstruction and construction, even calling the interplay between the two a "dialectic" (1988, 142-3) when clearly this is not the case. From Cherryholmes' perspective, binary oppositions seem to almost "spontaneously deconstruct"; indeed, he uses phrases like "eventual deconstruction," (39, 61) and "deconstructs in a relatively passive way" (83). Oppositions with heavily-invested social, political and economic commitments do not, however, voluntarily or easily deconstruct or they would not receive such semantic priviledging in the first place; rather, reinscription must take place or deconstruction would simply be an assertion of the reversibility of text.

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[3] This notion runs parallel to Derrida's claim that difference means both to differ but also to defer, implying a change in our notions of both space and time.

This emphasis on the seeming reversibility of text leads dangerously close to asserting texts are completely self-reflexive. On multiple occasions, Cherryholmes claims that deconstructive criticism "shows how the logic of a text embarrasses and contradicts itself" (38, my emphasis); "Derrida shows that texts are often not what they claim to be" (38); "texts make claims unsupported by the logic of their arguments" (39); texts "contradict themselves" and "turn on themselves" (61). Comments such as these suggests texts are self-containing, that they provide a mirror or projection of themselves and their inner workings. To assert this is to claim the severe formalism that texts are immanently in control of their identities and functionings. To suggest a text can show how it can undermine itself is nothing short of a sophisticated structuralism, with its attendent lack of force (Gasche 1994, 25-7). Texts can certainly claim to be self-reflexive, invite such readings, but cannot function mirror-like: they are not able to situate the production, investigation, and discovery of the truth itself.[4] Because texts open endlessly to other texts, they cannot effectively frame themselves off from the general iterability needed to create them in the first instance (Derrida, Glas, 1986). As Derrida comments in *Dissemination*, "A writing that refers back only to itself carries us at the same time, indefinitely and systematically, to some other writing" (1981, 202). This interplay of forces, inside and outside the text that create and sustain it, can never be resolved without extracting one of the forces and priviledging it to the detriment of other forces. While texts can claim to be reflexive, they can never be absolutely self-reflexive and therefore do not of themselves "deconstruct," "reverse," or "contradict". Deconstruction instead calls for a turn, a glancing look, an oblique angle of reinscription that does not allow for mere reversibility of oppositions. This is a significant point, for a belief in the text's self-reflexivity can lead to calls for pluralisms, free "play" of meaning, and a strong subject to "curb" these tendencies.

Cherryholmes' assertions that binarisms can be resolved by reversal, because the texts are self-reflexive and seem to decontruct "spontaneously," lead him toward a program of "critical pragmatism" and in particular cause him to advocate for a plurality or multiplicity of meanings in curricular development and educational research. Cherryholmes is well aware that because structuralism priviledges form over force, meaning is constructed in the Tylerian *Rationale* between and only between its elements, but t knowledge leades him to abandon the patience he shows earlier in the text (of working through epistemological criticisms of structuralism) to largely renounce the pursuit of epistemology altogether in his acceptance of the Rortian edict to find "edifying philosophy" – "finding newer, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking" (Cherryholmes, 1988, 97). Cherryholmes agrees with Rorty, suggesting "...keeping a conversation going [is] a sufficient aim of philosphy...preventing man [sic] from deluding himself with the notion that he knows himself, or anything else..." (Rorty 1980, 378-9).

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[4] In "The Purveyor of Truth," Yale French Studies no. 52, 1975, Derrida accuses psychoanalytic texts of such truth-staging by trying to assert their own self-reflexion.

This is indeed a far cry from the work of Derrida, who as Norris comments, does not dismiss the tradition of philosophy (Norris 1987, 159-60) and does not give up attempting to explain, justify or wonder about the nature of force that structuralism so 'forcefully' expels. Derrida's efforts are not simply an attempt to construct "a more interesting conversation," but rather to demand and articulate his (and the on-going) western philosophical tradition, albeit within and against this tradition. A Derridean analysis of the Tylerian *Rationale* would not reject the principle of, for example, reason for the sake of practicality or in Cherryholmes' "critical pragmatism." A Derridean analysis might even focus on how Tyler and his apologists themselves skirt the principle of reason in asserting the absence of any definitive answers or philosophical bases for developing curriculum, the non-necessity of following the four steps in order, the inextricably wide range of sources to draw content from, the lack of apriori grounds for decision-making, the admonishments to be practical. As a document imbued in western philosophical thought, the Tylerian *Rationale* is far more dependent upon historical notions of reason and western rationality than it may first indicate. Derrida himself comments upon this in his lecture "The Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of its Pupils" (1983, 3-20). Derrida claims that for Kant, the principle of reason has an intimate relation with the modern university (and, I would suspect, modernist schooling) in the sense that philosophy was granted special status due to its assumed distance from "practical arts" of law, government, and business. What role does reason (or the "practical") play in schools, and in curriculum development? Cherryholmes' abandonment of the principle of reason renders theory incapable of commenting on or working through such effects of reason. Instead, a Derridean approach would demand a reason for reasonableness itself, treating reason as a specific historical formation in asking "is the reason for reason rational?"[5] and "in what forms and effects does reason become reasonable (and therefore an organizing principle) for the Tylerian *Rationale*"?.

But instead of these questions, Cherryholmes advocates pluralism and multiplicity of meaning in order to guarantee justice as the absence of priviledged meanings. Cherryholmes suggests "stories submit to different tellings" (155); "explor[e] multiple voices of textual possibilities" (156-7); "tell more than one story" (157) and "live with these irreconcilable interpretations of interpretations simultaneously" (167). This position of pluralism extends as well to relativism in his discussion of human dignity:

> The meaning of human dignity will be continually negotiated, renegotiated, applied and changed...These writers approach human dignity differently...One person's "rigid, ideological egalitarianism" is another's "fair and just society"... Any single interpretation of human dignity should not be treated as a definitive, transcendental, critical standard. (174-6)

I do not raise this issue of relativism in order to accuse Cherryholmes of being a nihilist, or as amoral, as many detractors of both structuralism and poststructuralism do. Indeed, following these statements Cherryholmes advances the important comment that such definitions of human dignity are bound up with "Enlightenment hopes," and "liberal democratic values," closer to the concerns Derrida would pursue in questioning the historical phenomenon of reason. However, Cherryholmes' pluralism and relativism seem strangely similar to the Tylerian *Rationale* he critiques in their lack of attention to the animating force to make decisions amid contradictory and differing texts. Here, instead of reversing the binary opposition structuralism imposes, Cherryholmes instead renders them all equal elements, with differing but equal claims as "stories to tell." We are here a far cry from concern for difference, and for the often unequal priviledges and power associated with difference.

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[5] This is the actual question of Derrida's lecture on the university in "The Principle of Reason, p. 9.

As if to reinstate force to his project of critical pragmatism, Cherryholmes makes a quick manoeuvre from his section on pluralism and multiplicity to reinstate a strong subject. "Deconstructive criticism, and the subsequent construction of texts and discourse-practices," says Cherryholmes, "place people in the thick, if not center of things" (1988, 166). In response to the multiplicity of meaning, Cherryholmes includes a quote from Sartre, with its existentialist zeal: "In reality, things will be as much as man [sic] has decided they are" (Sartre, quoted in Cherryholmes 1988, 176). Given that multiple claims exert multiple viewpoints, at the end of the book Cherryholmes recommends "Our decisions are made in terms of what *we* find persuasive" (177) and "...we live and together build communities using our best visions of what is beautiful, good, and true" (186). This strong subject is reinstated even to the extent that Cherryholmes misinterprets Derrida's notion of freeplay as "free" play or playfulness: "One way to approach deconstruction is to adopt an attitude of playfulness" (60). Through the notion of "play," Derrida refers to the generative interaction among signs that create an unlimited chain of signification which disrupts all claims to presence, to the arresting of difference (Berman 1988, 207); Cherryholmes transforms this notion into a strong subject/self who has the power to "choose freely" between interpretations and meanings. Cherryholmes even extends this "power of choice" in relation to the activity of deconstruction, even after he has argued for the reversibility and self-reflexivity of texts: "How can the meaning of a word be fixed if it points...without end. Where do we begin? When do we end? ...Settling upon a foundation is situational and pragmatic...readers choose to stop deconstructing the text at certain moments" (38-9, my emphasis). A Derridean attention to difference, to singularity is not the politics of individualism, a choosing or deciding subject or existentialist self (Haverkamp, 1995, 11). Very much to the contrary, in poststructuralism, the subject is the object of analysis, not the director.

Singularity, Force, Context

In this excursion through Cherryholmes' attempted poststructural account of the Tylerian *Rationale*, I have only hinted at a notion of singularity, of Derrida's attempt to explain not just simple difference, but how difference arrives, how it is implicated with the missing notion of force in structuralism, and how singularity can be read alongside other notions of context and social context in order to expand Scheurich and Young's definition of epistemological racism beyond merely an essentialist description of race. It is now to this discussion of singularity that I turn.

Earlier in this paper, I raised two concerns of Scheurich and Young's definition of epistemological racism: the question of how we could know epistemological racism given that researchers (white and non-white) all inhabit a world imbued in white racism, and the question of how epistemological racism would be construed without recourse to essentialist definitions of race on the basis of shared reality, biology, or stereotypes that can actually erase differences in identity between, say

Chicanos and Chicanas, gay or straight African Americans, children of mixed parentage, etc. A third question should not be added to these: how can the specific histories of racial groups intersect with research epistemologies such that this historical specificity makes a difference? James Ladwig and Jennifer Gore in the concluding chapter of Gitlin's (1994) edited volume *Power and Method*, for example, pose such epistemological concerns even to a book utilizing "critical" research methods which explicitly gives discursive space to writers from differing racial, gender, class and sexual orientations. Why, Ladwig and Gore ask, are the specific histories of these differing social groups highlighted, while methodologically they remain the same? Why this "paradox of (non)difference—where did this difference go?" (in Gitlin 1994, 232). Cynthia Tyson, in her response to Scheurich and Young's "Coloring Epistemologies" similarly asks: "if a race-based epistemology can be African American or feminist or First Nation, what is it that makes this epistemology different when developing a formalized research methodology?" (Tyson, 1998, 22). What then is different about studying with or writing from the perspective of this social group, as opposed to other social groups? How does history make a difference?

One possible answer to these questions is not to look for essential or unchanging "characteristics" of a racial group, nor, as Cherryholmes suggests, view racial groups as the same in the sense of being equal n a pluralistic manner, but to focus on the singularity of cultural or racial difference. Derrida has several names for singularity: the "idiosyncratic," the "solitude," the "only," the "irreducible," "what is not returned," and "what is not repeated." What makes the singular distinct from mere racial or cultural difference is its attention to the animating force of its uniqueness – it describes not only "difference," but how difference arrives, how it is possible and how it comes to break established codes and secure its seemingly impossible status (Gasche 1994, 21). Simple or absolute difference is based only on a logic of identity, and as such would function as static, perhaps even structuralist in nature. Singularity does not involve extracting an essence of race or culture, a core of uniqueness that never changes. Singularity instead depends on its openness, the iterability that opens it onto new contexts. Understanding singularity seems almost akin to what Ladson-Billings terms capturing "lightning in a bottle" (Ladson-Billings 1990).

Perhaps the easiest means by which to understand singularity is to look at Derrida's example of the date (Derrida, 1992). A date is idiosyncratic, singular, a "once" that aspires to be absolutely different (than any other date), aspires to be fully present. Yet as a sign of written communication, it cannot be uniquely and only singular or it would not be able to be translated or read by everyone in more than just its context of origin. As Derrida suggests, "a text lives on…only if it is at once translateable and untranslateable" (Derrida 1978, 102-3). On the one hand, the date is singular, it takes place just once and is referred to as a "historical" event, but this singularization is never absolute, not a "fact" because as an event it must be transcribed, repeated, read and understood by others. While seemingly an immediacy, the date is also a point of departure for to become readable, it has to participate and belong to a chain of signification: we all participate in the "language" of the date, of dating events, in speaking, reading and writing dates, in generalizing the singular date so as to communicate it. But while the text must be able to be repeated as meaningful, its singularity is socially important in that it can never be repeated exactly because it has no "essence" that would be "unaffected" by context (Derrida 1992, 382). In terms of the date, it can of course never be repeated exactly (there can never be two May 23rd, 2000's), but in terms of racial singularities, the effects of context (at least in the case of the Tylerian *Rationale*) can be more easily veiled or erased by the writer.

In order to develop steps toward epistemologies of race that take into account the importance of singularity, epistemologies that do make a difference without essentializing it, Derrida's essay "The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration" (1987) can prove useful. Here again, Derrida asserts that the singular is not exclusively unique, not an absolute difference or it would be untranslateable. The task is not to find some absolute difference, some essence beyond the context we find ourselves in. Epistemologies of race cannot be absolutely different, or they would be untranslatable, impossible to comprehend. For Derrida, the singular arises in and only in the context of the universal. In "For Nelson Mandela," Derrida claims the singularity of Mandela is that he is a man of the law -- he is in relation to the laws of parliamentary democracy and the freedom of the individual. Mandela does not seek to erase or deny this context.

But the singular is that which is exemplary within this law, which (in a certain sense) subverts the law but simultaneously conforms to (and informs) it. Mandela does not reject western laws in an absolute sense, searching for a whole new system of law, but rather Derrida, quoting Mandela, says Mandela admires the law:

> [This is Mandela]...From my reading of Marxist literature and from conversations with Marxists, I have gained the impression that communists regard the parliamentary system of the West as undemocratic and reactionary. But, on the contrary, *I am an admirer* of such a system. The *Magna Charta*, the Petition of Rights, and the Bill of Rights are documents which are held in veneration by democrats throughout the world. *I have great respect* for British political institutions, and for the country's system of justice. I regard the British Parliament as the most democratic institution in the world, and the independence and impartiality of its judiciary never fail to arouse my admiration. [Nelson Mandela, *The Struggle is My Life* (London: International Defense and Aid for Southern Africa, 1978), p. 170.]

This is important. Mandela's singular cause for justice makes it clear that the struggle against apartheid is NOT an internal war the West carries on with itself, but rather it is forced by Mandela and those who struggle against it. Because Mandela admires the law, knows it well, respects its logic, he can REFLECT it back to the West. Derrida maintains Mandela is a keeper of the law, and much more so than the white South Africans who claim to have founded such law.

This does not mean, however, that Mandela is a simple inheritor of this law. (Neither are epistemologies of race "simple" inheritors of an academic and education research tradition, for they stand outside of it, often excluded from its benefits and its professional power.) Mandela's context, the context of South Africa, guarantees him as an inheritor of the law, if only because he lives there and is subject to it. Inheritors are generally those who conserve and reproduce, but inheritors are also those who respect the logic of its legacy enough to turn it on occasion against those who claim to be its guardians; and inheritors are also those who reveal what has yet to be seen in the inheritance by reflecting this logic, what Derrida says is an act of reflection (Derrida 1987, 17). Mandela is not a simple inheritor of this law for this second reason: of African descent, he has the ability to fore-see the future of parliamentary democracy because he brings the necessary supplement (Footnote 4) of his experiences in early African societies in this country. Mandela tells also of listening to elders speak of peaceful existence of the tribe *before the arrival of the white man*, of this classless society of freedom and equality as seeds of a revolutionary democracy Mandela can therefore characterize the West as an example of democracy, but perhaps not the most exemplary one (Derrida 1987, 25). Since the structure of the law Mandela so admires has a tendency toward universality -- it tries to extend beyond historical, cultural, geographical, linguistic limits of its origin -- Mandela can reflect this tendency back to itself, to show how white South Africans *claim* democracy, but in practice particularize these principles for their own benefit. Black freedom is therefore not just a remote possibility, *it will have already taken place in the past* (future anterior), where its seeds have already been cast (Derrida, 23). The force of the future anterior is invoked by Mandela's singularity, reflecting how the figures of Western and African society "prefigure, make visible ahead of time what still remains invisible in its historical phenomenon" (Derrida, 25).

Second, singularity, paradoxically, must be presented to the majority or it cannot exist. Mandela presents himself as a subject before the law, as one who is responsible (given *to* it, but also *able to respond* to the law). Such presentation is *not in the service of the law*, but is a justification for the singular which compels justice. Mandela is not an essence only for himself, or exclusively for his people. This is why he can appeal continually to his conscience, to the law of his conscience and the gap between this and the enforced laws of South Africa: the two are not separate, but together in a single historical context -- single context, double focus. White South Africa, by contrast, fails to present itself on numerous occasions: it does not respond to Mandela, does not even acknowledge his letters. Mandela thus reflects the law of civility, whereas white power scorns the law, returning to uncivil, almost pre-social behavior.

Finally, because singularity is forever bound together with universality, Mandela is never completely outside or Other, but exists on the limit of the law to transform it (indeed, he can do no other). Mandela was physically forced to remain outside of cities and towns by court order, and chose to (in a certain sense) defy this law in order to continue to practice law, bringing representation to his people, and justice to his profession. A man of law by vocation, Mandela is singular in his practice of it -- forced outside, he breaks the particularization (unethical application of the law) by working to repair the law, to supplement it, all the while reflecting this specific and singular legal task to white South Africa. Singularity is thus forced upon him, but also creates the forceful singularity of his inventiveness, the uniqueness of his reponse which is distinctly *different* from legal applications the universal law would generally dictate. This is not an essence of Nelson Mandela, but a singularity caused by his context, put into play by his context, which provokes singularly unique responses. Mandela bears witness in this singularity, in his singularity, to respect for the law. As Derrida puts it, it is "out of respect that he did not show respect: no more respect. Respect for the sake of respect" (1978, 39). Can we, in thinking about epistemologies of race, follow in Mandela's reflection?

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Educational Background

Ph.D. in Curriculum and Instruction, University of Alberta
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  Thesis title: *Figuring Inventions: Education in the Wake of the Postmodern*
Visiting student, University of Wisconsin-Madison (Sept 1993-May 1994)
  Department of Curriculum and Instruction
A.M. in Education, Stanford University (June 1992)
  Department of Curriculum and Teacher Education
  Major: Design and Evaluation of Educational Programs
B.Ed. with distinction, University of Alberta (Dec 1988)
  Department of Secondary Education

Career Objective

An academic career allowing me opportunities to publish educational research and curriculum theory, work in pre-service teacher education programs, and analyze public education policy. Alternately, a public service career in the design, analysis, and evaluation of educational curricula and policy.

Personal Summary

I have recently defended my dissertation at the University of Alberta, and am finishing a contract position in schools as guidance counsellor and teacher at Camrose Composite High School that I have held for the last two years. My interests are in qualitative research methodology, poststructural curriculum theory, and school and policy environments. My thesis entitled *Figuring Inventions: Education in the Wake of the Postmodern*, explores poststructural curriculum theorizing in qualitative research, teacher education and research, critical and neo-Marxist educational literatures, and race and education.

I completed my masters' degree at Stanford University in the Department of Curriculum and Teacher Education. Concurrent with this degree I held the position of English supervisor in the Stanford Teacher Education Program, supervising student and intern teachers throughout the Bay area. I have published two regular columns in Canada; one in Canada's national social studies journal, and another in a provincial teachers' magazine.

My formal classroom teaching duties have included successful experiences in Grade 12 Social Studies, English and computer technology education at Augustana University College, and Camrose Composite High school. I have been self-employed as both a consultant and as a successful freelance curriculum developer, publishing educational materials such as textbooks and teachers' guides in elementary, junior high, and high school social studies in Alberta and Ontario. My personal qualities include creative ability, teaching and writing skill, a sense of humor, and an ability to collaborate well with both university and school-based personnel that has proven especially valuable.

Conference and Professional Presentations

Mackwood, Gae (2000). "(An)Other reading: Conceptions of Other and Otherness in curriculum theorizing." American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans.

Mackwood, Gae (2000). "Questioning paradigm proliferation: "Community" as validity criterion in curriculum studies." American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans.

Mackwood, Gae (1999). "Race, singularity, context: Reading epistemology in Tyler's *Rationale*." American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Montreal.

Mackwood, Gae (1998). "The signs of history: Narrative and repetition, or, "The importance of 'keeping posted'." American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, San Diego, April.

Mackwood, Gae (1998). "Heirs to the groan: Analyzing repetition, recollection, and deferred action in the balkanization of educational research." American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, San Diego, April.

Mackwood, Gae (1998). "Epistemological racism in educational research methodologies: a case study." American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, San Diego, April.

Mackwood, Gae (1997). "The aesthetic turn: education through romanticism(s) and the postmodern." American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, March.

Mackwood, Gae (1997). "Re-thinking the theory-practice dilemma: after 'practice,' w(h)ither 'theory'?" American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, March.

Mackwood, Gae (1996). "Narrative as testimony in post-colonial curriculum studies: a theory of readability." Curriculum as Narrative/Narrative as Curriculum Conference, Centre for the Study of Curriculum and Instruction, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, May.

Mackwood, Gae (1996). "Desire and encryption: a theory of readability." American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, New York, April.

Mackwood, Gae (1996). "What's the difference? A genealogy of 'difference.'" American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, New York, April.

Mackwood, Gae (1995). "Crossing the textual and corporeal: student teachers and embodiment." Canadian Association for Curriculum Studies, Montreal, June.

Mackwood, Gae (1995). "Materiality as excess: ethics in the practice of theorizing practice." American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, April.

Invited respondent for international symposium, "On educational pleasure." Semiotics SIG (Special Interest Group), American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, April 1995.

Mackwood, Gae (1994). "Narrative and paranoia: the discursive production of subjectivity." Canadian Association for Curriculum Studies, Calgary, June.

Mackwood, Gae (1993). "Ethical criticism as teacher evaluation." American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Atlanta, April.

Mackwood, Gae (1993). "Reading back the Secondary Teacher Education Program." Presentation to the Centre for Research for Teacher Education and Development, and the Faculty of Education, University of Alberta, April.

Mackwood, Gae (1993). "What counts as knowledge: questions about teacher knowledge and experience." Westcast 93, Vancouver, March.

Session chair for 4 presenters of on-going teacher research projects from the University of Alberta (Canada), UC Berkeley/Michigan State University (U.S.A.), Innsbruck University (Austria), and the University of East Anglia (U.K.). International Conference on Teacher Research, Center for Educational Research at Stanford, April 15-17, 1992.

Publications

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Mackwood, Gae (1993). Christmas exam, 1990. *Journal of educational thought*, 27:1, 74-77.

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Mackwood, Gae (1992). (No) Easy answers: (complex) concerns and the James Bay project. *Canadian social studies: the history and social science teacher*, 26:2, Winter.

Mackwood, Gae (1991). Hockey gloves, chocolate bars, asbestos and why trees fall in the forest: teaching global economics. *Canadian social studies: the history and social science teacher*, 26:1, Fall.

(Chapters in Books)

Mackwood, Gae (1997). Desire and encryption: a theory of readability. In Sharon Todd (ed), *Learning desire: perspectives on pedagogy, culture, and the unsaid*. New York: Routledge.

(Professional teaching journals)

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Mackwood, Gae (1992). Conversation on the road. *The ATA magazine*, 72:3. Edmonton: Alberta Teachers' Association.

Mackwood, Gae (1992). A view from the ivory tower back to home. *The ATA magazine*, 72:2. Edmonton: Alberta Teachers' Association.

Mackwood, Gae (1991). Welcome to the beginning. *The ATA magazine*, 72:1. Edmonton: Alberta Teachers' Association.

Mackwood, Gae (1991). Shrinking to excellence. *The ATA magazine*, 71:3, 19-22. Edmonton: Alberta Teachers' Association.

Mackwood, Gae (1990). Daring to scratch the surface – computer literacy for teachers. *The ATA magazine*, 70:4, 31-33. Edmonton: Alberta Teachers' Association.

Mackwood, Gae (1990). Deciding what to teach. *The ATA magazine*, 70:2, 18-20. Edmonton: Alberta Teachers' Association.

(Curricular Publications (texts and books)

Saywell, John, John Ricker, Jim Parsons and Gae Mackwood (1991). *How are we governed in the 90s?* Concord, ON: Irwin Publishing. (High school – introductory university text used province-wide in Ontario schools).

Mackwood, Gae (1990). *Made in the U.S.A.* Edmonton: Reidmore Books. (Grade 9 social studies text for current Alberta social studies curriculum, granted basic status in 1990. This text is used province-wide in junior high schools.)

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(Curricular Projects)

Contributing developer for a junior high humanities unit, Teachers' Curriculum Institute (TCI), Palo Alto, California, 1992.

Contributing author to a high school religious studies curriculum project for Indonesian schools, Edmonton, Alberta, 1989-91.

Present Professional Memberships

Alberta Teachers' Association (ATA)
American Educational Research Association (AERA)
Canadian Society for Hermeneutics and Post Modern Thought/Societe Canadienne d'Hermeneutique et la Pensee Postmoderne
Foucault and Education Special Interest Group (AERA)
Phi Lambda Theta (1993--)
Semiotics in Education Special Interest Group (AERA)

Professional Experience

School counsellor and teacher, Camrose Composite High School, 1999-2000 (Alberta, Canada). Additional teaching duties included Computer Word Processing 1A, 2A, Enterprise and Innovations 2A, Social Studies 10.

School counsellor, Camrose Composite High School, 1998-1999 (Alberta, Canada). Duties included career, personal, and crisis counselling.

Contract teacher, Battle River Regional School Division, 1995-8 (Alberta, Canada). Classroom duties included all high school humanities courses (including English and social studies) and high school information processing (including keyboarding and computer literacy).

Supervisor of Student Teachers, Stanford Teacher Education Program (STEP), Stanford, CA, U.S.A., 1991-2. Duties included observing and evaluating student and intern teachers' progress during the year; coordinating school-university supervision; promoting collaboration between schools and Stanford University.

English education seminar leader, Stanford Teacher Education Program (STEP), June 1991-June 1992, Stanford, CA, U.S.A.

Instructor, Grade 12 Division, Augustana University College, Camrose, AB, Canada, 1989-1991. Duties included Grade 12 English and ESL, as well as academic counselling for Grade 12 students.

Instructor, Continuing Education Division (Adult education), Augustana University College, Camrose, AB, Canada, May 1989-1991. Duties included Grades 10, 11 and 12 Social Studies and English, Grade 10 Occupations course, and Grade 10 Psychology.

Other Professional Activities

2000	Proposal reviewer, Divisions B and K, Foucault and Education SIG, American Educational Research Association. Reviewer, *Alberta Journal of Educational Research*
1999	Proposal reviewer, Semiotics SIG, American Educational Research Association. Reviewer, *International Journal of Applied Semiotics*
1998	Reviewer, *American Educational Research Journal*
1998	Proposal reviewer, Divisions B and K, Semiotics SIG, Foucault and Education SIG, Critical Issues in Curriculum SIG, American Educational Research Association.
1996-7	Reviewer, *Research in the Teaching of English*
1995-1998	Proposal reviewer, Semiotics SIG, American Educational Research Association
1995-6, 1996-7	Appointed member, Equity and Respect Committee, Faculty of Education, University of Alberta. Collaborative preparation and implementation of equity policy for the Faculty.
1993	"Semiotics in/of the classroom." Presentation to the ED EL 697 doctoral seminar, University of Alberta, March 24.

Consultations

Strategic planner, Camrose Association for Community Living, Camrose, Alberta (1994-5). Contracted to provide human resource assessment and development of strategic business plan for community group providing support to developmentally delayed individuals.

Invited researcher, Teacher Identity Project, Department of Secondary Education, Faculty of Education, University of Alberta (1993). Research and evaluation of the teacher education program, utilizing narrative interviews with undergraduate students in the department.

Invited member, evaluation of Camrose Composite High School, Camrose, Alberta (1984). Appointed to serve on committee for a provincial assessment of curriculum and instruction at a public high school.

Other Research Experience

"Statistical Reasoning of Adolescents." Research assistant, Wisconsin Center for Educational Research (WCER) and Department of Educational Psychology, University of Wisconsin-Madison (1994). Data collection including pre-testing and classroom videotaping.

Action research project on my facilitation as a Stanford Teacher Education Supervisor (independent winter term project, 1992).

"Teachers' perceptions of 'experience' and 'wisdom'" (independent fall term project, 1992). Collaboration with another research and four teachers of differing years of teaching practice to investigate relationships between use of concepts "experience" and "wisdom" in relation to age and generation in teaching.

Research Methods Courses and Background

Research and evaluation paradigms in curriculum and instruction (Popkewitz) – coursework and conceptual paper, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994.

Structuralist and post-structuralist thought in France (Rand) – coursework and conceptual papers, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994.

Deconstruction contextualized (Gumbrecht) – coursework and conceptual papers, Stanford University, 1991.

Educational criticism and connoisseurship (Eisner) – coursework and class project, Stanford University, 1991.

Ethnographic methodologies (G. and L. Spindler) – coursework and class project, Stanford University, 1991.

Action research (Posch) – coursework and class project, Stanford University, 1992.

Narrative inquiry (Clandinin) – coursework and class project, University of Alberta, 1992.

Introduction to educational evaluation (D. C. Phillips) – coursework and class project, Stanford University, 1992.

Fellowships and Grants:

Doctoral fellowship, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC). First award: April, 1992 ($28 872 for two years).

(Renewal), Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC). Second award: April, 1994 ($28 872 for two years).

Walter H. Johns Graduate Fellowship (1992); second award (1993); third award (1994); fourth award (1995). Tuition award granted to major scholarship recipients of a Canadian federal research council.

Mary Louise Imrie Graduate Student Award (1993). Award granted to present research or paper at a major conference.

The Milton Ezra LaZerte Gold Medal – University of Alberta (1985). The Medal is awarded to the student showing the highest general proficiency in the final two years of the Bachelor of Education program. Donated by the Alberta Teachers' Association in honor of the former Dean of the Faculty.

Louise McKinney Post-Secondary Studies Scholarship (1985). Awarded on the basis of outstanding academic attainment (top 1.5-2% of faculty standing) to students at post-secondary institutions (nomination by awards committees).

Honors:

Schoolnet national award, "program" category in school website development (April, 1999).

Appointed Graduate Student Association Representative for doctoral students in the Faculty of Education, University of Alberta (1992-3).

Elected Committee Area Representative (CAR) for masters' students in Curriculum and Teacher Education, Stanford University (1991-2).

Publications and Presentations:

Please note that any publications or conference papers listed are available upon request.

Coursework completed (Doctoral level)

University of Wisconsin-Madison (Sept 93-May 94)
CURRIC 714 Research & Evaluation Paradigms in Curriculum and Instruction (Popkewitz)
CURRIC 716 Reform and Change in Curriculum and Instruction (Popkewitz)
CURRIC 800 Postmodernism, Media, Education (Ellsworth)
CURRIC 999 Culturally Relevant Pedagogy (Ladson-Billings)
FRENCH 450 Literature in Translation: Structuralist and Post-structuralist Thought in France (Rand)

University of Alberta (Sept 92-May 93)
ED 697 Symposium in Elementary Education (Juliebo/Blakely)
ED 597 Symposium in Elementary Education (Clandinin)
ED 507 Postmodernism and Curriculum: Culture, Gender, Difference (Jagodzinski)
ED 502 Independent Study: Teacher Identity (Carson)
ED 691 Independent Study: Teacher Evaluation (Carson, Clandinin, Jagodzinski)
PHIL 250 Introduction to Ethics
PHIL 260 Professional Ethics

Coursework completed (Masters level – Granted A.M., June 1992)

ED 280 Ethnography of Schooling (G. and L. Spindler)
ED 180 Directed Reading: Narrative Inquiry (Eisner)
ED 397X Controversies in Classroom Research (J. M. Atkin)
ED 214S Foundations of Action Research (P. Posch)
ED 261S Process of Action Research (P. Posch)
ED 278 Issues in Evaluation (D. C. Phillips)
ED 190 Directed Research: Social Studies Curriculum Development (G. Grant)
ED 303 Qualitative Inquiry in Education (Eisner)
UGS 104 Feminist Epistemology (P. Sutton)
GERM 345 Deconstruction Contextualized (H. Gumbrecht)
ENG 165C Introduction to Literary Theory (R. Saldivar)
WST 154 Feminist Political Theory (S. Okin)
POLSCI 267 Explanation, Justification, Relativism (M. Tunick)
PHIL 133 Hermeneutics and Critical Theory (E. Forster)
COMPLIT 265 Habermas (R. Berman)